Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Chavana

• Decision Date: 24 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 13-93-112-CV,13-93-112-CV
• Citation: 909 S.W.2d 554
• Parties: STANLEY STORES, INC., Appellant, v. Amadeo CHAVANA, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 554

909 S.W.2d 554

STANLEY STORES, INC., Appellant, v. Amadeo CHAVANA, Appellee.

No. 13-93-112-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

Aug. 24, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled Nov. 16, 1995.

Frank S. Manitzas, San Antonio, Kenneth Fuller, Fuller & Fuller, San Antonio, for appellant.

Wanda Roberts, Garner, Roberts & Roberts, Port Lavaca, Larry D. Woody, Victoria, for appellee.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and DORSEY and YANEZ, JJ.

OPINION

YANEZ, Justice.

This is an age discrimination case in which Stanley Stores appeals from a judgment rendered following a trial to the court. Stanley Stores contends that the court was without jurisdiction to proceed to trial because Chavana failed to timely file a charge or complaint with the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") as required by statute. Additionally, Stanley Stores contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Stanley Stores intentionally discriminated against Chavana because of his age, and that the court erred in awarding Chavana front pay, back pay, and expert witness fees. We affirm in part, reverse and remand in part, and reverse and render in part.

Chavana, age 51, worked at Stanley Stores for fourteen and one-half years holding various jobs. Chavana asserts that his employment was terminated because of his age and that he was replaced by a nineteen-year-old who was paid half his salary.

The trial court, by its judgment, ordered that Chavana recover from Stanley Stores Back Pay of $33,594.70, Front Pay of $106,838.00, Expert Witness Fees of $3,000.00, and Prejudgment Interest of $23,419.47. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were properly requested below and none were filed. Absent findings of fact and conclusions of law, all questions of fact are presumed to support the judgment, and the judgment will be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the pleadings and the evidence. Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.1987); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. La Villa Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Campbell & Son Constr. Co. v. Housing Auth., 655 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).

Jurisdiction

By points one and two, Stanley Stores contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment because it lacked jurisdiction. Appellant argues that Chavana filed his discrimination complaint with the Commission after the statutory limitations period had expired. If Chavana filed untimely with the Commission, the trial court would lack jurisdiction in this case.

We construe pleadings in favor of jurisdiction. Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989).

The federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is responsible for enforcing Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, ¹ and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), which prohibits discrimination in employment against persons 40 years of age or older. ² Both federal acts provide that if a state has its own anti-discrimination laws and fair employment practice agency, the EEOC must defer its processing of a discrimination complaint until the state has had at least 60 days to investigate and resolve it. One of the purposes of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("CHRA") was to create a Texas "deferral agency" so that investigation and resolution of employment discrimination complaints could be addressed at the state level.

CHRA provides for a comprehensive administrative review system to carry out the policies embodied in Title VII. A complaint to the Commission about a discriminatory employment practice must be in writing, under oath or affirmation, stating that an unlawful employment practice has been committed. The writing must set forth the facts on which the complaint is based, including the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice, and set forth facts sufficient to enable the commission to identify the person charged. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) (currently codified at TEX.LAB.CODE ANN. § 21.201 (Vernon Pamph.1995)). Under § 6 of the CHRA, a complaint must be filed with the Commission within 180 days after the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; untimely complaints shall be dismissed by the commission. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221k, § 6.01(a) (Vernon 1987) (currently codified at TEX.LAB.CODE ANN. § 21.201 (Vernon Pamph.1995)). The time limit of 180 days is mandatory and jurisdictional. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex.1991) (citing Green v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 760 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex.App.--Austin 1988, no writ)). Because Texas is a deferral state, if an employee wishes to pursue a remedy under the federal laws, Title VII or ADEA, the time limit for filing a complaint with the EEOC is 300 days rather than the 180 days under the CHRA.

Chavana's petition asserts that he timely filed charges of age discrimination with the EEOC and the Commission, and met all administrative prerequisites for this cause of action. The alleged unlawful employment practice at issue here occurred when Stanley Stores terminated Chavana after fifteen years of employment because of his age. The date of this event, March 14, 1990, is undisputed. Under CHRA, a complaint to the Commission must have been made within 180 days, by September 12, 1990.

Stanley Stores argues that the certified record of the EEOC shows that on October 9, 1990, Chavana's attorney mailed a completed and verified EEOC Form 5, Charge of Discrimination, signed by Chavana and dated "10-8-90" to the EEOC and asked that the form be filed with both the EEOC and the state Commission. Attached to the form was Exhibit "A" reciting in paragraph form Chavana's basis for his claim of age discrimination. The complaint was received and stamped "filed" on October 11, 1990. The EEOC notified the Commission of its receipt of Chavana's complaint by a form titled "Charge Transmittal" which was received by the Commission on October 24, 1990. Stanley Stores contends that Chavana's complaint to the EEOC was not filed within the 180 days required by the state statute.

On August 22, 1991, Chavana's attorney submitted to the EEOC investigator a written "Request for Withdrawal of Charge of Discrimination" because a lawsuit had been filed in state district court. On August 30, 1991, the EEOC director sent an acknowledgement and approval of the withdrawal. The lawsuit was filed April 12, 1991, in state court based solely upon the CHRA.

Chavana responded that though not reflected in the certified EEOC record, he had written a letter dated June 21, 1990, complaining about his discriminatory employment termination to the EEOC which he said that he mailed on June 21, 1990. At the trial court's hearing addressing jurisdiction, Chavana entered in evidence a copy of the letter that his wife prepared, and that he had signed and sent to the EEOC. Chavana contends that this letter constituted a timely complaint under the CHRA limitations provision. Chavana testified that he made a copy of the letter to keep for himself and then mailed the letter. He explained that he did not send the letter by certified mail return receipt requested. Chavana's letter contained his name, address, date of birth, social security number, name of the company he worked for and its address, and the name of the owner of the company and his telephone number. The letter reads as follows:

I was working at Stanley stores in Port Lavaca, Texas. It was 3:00 in the afternoon when John Cano (mrkt. supervisor) came and fired me. I asked him why and he said it was not working out and, that they no longer needed me. I was making $10.00 an hour. I was a meat cutter. They then hired somebody younger and for less pay from the same company. [illegible name] was less experience than me. I worked for the company 15 years. The ad I'm sending is from a newspaper from Victoria, Texas. They have 2 stores in Pt. Lavaca. I worked at both stores in Port Lavaca. I am now 50 years old. I can not get a job as easy as a 20 year old.

Chavana also entered in evidence a letter dated October 5, 1990, addressed to him from the EEOC which also did not appear in the certified record. Accompanying the EEOC's letter was EEOC's form 5, Charge of Discrimination. The EEOC letter to Chavana stated that it had filled in the form with the information from "your correspondence." Chavana asserts that his June letter and the letter from the EEOC are sufficient evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that he filed his complaint timely and that the court had jurisdiction over his case. Chavana asserts that from 1) his and his wife's testimony that they had prepared and mailed a letter to the EEOC in June 1990, 2) the copy of the letter drafted and mailed, 3) the October 5 letter from the EEOC to Chavana, and 4) the prepared charge accompanying the October 5 letter from the EEOC containing language from his June letter, the trial court could draw a reasonable inference that the filing of his complaint was timely for purposes of jurisdiction in the state court action. Stanley Stores contends that because there exists no evidence of receipt of the June 21 letter by the EEOC that the EEOC filing dated October 11 cannot relate back to the June letter.

The relation back doctrine was applied in a gender discrimination action where jurisdiction was at issue in Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.1993). I.P. Petroleum terminated Hennigan's employment on August 12, 1989. Hennigan filed an unverified complaint two days later with the Texas Employment Commission. TEC forwarded the complaint to the Commission on August 21. On March 12, 1990, Hennigan filed an amended sworn complaint with the Commission. The Hennigan cour...