State Carolina v. Jones

Decision Date21 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. COA10–1202.,COA10–1202.
Citation711 S.E.2d 791
PartiesSTATE of North Carolinav.Jerry Lee JONES, Defendant.State of North Carolinav.Tina Jones, Defendant.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal by defendants from judgments entered 26 May 2011 by Judge Laura J. Bridges in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Brian R. Berman, for the State.

Guy J. Loranger, Mebane, for defendant-appellant Jerry Lee Jones. Peter Wood for defendant-appellant Tina Jones.

HUNTER, ROBERT C., Judge.

Defendants Jerry Lee Jones and Tina Jones appeal their convictions for failing to cause their daughter “P.J.” to attend school, in violation of North Carolina's Compulsory Attendance Law (“CAL”), N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C–378 to –383 (2009).1 Defendants primarily contend that the trial court erred in denying their respective motions to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. We conclude, however, that the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the offense, and, therefore, the court properly submitted the charge against each defendant to the jury. Accordingly, we find no error.

Facts

The State's evidence at trial tended to establish the following facts: Mr. and Mrs. Jones are the biological parents of P.J. At the start of the 2008–09 school year, P.J. was 14 years old and entered the 9th grade at North Buncombe High School in the Buncombe County school system. After her family moved, P.J. transferred in September 2008 to T.C. Roberson High School, which is also in the Buncombe County school system.

On 17 November 2008, Rob Weinkle, T.C. Roberson's principal, sent defendants a letter notifying them that the school's attendance records showed that P.J. had accumulated three or more unexcused absences (“three-day letter”). The letter also advised defendants that they were “responsible for [their] child's school attendance” under CAL, that they may be “prosecuted in a criminal action if [their] child's unlawful absences continue[d],” and that they “should contact [their] child's counselor or administrator ... to discuss this matter.” Mr. Weinkle mailed an identical letter on 2 February 2009, notifying defendants that P.J. had accumulated six or more unexcused absences (“six-day letter”).

On 3 February 2009, Mrs. Jones took P.J. to Access Family Services (“AFS”), a community support agency, for a clinical assessment. The assessment, performed by J.C. Cagle, diagnosed P.J. with [c]onduct disorder with adolescent onset and intermittent explosive disorder.” Lori Siemens, an AFS case manager, and Steven Luke, a mental health counselor, were assigned to work with P.J. and her family. Ms. Siemens was permitted to accompany P.J. to school on several occasions in order to observe her behavior and to help her “learn how to deal” with her anger and anxiety issues. Mr. Luke also discussed with a school administrator implementing a plan to “help [P.J.] cope in school[.]

On 25 February 2009, after P.J. had accumulated 10 unexcused absences, Mr. Weinkle sent defendants a third letter informing them that they were in violation of CAL, that they could be prosecuted for the violation, and that a conference had been scheduled for 10 March 2009 to address P.J.'s lack of attendance (“10–day conference”). The 10–day conference was held on 13 March 2009 at T.C. Roberson; Mr. Jones, Mrs. Jones, P.J., and Ms. Siemens attended the conference as well as assistant principal Janet Greenhoe, drop-out specialist Jill Castelloe, at-risk counselor Anna Hubbell, and 9th grade counselor Natalie Anderson. During the conference, school administrators agreed to develop a new schedule for P.J., make accommodations for materials to be provided in her classrooms, set up a “time-out plan” for her, and recommend P.J. as a candidate for the “PASS program.” Ultimately, P.J. accumulated 21 unexcused absences during the 2008–09 school year.

After the 10–day conference, defendants were charged with failure to cause attendance based on complaints filed by Mr. Weinkle on 18 March 2009. Defendants were initially tried and convicted in Buncombe County District Court. On appeal to Buncombe County Superior Court, defendants' cases were consolidated for a trial de novo. Defendants moved to dismiss their respective charges at trial and the court denied the motions. The jury found defendants guilty of violating the school attendance law and the trial court sentenced defendants each to 45 days in the Buncombe County jail, suspended the sentences, and imposed 18 months of supervised probation as well as a $500.00 fine. Both defendants timely appeal to this Court.

I

Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the charge for insufficient evidence. 2 A defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied if there is substantial evidence: (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). “Substantial evidence” is that amount of relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). When considering the issue of substantial evidence, the trial court must view all of the evidence presented “in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 115 S.Ct. 2565, 132 L.Ed.2d 818 (1995). “Whether [the] evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court [,] State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991), “which this Court reviews de novo, State v. Bagley, 183 N.C.App. 514, 523, 644 S.E.2d 615, 621 (2007).

Defendants were charged with failing to cause attendance under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–378, which provides in pertinent part:

(e) The principal or the principal's designee shall notify the parent, guardian, or custodian of his or her child's excessive absences after the child has accumulated three unexcused absences in a school year. After not more than six unexcused absences, the principal or the principal's designee shall notify the parent, guardian, or custodian by mail that he or she may be in violation of the Compulsory Attendance Law and may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under the established attendance policies of the State and local boards of education. Once the parents are notified, the school attendance counselor shall work with the child and the child's family to analyze the causes of the absences and determine steps, including adjustment of the school program or obtaining supplemental services, to eliminate the problem. The attendance counselor may request that a law enforcement officer accompany him or her if the attendance counselor believes that a home visit is necessary.

(f) After 10 accumulated unexcused absences in a school year, the principal or the principal's designee shall review any report or investigation prepared under G.S. 115C–381 and shall confer with the student and the student's parent, guardian, or custodian, if possible, to determine whether the parent, guardian, or custodian has received notification pursuant to this section and made a good faith effort to comply with the law. If the principal or the principal's designee determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian has not made a good faith effort to comply with the law, the principal shall notify the district attorney and the director of social services of the county where the child resides. If the principal or the principal's designee determines that the parent, guardian, or custodian has made a good faith effort to comply with the law, the principal may file a complaint with the juvenile court counselor pursuant to Chapter 7B of the General Statutes that the child is habitually absent from school without a valid excuse. Upon receiving notification by the principal or the principal's designee, the director of social services shall determine whether to undertake an investigation under G.S. 7B–302.

(g) Documentation that demonstrates that the parents, guardian, or custodian were notified and that the child has accumulated 10 absences which cannot be justified under the established attendance policies of the local board shall constitute prima facie evidence that the child's parent, guardian, or custodian is responsible for the absences.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–378(e)(g).

This Court has held that “the procedures set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–378 requiring that the schools take certain steps prior to causing a warrant to be issued” establish the six “elements of the offense.” State v. Frady, 195 N.C.App. 766, 769, 673 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2009). Thus, the elements of failure to cause attendance are: (1) that the defendant was a parent, guardian, or custodian of a school-age child; (2) that the child was enrolled in a North Carolina public school or an approved non-public school during the specified school year; (3) that the school's principal or the principal's designee notified the defendant of the child's absences from school after the child accumulated three unexcused absences during the specified school year; (4) that after not more than six unexcused absences, the defendant was notified by mail that he or she may be in violation of CAL and that he or she may be prosecuted if the absences cannot be justified under established school board policies; (5) that after the defendant has been notified, the school attendance counselor worked with or attempted to work with the child and the defendant to analyze the causes of the absences and determine steps to eliminate the problem; and (6) that during the specified school year, the child accumulated at least 10 unexcused...

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    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 5 Agosto 2014
    ...... waive[s] his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error review.” State v. Jones, 213 N.C.App. 59, 67, 711 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2011) (quoting State v. Barber, 147 N.C.App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001)). Therefore, “[a]lthough defendant labels thi......
  • State v. Randolph
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    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
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    ...of the substance of the written instrument on cross-examination to impeach Defendant constituted error. See State v. Jones, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2011) (observing that a defendant may not request a new trial on the basis of error he causes or joins in causing). Defen......
  • State v. Hight
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    • 3 Julio 2012
    ...court to commit error is not in a position to repudiate his action and assign it as ground for a new trial.” State v. Jones, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In State v. Barber, 147 N.C.App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001) (citati......
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    ...court to ‘commit error is not in a position to repudiate his action and assign it as ground for a new trial.’ ” State v. Jones, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 711 S.E.2d 791, 796 (2011) (quoting State v. Payne, 280 N.C. 170, 171, 185 S.E.2d 101, 102 (1971)). Additionally, “a defendant who invites ......
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