Estes v. State Highway Com'n

• Decision Date: 20 June 1930
• Citation: 29 S.W.2d 583,235 Ky. 86
• Parties: ESTES v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

29 S.W.2d 583

235 Ky. 86

ESTES v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

June 20, 1930

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County.

Action by R. S. Estes against the State Highway Commission of Kentucky and others. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Charles H. Morris, of Frankfort, for appellant.

J. W Cammack, Atty. Gen., Clifford E. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John S. Carroll, of Frankfort, for appellees.

LOGAN J.

The General Assembly at its regular session in 1928 enacted chapter 172 of the published acts of that year known as the Murphy Toll Bridge Act, and that act now comprises sections 4356s1 to 4356s15, Ky. St. The purpose of that act was to confer power upon the state highway commission to enter upon a plan of constructing bridges connecting and making more convenient to the traveling pulic the primary roads of the state, and connecting the primary roads of this state with main highways in other states. A reading of that chapter shows that the main idea running all through it is that the state highway commission may sell bonds to obtain the necessary funds to construct such bridges and, as security for the payment of the bonds so issued, may pledge the tolls received from such bridges as security. Consonant with that main idea, the state highway commission as an administrative body was given authority to do all such things as might be found necessary within the limits of the act, and other laws on the subject, to carry into effect the purposes so expressed. The state highway commission was given wide discretion in the administration of the act, but its main purpose was clearly expressed and may not be materially departed from. Some question arose as to whether the physical bridge property might be pledged for the security of the bonds to be issued; whether the bonds were taxable under the laws of Kentucky; whether the state might pay a part of the cost of a bridge, or bridges, out of the general fund set apart for the construction and maintenance of highways; and in addition, many questions of procedure arose, and that chapter of the acts of 1928 was before the court in the cases of State Highway Commission et al. v. Veiling et al., 230 Ky. 381, 19 S.W.2d 967, and Bloxton v State Highway Commission, 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d 392, and these opinions settled the questions therein discussed.

The state highway commission made a contract for the sale of more than $10,000,000 in bonds on May 22, 1929, but that contract was held to be invalid by this court in the Veiling Case because of errors in procedure. Thereafter the state highway commission again advertised for bids, but received no satisfactory bid. Another advertising for bids resulted in the reception of bids which were satisfactory, consequently on January 8, 1930, the state highway commission made an order awarding a contract for the bonds for seventeen bridges to C. W. McNear & Company, Stranahan Harris & Oatis, Inc., and Stiffel Nicholaus & Company, Inc.

The form of advertisement, prospectus, and form for bids were made a part of the petition in this action, and they are before the court. They appear to have been drawn in conformity with the opinion of this court in the Veiling Case, and the procedure leading up to the contract of January 8, 1930, was in substantial accord with the opinion of this court in that case.

The General Assembly, at its regular session in 1930, enacted House Bill No. 641, chapter 157 which authorized the state highway commission to make a new contract with the purchasers of the bonds under the contract of January 8, 1930, but such substituted contract, of course, could not be made without the consent of the purchasers, and then could be made only in accordance with the provisions found in House Bill No. 641. The highway commission and the purchasers of the bonds agreed on a substituted contract on the 12th day of June, 1930, which covered the sale of the bonds for bridges included in the contract of January 8, 1930, except three bridges known as Clay's Ferry, Rio, and Munfordville bridges. These bridges appear to have been excluded from the contract because they were in a different class from the other fourteen bridges covered by the first contract. The contract of June 12, 1930, provides for the sale of bonds with the proceeds of which additional bridges not covered by the contract of January 8, 1930, should be constructed. All of the bonds were sold for a better price under the contract of June 12th than under the contract of January 8th, but the better price was obtained because the contract was so modified under the authority of the act of 1930 as to make the entire plan, or scheme, for the building of toll bridges more feasible.

The contract of June 12, 1930, bears evidences of careful preparation and a thorough understanding of the Murphy Toll Bridge Act of 1928, House Bill No. 641 of 1930, and the opinion of this court in the Veiling Case, as well as the case of Bloxton v. State Highway Commission et al., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d 392.

After the contract of June 12, 1930, had been executed the appellant, a citizen and taxpayer of Franklin county, Ky. eligible to maintain such a suit, instituted an action in the Franklin circuit court attacking the validity of the contract because of procedural defects and constitutional defects in the acts themselves.

We shall summarize, with brevity, the points relied on by appellant for a reversal of the judgment as these points are found in the record, and as the point is stated we shall determine whether it is meritorious.

The first point is that House Bill No. 641 is unconstitutional in that it violates section 51 of the Constitution of Kentucky, which contains a provision that no law shall relate to more than one subject which must be expressed in the title. It is said that the title relates to more than one subject, but it requires no profound thought to determine that the title relates to the construction of toll bridges under the supervision of the state highway commission and every sentence and phrase in the title relates to that one subject. The title is unnecessarily prolix. It is never required that the title state the general manner in which the object of an act is to be accomplished. Collins v. Henderson, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 74; Commonwealth v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 384. Stating the subject-matter of an act more in detail in the title than is necessary does not render the act unconstitutional. Allen v. Hall, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 85. If all the provisions of an act relate to the same subject and are naturally connected and are not foreign to the subject expressed in the title it is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Starr, 160 Ky. 260, 169 S.W. 743; Mark v. Bloom, 141 Ky. 474, 133 S.W. 203. It is only required that the title be fairly expressive of the context of the act. Commonwealth v. Barney, 115 Ky. 475, 74 S.W. 181, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2352. It is not essential that every provision in an act be specifically referred to in the title. It is only necessary that each provision shall be germane and not foreign to the title. Duke v. Boyd County, 225 Ky. 112, 7 S.W.2d 839. The purpose of section 51 of the Constitution was to enable a person reading the title of an act to obtain a general idea of the subject treated in the act. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 8, 166 S.W. 623.

Measured by the opinions cited, House Bill No. 641 relates to only one subject and that is fairly expressed in the title. The title is sufficient and the act is not unconstitutional by reason of any defect in the title.

The next point raised against House Bill No. 641 is that it violates section 29 of the Constitution of Kentucky in that it vests the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly in that the act delegates to the highway commission the power to determine what bridges shall be coupled or united for financing purposes, so that the tolls upon all bridges so united shall be continued until the bonds issued to pay the cost of such bridges shall have been paid. It is insisted that coupling the bridges together results in compelling the payment of toll on some bridges that would be freed earlier if they were not coupled with other bridges, and that the power to make such an arrangement is vested in the General Assembly and cannot be delegated to the commission.

In the case of Bloxton v. State Highway Commission et al., 225 Ky. 324, 8 S.W.2d 392, it was held that the Murphy Toll Bridge Act did not violate sections 27 and 28 of the Constitution of Kentucky in that it delegated legislative powers to the state highway commission by authorizing it to fix the rate of toll for each bridge, terms and maturity of bonds, and terms upon which bids should be made as such matters were administrative and not legislative. It was there held that legislative powers may not be conferred upon any executive board, but administrative powers may be conferred upon a board without violating those provisions of the Constitution requiring a separation of legislative executive, and judicial departments. By the provisions of section 29 of the Constitution all legislative power is vested in the General Assembly, but that section does not forbid the delegation of administrative powers, and the coupling of bridges as allowed by that act is an administrative power that could be conferred upon the commission. It was held in the case of Hunter v. City of Louisville, 204 Ky. 562, 265 S.W. 277, that an act authorizing a commission for the construction of a memorial building to make and enforce rules and regulations for the conduct of its business was not an unauthorized delegation of power. In the case of Klein et al. v. City of Louisville et al., 224 Ky. 624, 6 S.W.2d 1104 it...