Starr v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1901
• Citation: 110 F. 3
• Parties: STARR et al. v. CHICAGO, R.I. & P. RY. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

110 F. 3

STARR et al. v. CHICAGO, R.I. & P. RY. CO. et al.

United States Circuit Court, D. Nebraska.

April 25, 1901

Woolworth & McHugh, for complainants.

Frank N. Prout, per se.

Before SANBORN, Circuit Judge, and MUNGER, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This is a demurrer to a supplemental bill of the complainants, which discloses these facts: In 1893 the legislature of the state of Nebraska passed an act commonly called the 'Maximum Freight Rate Law,' which named certain rates of transportation, required the railway companies operating in that state to reduce their rates to those there prescribed and provided that they should become liable to severe penalties for any failure to comply with its provisions. Comp. St. Neb. 1893, c. 72, art. 12. The complainants were stockholders of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company; and on August 3, 1893, they exhibited to this court their bill in equity against the railway company, George H Hastings, who was then the attorney general of the state of Nebraska, and numerous other parties, officers of the state upon whom the discharge of some duty devolved under the act of the legislature to which we have adverted. They alleged in this bill that the rates prescribed by this act were confiscatory, and that the law was unconstitutional, and prayed for a temporary and perpetual injunction against the defendants, forbidding them from taking any action to put in operation or to enforce any of the provisions of the law. On August 3, 1893, this court issued a temporary injunction upon a bond for $10,000, which forbade the railway company from putting in operation the rates prescribed by the law and from complying with its provisions; prohibited George H. Hastings the attorney general, from bringing, or aiding in bringing, or causing or advising to be brought, any proceeding by way of injunction or mandatory or other process or civil action or indictment against said company for or on account of any act or omission commanded or forbidden by the act; and restrained the members of the board of transportation of the state from taking any action under the law until the further order of this court. At about the same time that this suit was commenced, the stockholders of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, and of the Union Pacific Railway Company brought suits of the same nature against those companies, respectively, and against George H. Hastings, the attorney general, and against the other officers of the state, and prayed for the same relief. The issues in the four suits were the same, and they were prosecuted and defended by the same counsel. Voluminous proofs were taken in the three suits against the other companies, and it was agreed that the proofs taken in those suits should have the same force and effect in this suit as if taken herein, and that the same decree should be eventually rendered in this suit that should be finally affirmed or rendered by the supreme court in those suits. Constantine J. Smyth succeeded George H. Hastings as attorney general of Nebraska, and was substituted for him in the three suits. These three cases finally resulted in decrees to the effect that the maximum freight rate law was unconstitutional. that the railway companies, the board of transportation, its members and secretaries, were forbidden from putting in force the rates it prescribed, or from complying with its provisions; 'and that the attorney general of this state be in like manner enjoined from bringing, aiding in bringing, or causing to be brought, any proceeding by way of injunction, mandamus, civil action, or indictment against said companies, or either of them, or their receivers, for or on account of any action or omission on their part commanded or forbidden by said act. ' Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 477, 550, 18 Sup.Ct. 418, 421, 435, 42 L.Ed. 819, 850. Smyth was not substituted for Hastings in this suit. In ignorance of the injunction herein, he brought an action in the name of the state of Nebraska, in the year 1900, in the supreme court of the state of Nebraska, against the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, for $310,000, and another in one of the district courts of the state for $150,000, penalties prescribed by the freight rate law for the failure of the company to disobey the injunction of this court, and to reduce its rates of transportation to the rates prescribed by that act. About January 1, 1901, the defendant Frank N. Prout succeeded Smyth as attorney general of the state. To the action in the supreme court of Nebraska the railway company answered the proceedings in this suit in this court, and made a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was denied by the supreme court of the state on the ground that this court, on account of the eleventh amendment to the constitution, had no jurisdiction to enjoin the attorney general or any other officer of the state from enforcing the provisions of this unconstitutional law. State v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. (Neb.) 85 N.W. 557. The prayer of the supplemental bill is that the injunction in this case be extended to Frank N. Prout, as attorney general of the state of Nebraska; that he be restrained from further prosecuting the two actions against the railway company; and that the complainants have general relief. The ground of the demurrer is that the relief sought by the supplemental bill is in contravention of the eleventh amendment of the constitution of the United States, which provides:

'The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit at law or in equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.'

The contention of Mr. Prout is that this court has no jurisdiction to enjoin him from enforcing the maximum freight law, because he is acting not for himself, but for and in the name of the state, and that this proceeding is in reality a suit against the state.

This court is not at liberty to disregard the decisions of the supreme court of the United States. Its duty is completely performed when it protects the rights and administers the remedies of litigants in strict accord with the rules of law established by those decisions. In the case before us the opinions of that court, and the decrees which it has rendered or affirmed, have conclusively settled every question which has been presented, and have left nothing open for our discussion or decision. We shall accordingly content ourselves with a brief statement of the principles which determine and the authorities which compel our action.

1. The federal courts must determine for themselves the limits of their jurisdiction, and the supreme court of the United States is the final arbiter in all questions of this nature. A renunciation of this power or a failure to discharge this duty would be fatal to our system of government. It would withdraw the keystone of the arch. U.S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115, 3 L.Ed. 53; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 459, 460, 16 L.Ed. 749.

2. Wherever a federal court and a state court have concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose jurisdiction first attaches holds it to the exclusion of the other until its duty is fully performed and the jurisdiction involved is exhausted. This rule applies equally to civil and criminal proceedings. Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148, 164, 19 Sup.Ct. 119, 43 L.Ed. 399; Sharon v. Terry (C.C.) 36 F. 337; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet. 135, 10 L.Ed. 95; Clark v. Five Hundred and Five Thousand Feet of Lumber, 65 F. 236, 12 C.C.A. 628, 24 U.S.App. 509; Gates v. Buckeye, 12 U.S.App. 69, 4 C.C.A. 116, 53 F. 961; Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191, 17 L.Ed. 839; Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263, 265, 15 L.Ed. 393; Union Trust Co. v. Rockford, R.I. & St. L.R. Co., 6 Biss. 197, 24 Fed.Cas. 704 (No. 14,401); Owens v. Railroad Co., (C.C.) 20 F. 10; Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago (C.C.) 6 Fed. 443; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L.Ed. 749; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622, 625, 12 L.Ed. 841; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 596, 597, 15 L.Ed. 1028; Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52, 14 L.Ed. 322; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176, 4 Sup.Ct. 355, 28 L.Ed. 390; Heidritter v. Oilcloth Co., 112 U.S. 294, 302, 5 Sup.Ct. 135, 28 L.Ed. 729; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166, 196, 18 L.Ed. 768; Central Trust Co. of New York v. South Atlantic & O.R. Co. (C.C.) 57 F. 3.

3. The foregoing principle is so indispensable to the harmonious working of our systems of federal and state jurisprudence that neither the eleventh amendment to the constitution, nor section 720 of the Revised Statutes, which prohibits the issue by a court of the United States of a writ of injunction to stay proceedings in any court of a state, can be permitted to interfere with its maintenance.

The court which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the necessary parties to a suit may, and if it discharges its duty it must, if necessary, issue its injunction to prevent any interference by any one with its effectual determination of the issues, and its administration of the rights and remedies involved in the litigation. French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, 22 L.Ed. 857; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494, 26 L.Ed. 497; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 14 Sup.Ct. 1019, 38 L.Ed. 981; Fisk v. Railroad Co., 10 Blatchf. 518, Fed. Cas. No. 4,830; Garner v. Bank, 33 U.S.App. 91, 16 C.C.A. 86, 67 F. 833; Terre Haute & I.R. Co. v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co. (C.C.) 82 F. 943.

4. In suits to enjoin officers of a state from inflicting threatened injury upon property rights, two classes of cases arise: (1) Those in which the suits are held to be in reality...