Stansberry v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:18-cv-01563-KAW |
| Parties | RANDY STANSBERRY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
On June 29, 2019, Defendant United States of America ("Defendant") filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Def.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 18.) On July 27, 2018, Plaintiff Randy Stansberry ("Plaintiff") opposed. (Pl.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 24.) On August 10, 2018, Defendant replied. (Def.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 26.)
The Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1 (b), and hereby vacates the hearing initially set for September 20, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
Plaintiff is an elderly, disabled woman who was receiving Title XVI supplemental security income benefits when on February 2, 2013 and March 8, 2013, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") issued notices informing her that she was overpaid benefits in the amount of $19,233.80 for the period from January 2011 through March 2013. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 10; Ex. A, Dkt. No. 28 at 6.) On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff requested waiver of the overpayment, stating that she was not at fault in causing the overpayment and could not afford to pay. (Ex. A at 6.) On May 21, 2013, her request for waiver was denied. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration on August 1, 2013. (Id.) On February 6, 2014, the Administration decreased the amount of the overpayment by $2,732.07. (Id.) On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Id.) ALJ Michael Blume held a hearing on May 19, 2015 in Oakland, California. (Id.) On August 6, 2015, ALJ Blume rendered a partially favorable decision finding that Plaintiff was overpaid benefits in the amount of $19,349.96 during January 1, 2011 to March 1, 2013, that Plaintiff was at fault in causing a portion of the overpayment for the amount of $13,902.52, that Plaintiff was not at fault in causing a portion of the overpayment for the amount of $5,447.44, that recovery of the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience for a portion of the overpayment and recovery of the overpayment was not waived, and Plaintiff is liable for repayment of a portion of the overpayment, $13,390.52, but is not liable for repayment of $5,447.44 during the period of January 2011 to March 2013. (Id. at 8-9.)
ALJ Blume also mentioned in his opinion that:
As previously noted, the Administration has failed woefully in its legal requirement to provide adequate and proper accounting of the overpayment amount and the basis for this calculation. The myriad of confusing and even conflicting notices are well documented in the record. Further exacerbating the situation, the Administration has failed to adequately resolve these deficiencies notwithstanding the many attempts of the claimant and her representative. In fact, the record indicates the Administration had alleged absurdly that the claimant owned real property in Simi Valley, CA based on the fact that Texas was sending tax bills to a Simi Valley property for a Texas property the claimant jointly owned. Apparently, the claimant was living at the Simi Valley property owned by her brother. As a result of the Administration's mistaken assumption, her payments were ceased and she lost her home to foreclosure.
(Id.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that as a direct result of the Administration's negligence in the handling of Ms. Stansberry's overpayment issue, Ms. Stansberry's home was lost to foreclosure proceedings, as her main source of income was from social security income, and as a direct result of losing her home to foreclosure, Ms. Stansberry has been homeless. (Compl. ¶ 13) Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges that as a direct result of the Administration's negligence, Ms. Stansberry has suffered extreme emotional distress and continues to suffer emotional distress from the loss of her home and the use of many of her personal possessions. (Id.)
Plaintiff has not timely appealed the ALJ's decision, because well over 60 days have expired since August 6, 2015, the date of the ALJ's decision. (Def.'s Mot. at 3; Ex. A at 3.) Instead, Plaintiff filed this instant action on March 12, 2018, where she sued the United States ofAmerica under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), alleging negligence in connection with Ms. Stansberry's application for appeal and waiver of overpayment of benefits. (Compl. ¶ 1-3, 15-18.) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint followed. (Def.'s Mot.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the ground for the court's jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. See Kokkoken v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). A defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack can be either factual or facial. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). "A 'facial' attack asserts that a complaint's allegations are themselves insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, while a 'factual' attack asserts that the complaint's allegations, though adequate on their face to invoke jurisdiction, are untrue." Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 780 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). Under a facial attack, the court "accept[s] all allegations of fact in the complaint as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). In a factual attack, the court "need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations" and "may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v.Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court may also dismiss the case or a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)).
Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss and dismisses a complaint, it should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend is made "unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, dismissal with prejudice is proper only if amendment is futile or if the "complaint could not be saved by any amendment." United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011).
"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." Jachetta v. United States, 653 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)). "As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless it waives such immunity." Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015). "Similarly, suits against officials of the United States...in their official capacity are barred if there has been no waiver." Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2001). This is the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
As the Ninth Circuit has explained: "Before we may exercise jurisdiction over any suit against the government, we must have 'a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity, together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver.'" Jachetta, 653 F.3d at 903 (citing United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003)). Furthermore, "limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Mollison v. United States, 568 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)) (internal quotations omitted; alteration in original)). Absent a waiver, "a court does not have authority to award relief against the United States or a federal agency." Isaacs v. United States, No. 13-cv-01394-WHO, 2013 WL 4067597, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013). "As the party asserting a claimagainst the United States, [the plaintiff] has the burden of 'demonstrating unequivocal waiver of immunity.'" United States v. Park Place Associates, Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 924 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cunningham v. United States, 786 F.2d 1445, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986)). Waivers must be "unequivocally expressed in the statutory text" and "are to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign." Jordan v. The Presidio Trust, 4:16-cv-02122-KAW, 2017 WL 396169, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2017) (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)). The party seeking the waiver must also meet this "high standard" in order to obtain it. Id. (quoting Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 1086, 1101 (9th...
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