Stark v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date18 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. COA09-286.,COA09-286.
Citation693 S.E.2d 253
PartiesCheyenne Saleena STARK, a Minor, Cody Brandon Stark, a Minor, by their Guardian Litem, Nicole JACOBSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Appeal by Plaintiffs from judgment entered 15 May 2007 and orders entered 28 April 2008 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 November 2009.

Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, Raleigh; and Gilbert, Ollanik & Komyatte, P.C., by James L. Gilbert, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, by Kirk G. Warner and Christopher R. Kiger, Raleigh; and Bowman and Brooke LLP, by Robert L. Wise and Sandra Giannone Ezell, Richmond, VA, for Defendant-Appellee.

McGEE, Judge.

Cheyenne Saleena Stark (Cheyenne), Cody Brandon Stark (Cody), and Cory Christian Stark (Cory), through their then Guardian ad Litem, Ruby Squires Stark; and Gordon Walter Stark, Jr. (Gordon Stark), filed a complaint on 23 April 2004 against Ford Motor Company (Defendant) alleging inter alia, that Cheyenne suffered a spinal cord injury caused by a defective design of the seatbelt she was using during an accident involving her parents' 1998 Ford Taurus (the Taurus) on 23 April 2003. The complaint further alleged that Cody suffered “severe abdominal injuries, including damage to his spleen.” The claims of Gordon Stark and Cory were later dismissed, as discussed below.

Cheyenne and Cody were passengers in the back seat of the Taurus on 23 April 2003. At the time of the accident, Cheyenne was five years old and Cody was nine years old. Each was secured in the Taurus by a three-point seatbelt designed by Defendant. Neither Cheyenne nor Cody was sitting in a booster seat. Their three-year-old sibling, Cory, was sitting in the middle of the back seat.

Cheyenne's mother, Tonya Stark, was driving the Taurus. Cheyenne's father, Gordon Stark, was a passenger in the front seat. Tonya Stark was operating the Taurus in a parking lot at a speed of twenty-six miles per hour, when the vehicle suddenly accelerated. She lost control of the Taurus, and it collided with a light pole.

Following the collision, Cheyenne was dazed but able to walk. However, after Cheyenne was taken to the hospital a short time later, she complained of leg pain. Cheyenne later lost all feeling in her body below her rib cage.

The complaint alleged that Defendant engaged in [w]illful, [w]anton and [r]eckless [m]isconduct” in designing the seatbelts in the Taurus and that Defendant's actions caused physical and cognitive injuries to Cheyenne and Cody. The complaint also alleged that the engine in the Taurus was defectively designed in that it caused a “sudden unintended acceleration” which led to the collision. Defendant filed an answer generally denying negligence and defective design and asserting that Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark were the cause of any injuries. Defendant also alleged inter alia, the affirmative defenses of unauthorized modification or alteration of the Taurus or its components and failure to follow instructions or warnings given by Defendant.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 17 February 2005. The trial court filed an order on 22 August 2005 granting Defendant's motion as to: (1) the claim for cognitive injury to Cheyenne, and (2) the claim based on the sudden unintended acceleration of the Taurus. In its order, the trial court also dismissed personal injury claims asserted by Gordon Stark and Cory. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remainder of claims, finding that there remained genuine issues of material fact.

Nicole Jacobsen, (Guardian ad Litem), filed a motion on 15 March 2005 seeking to be substituted as Guardian ad Litem in the action. The record is unclear as to when this motion was granted; however, at the time of trial, plaintiffs in the action were as follows: Cheyenne Saleena Stark and Cody Brandon Stark, by their Guardian ad Litem, Nicole Jacobsen (Plaintiffs).

At trial, Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that the injuries Cheyenne suffered were caused or enhanced by a design defect known as “film spool” in the seatbelt she was using. This defect allowed slack in the seatbelt to cause the shoulder portion of the belt to slip off Cheyenne's shoulder and come to rest in a position lower on her body, such that she bent over the seatbelt during the accident. It was this “film spool” and the resulting movement by Cheyenne that Plaintiffs asserted as the cause of Cheyenne's injuries. Plaintiffs further presented evidence that the use of certain devices may prevent “film spool” from occurring during accidents by retracting or otherwise restricting any excess belt material during a collision. The Taurus was not equipped with any of these devices.

At the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of “testing to show that any of their alleged alternative designs would have made the Taurus any safer in this crash.” Defendant renewed its directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both of Defendant's motions.

Defendant presented evidence at trial that Cheyenne's injuries were caused by her improper use of the seatbelt. Specifically, Defendant asserted that Cheyenne was wearing the seatbelt with the shoulder portion behind her back. Defendant argued that, because Cheyenne was not restrained by the shoulder portion of the belt, the “film spool” effect could not have been the cause of her injuries. Because “film spool” was not a cause, the use of the preventative devices offered by Plaintiffs would have made no difference as to Cheyenne's injuries. Instead, Defendant presented three theories of causation for Cheyenne's injuries: (1) the accident itself; (2) Cheyenne's improper use of the seatbelt by wearing the shoulder belt behind her back; and (3) Cheyenne's nonuse of a booster seat, contrary to Defendant's instructions.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for a directed verdict as to two of Defendant's affirmative defenses. In their motion, Plaintiffs specifically requested a directed verdict as to Defendant's affirmative defenses of “Alteration or Modification of Product” pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B-3, and “Adequate Warnings or Instruction” pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 99B-4. With respect to their requested directed verdict based on N.C.G.S. § 99B-3, Plaintiffs argued that, because Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark were not parties to the action, and because Cheyenne was a minor under the age of seven years and was therefore legally incapable of negligence, N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 did not provide an affirmative defense to Defendant. After hearing arguments from Plaintiffs and Defendant, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion.

The trial court submitted questions to the jury. The jury answered those questions, in pertinent part, as follows:

4. Did the Defendant Ford Motor Company act unreasonably in designing the 1998 Ford Taurus and its component parts, proximately causing enhanced injury to Cheyenne Stark?
Answer: [Yes]
[If you answer “Yes” to this issue, then go to Issue 5; if you answer “no” to this issue, then do not consider any further issues.]
5. Were the enhanced injuries to Cheyenne Stark caused by using the 1998 Ford Taurus in a manner contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings which were known or should have been known by the user?
Answer: [No]
[If you answer “Yes” to this issue, then do not consider any further issues; if you answer “no” to this issue, go to Issue 6.]
6. Were the enhanced injuries to Cheyenne Stark caused by an alteration or modification of the 1998 Ford Taurus?
Answer: [Yes]
[If you answer “yes' [sic] to this issue, then do not consider any further issue; if you answer “no” to this issue, then go to Issue 7.]

The jury further determined that Defendant's product, the Taurus, was not the proximate cause of enhanced injury to Cody. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant on 15 May 2007, ordering that Plaintiffs recover nothing from Defendant, dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint, and awarding costs to Defendant. The trial court retained jurisdiction for the purposes of determining costs and expert witness fees.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial on 24 May 2007. The trial court filed an order denying Plaintiffs' motion on 23 April 2008.

Defendant filed a motion for costs in the amount of $135,634.74 on 8 August 2007 on the grounds of “its successful defense and jury verdict”. In an order entered 28 April 2008, the trial court granted Defendant's motion in part but reduced the award to $45,717.92. The trial court stated that “after consideration of the motion, affidavits, materials submitted by the parties, arguments of counsel, and other matters of record, that [Defendant] was the prevailing party at trial and that certain costs should, in the [c]ourt's discretion, be awarded to [Defendant].” The trial court awarded these costs “against Plaintiffs and Nicole Jacobsen as Guardian ad Litem, jointly and severally[.]

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's judgment entered 15 May 2007, the trial court's order denying Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion for award of costs. Defendant cross-assigns error and argues that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict as to Plaintiffs' inadequate design claims.

Directed Verdict

Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of product alteration. Because Cheyenne was five years old at the time of the collision, Plaintiffs contend s...

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4 cases
  • Christmas v. Greyhound Lines Inc
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 1, 2011
    ...We disagree. "Our Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict de novo." Stark v. Ford Motor Co., _____ N.C. App. _____, _____, 693 S.E.2d 253, 257 (2010)."The standard of review of directed verdict is whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the n......
  • Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 313PA10.
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    ...TEXT STARTS HERE On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A–31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 204 N.C.App. 1, 693 S.E.2d 253 (2010), reversing a judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint entered on 15 May 2007 and vacating an order awarding costs to defendant entere......
  • Stark v. Ford Motor Co.
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    • March 19, 2013
    ...the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 365 N.C. 468, 723 S.E.2d 753, reversing and remanding the decision of the Court of Appeals, 204 N.C.App. 1, 693 S.E.2d 253. Appeal by plaintiffs from judgment entered 15 May 2007 and orders entered 28 April 2008 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Mecklenburg......
  • Collier v. Judith J. Collier As Sole Dir.
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    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 18, 2010

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