Stark v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 19 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. COA09–286–2.,COA09–286–2.
• Parties: Cheyenne Saleena STARK, a Minor, and Cody Brandon Stark, a Minor, by their Guardian ad Litem, Nicole Jacobsen, Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

739 S.E.2d 172

Cheyenne Saleena STARK, a Minor, and Cody Brandon Stark, a Minor, by their Guardian ad Litem, Nicole Jacobsen, Plaintiffs,

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant.

No. COA09–286–2.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

March 19, 2013.

On remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 365 N.C. 468, 723 S.E.2d 753, reversing and remanding the decision of the Court of Appeals, 204 N.C.App. 1, 693 S.E.2d 253. Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 15 May 2007 and orders entered 28 April 2008 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 November 2012.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, Raleigh, by Tobias S. Hampson and K. Edward Greene, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Winston–Salem, by Adam H. Charnes and Richard D. Dietz, and Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan L.L.P., Raleigh, by Kirk G. Warner, for defendant-appellee.

HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.

This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 723 S.E.2d 753 (2012) (hereinafter “Stark II ”), reversing and remanding our decision in Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 204 N.C.App. 1, 693 S.E.2d 253 (2010) (hereinafter “Stark I ”). After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part the orders of the trial court.

Background

The facts and procedural history of this case is provided in Stark II and only the essential details are recited here. In 2004, Cheyenne Saleena Stark (“Cheyenne”) and Cody Brandon Stark (“Cody”) (collectively “plaintiffs”), through their guardian ad litem filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) seeking recovery for injuries plaintiffs sustained in an automobile collision involving a 1998 Ford Taurus in which plaintiffs were passengers. Plaintiffs alleged the collision was the result of a design defect in the automobile's engine which resulted in the vehicle's unintended acceleration and that they sustained injuries from the automobile's defectively designed seatbelts.

Plaintiffs' claims came on for trial in April 2007. Ford asserted the affirmative defense provided in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B–3 that the seatbelt that caused Cheyenne's injuries was altered or modified by a party other than the manufacturer or seller such that Ford was relieved of liability for her injuries. At the close of evidence, Cheyenne moved for a directed verdict. The motion was denied and Ford's affirmative defense was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict finding that Ford acted unreasonably in designing the Taurus but that Cheyenne's enhanced injuries were caused by an alteration or modification to the vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford, dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, and taxed plaintiffs with Ford's costs. Cheyenne then filed motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and a new trial, and the trial court denied both motions.

In a separate order, the trial court granted Ford's motion for costs, holding Cheyenne, Cody, and their guardian ad litem, Nicole Jacobsen (“Jacobsen”), jointly and severally liable in the amount of $45,717.92 for Ford's costs for expert witnesses, mediation, and depositions. Plaintiffs and Jacobsen appealed. Cheyenne and Cody also appealed from the trial court's 15 May 2007 judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint, and Cheyenne, individually, appealed from the trial court's order denying her motions for a JNOV and a new trial.

On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict because, we concluded, in part, that Ford could not establish the affirmative defense under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B–3. Stark I, 204 N.C.App. at 12, 693 S.E.2d at 260. Central to our holding in Stark I was our interpretation of section 99B–3 as requiring that “the entity responsible for the modification or alteration of the product must be a party to the action in order for the defense to apply.” Id. Because Cheyenne was five years old at the time of the accident, we concluded, she was legally incapable of modifying the seatbelt. Id. at 9, 693 S.E.2d at 258. Furthermore, because Cheyenne's parents were not parties to the lawsuit we concluded Ford was unable to assert a defense under section 99B–3. Id. at 12, 693 S.E.2d at 260.

On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed our decision concluding that the defense provided in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B–3 is not limited to those situations in which the entity alleged to have modified the product at issue was a party to the litigation: “The plain language of section 99B–3 says that this defense may be used when anyone other than the manufacturer or seller modifies the product, so long as the remaining requirements of that section are met.” Stark II, 365 N.C. at 481, 723 S.E.2d at 761. Additionally, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the trial court's denial of Cheyenne's motion for a directed verdict and the jury's verdict. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to this Court for additional proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 481, 723 S.E.2d at 762. We allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs and make oral arguments for our consideration of the issues on remand.

Discussion

A. Trial Court's Judgment and Denial of Motions for JNOV and New Trial

Plaintiffs argue that our Supreme Court's holding in Stark II was a narrow ruling and was limited to the single issue of whether Ford's affirmative defense under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B–3 was properly submitted to the jury. Therefore, on remand, plaintiffs contend that the issues remaining to be decided by this Court are whether the trial court erred: (1) in entering judgment for Ford based on the affirmative defense provided in section 99B–3; (2) in denying Cheyenne's motion for a JNOV; (3) in denying her motion for a new trial; (4) in taxing costs against plaintiffs' guardian ad litem; and (5) awarding certain expert witness fees. We do not agree with plaintiffs' reading of Stark II, and we conclude that the only issues remaining for this Court to address are related to the trial court's award of costs.

Despite plaintiffs' contention that Stark II only addressed whether Ford's affirmative defense was properly submitted to the jury, the Supreme Court addressed the sufficiency of the evidence “to resolve the directed verdict inquiry,” and concluded:

The trial court's decision on plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict, as well as the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment applying section 99B–3 to relieve Ford of liability for the injury proximately caused by the design of its product, can therefore be sustained on the basis of this evidence, and we need not consider evidence of other potential modifications or modifiers.

Id. at 481, 723 S.E.2d at 761 (emphasis added). That the Supreme Court decided these issues, in addition to its interpretation of the meaning of “party” as used in section 99B–3, is evidenced by the dissenting opinion:

Our proper role, in my opinion, is to ask the Court of Appeals to review the sufficiency of the evidence whether Gordon Stark modified the Taurus before we undertake that matter. Nonetheless, because the majority decided to engage in that analysis—incorrectly, in my view, holding the evidence sufficient—I include the following discussion of why I conclude the opposite.

Id. at 484, 723 S.E.2d at 763(Hudson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). We are “ ‘not at liberty to revisit’ issues previously decided by our Supreme Court.” Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 146 N.C.App. 658, 667, 554 S.E.2d 356, 363 (2001) (quoting State v. Stephenson, 144 N.C.App. 465, 478, 551 S.E.2d 858, 867 (2001)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied,355 N.C. 348, 563 S.E.2d 562 (2002); see Goldston v. State, 199 N.C.App. 618, 624, 683 S.E.2d 237, 242 (2009) (“[T]he law of the case applies ... to issues that were decided in the former proceeding, whether explicitly or by necessary implication[.]”), aff'd,364 N.C. 416, 700 S.E.2d 223 (2010). Thus, whether the trial court's denial of the motion for a JNOV is properly before us, our Supreme Court's holding that the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict necessarily implies that the motion for a JNOV was also properly denied, and it precludes our inquiry into the matter. See Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 473, 562 S.E.2d 887, 892 (2002) (“The test for determining whether a motion for directed verdict is supported by the evidence is identical to that applied when ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”).

Plaintiffs also argue that the jury's verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent regarding the location of Cheyenne's seatbelt at the time of the accident, and, consequently, the trial court's denial of Cheyenne's motion for a new trial should be reversed. Our deliberation of plaintiffs' verdict inconsistency argument, however, would require us to impermissibly ignore our Supreme Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict and the trial court's judgment could be upheld by the evidence. Stark II, 365 N.C. at 481, 723 S.E.2d at 761. Accordingly, we must affirm the 15 May 2007 judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and the 28 April 2008 order denying Cheyenne's motion for a JNOV and a new trial.

B. Award of Costs

The only matter remaining before this Court is the appeal from the trial court's 28 April 2008 order taxing plaintiffs and their guardian ad litem with Ford's costs for expertwitnesses, mediation, and depositions. We review the trial court's award of costs to a prevailing party for abuse of discretion. Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 182 N.C.App. 635, 646, 643 S.E.2d 28, 34 (2007), disc. review denied,361 N.C. 694, 652 S.E.2d 647 (2007). It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to base its...