State Compensation Fund v. Reed

• Citation: 12 Ariz.App. 317,470 P.2d 465
• Decision Date: 11 June 1970
• Docket Number: CA-IC,No. 1,1
• Parties: STATE COMPENSATION FUND, Insurer of Alabam Freight Lines, a division of Consolidated Copper State Lines, Petitioner, v. Barbara J. REED, widow of Donald S. Reed, deceased, Respondent Employee, The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Respondent. 360.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 465

470 P.2d 465

12 Ariz.App. 317

STATE COMPENSATION FUND, Insurer of Alabam Freight Lines, a division of Consolidated Copper State Lines, Petitioner, v. Barbara J. REED, widow of Donald S. Reed, deceased, Respondent Employee, The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Respondent.

No. 1 CA-IC 360.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

June 11, 1970.

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1970.

Robert K. Park, Chief Counsel, by Courtney L. Varner, Phoenix, for petitioner State Compensation Fund.

Donald L. Cross, Chief Counsel, Phoenix, for respondent The Industrial Commission of Arizona.

Stevenson, Warden & Smith, by Robert W. Warden, Flagstaff, for respondent Barbara (Reed) Stone.

HAIRE, Judge.

On this appeal by certiorari from an award of the Industrial Commission, the Court is required to consider the legality of the Commission's award to the widow of a deceased workman, which reinstated the payment of monthly death benefits previously discontinued because of the widow's remarriage.

A.R.S. § 23--1046 ¹ provides for the award of certain death benefits to the survivors of a deceased workman whose death was caused by a compensable injury. Pursuant to the provisions of that statute, the respondent herein, Barbara J. Reed as the surviving widow of the deceased workman, was originally awarded the sum of $257.52 monthly until her death or remarriage, with two years compensation in one sum ($6,180.48) payable in the event and at the time of remarriage. This award was entered on January 16, 1968.

On August 12, 1968, Mrs. Reed advised the Commission that she had remarried on August 8, 1968, and requested payment of the lump sum marriage settlement. On October 10, 1968, the Commission entered 'Supplemental Findings and Order' (1) terminating monthly death benefits effective August 8, 1968, and (2) awarding to Mrs. Reed the sum of $6,248.23 (lump sum payment of $6,180.48 plus $67.75 for period of August 1, 1968 through August 8, 1968) '* * * to be paid to her in full settlement of all benefits to which she might be entitled under the provisions of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Law.' This latter award became final and the lump sum payment was paid to Mrs. Reed in accordance therewith.

On April 14, 1969, approximately eight months after the remarriage, Mrs. Reed filed with the Commission her 'Petition to Reinstate Award'. The file discloses that on March 26, 1969, the new husband, Donald R. Stone, had filed in the Coconino County Superior Court a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Mrs. Reed, alleging that the marriage was induced by Mrs. Reed's fraudulent misrepresentations as follows:

'That prior to and at the time of said marriage and when plaintiff consented thereto, defendant falsely and fraudulently represented to plaintiff that she was capable of, and would accept, the care, management and training of plaintiff's retarded son of the approximate age of four (4) years.'

The complaint further alleged that such misrepresentations were material, that plaintiff was unaware of their falsity, that he relied thereon, and that thereafter Mrs. Reed refused to accept the care, management or training of plaintiff's retarded son. On that same date, March 26, 1969, Mrs. Reed filed a one sentence answer to the complaint as follows:

'COMES NOW the defendant and in Answer to plaintiff's Complaint herein, admits the allegations contained therein.'

Some seven days after the filing of the complaint and the answer, the Coconino County Superior Court on April 2, 1969, entered a decree of annulment which provided that:

'* * * the marriage existing in form between the plaintiff, DONALD R. STONE, and the defendant, BARBARA JEAN STONE, be and the same is here-by annulled and declared void and of no force, form or effect whatsoever.'

The decree stated that it was based upon a finding of the material allegations of the complaint in the plaintiff husband's favor.

As previously indicated herein, twelve days after the entry of the decree of annulment by the court, Mrs. Reed filed her petition with the Commission which in essence recited tender of return to the Commission of the lump sum award of $6,180.48, and requested that the Commission's prior award of monthly death benefits be reinstated as of the date it was originally terminated. Subsequently, by 'Supplement to Petition to Reinstate Award' (filed April 18, 1969) Mrs. Reed requested that:

'It is requested that instead of a return of the $6,180.48 lump sum settlement made on August 8, 1968, that the award of January 16, 1968 be reinstated as of August 8, 1970 (twenty-four months after the lump sum settlement) in the amount of $257.52 monthly until the death or remarriage of petitioner.'

On May 1, 1969, there was issued a 'Denial of Petition to Reinstate Award'. Timely application for hearing was filed, and after formal hearing before the Commission, it entered an award reinstating the monthly death benefits as requested by Mrs. Reed.

Petitioner contends that the Commission erred in reinstating the prior award because the fraudulent misrepresentations alleged in the husband's complaint for annulment were not sufficient to give the Superior Court jurisdiction to enter an annulment decree, citing Hallford v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ariz. 40, 159 P.2d 305 (1945).

In a decision preceding Hallford, Supra, Southern Pacific Co. v. Industrial Commission, 54 Ariz. 1, 91 P.2d 700 (1939), the Arizona Supreme Court first considered whether a widow to whom an award of monthly death benefits had been made under the Workmen's Compensation Laws, and who had thereafter received a lump sum in settlement of the original award upon a remarriage, could have such original award reinstated upon a subsequent annulment of the remarriage. The court specifically stated that upon a valid legal annulment and a tender back of the lump sum award, a widow would be entitled to a reinstatement of such an award. However, upon the facts before it, the court held that the remarriage was not, under Arizona law, subject to annulment for the cause set forth in the complaint (fraudulent misrepresentations concerning physical impotency) and that the Superior Court therefore had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of annulment. For that reason the Arizona Supreme Court set aside the Industrial Commission award which had reinstated the original award, holding that the decree of annulment was void on its face and subject to collateral attack in the Industrial Commission proceedings, and that the widow was still married notwithstanding the purported decree of annulment.

The Arizona Supreme Court next considered precisely the same question in Hallford v. Industrial Commission, Supra, and again reach the same result. In that case the complaint for annulment of the remarriage filed by the widow in the Superior Court alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by the husband concerning his condition in life and '* * * that he stated to plaintiff that he was making sufficient money to support plaintiff, and that he would continue to make a home for her and support plaintiff * * *'; that after marriage '* * * upon learning that defendant had misrepresented his condition in life, and that he had misrepresented the fact that he could and would support plaintiff, plaintiff caused defendant to remove himself from her home * * *.' Based upon these allegations, at the hearing on the petition to reinstate, the Commission concluded that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to enter the annulment decree and denied the petition for reinstatement. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed this action by the Commission, stating:

'Whether or not the award was properly made rests upon the force and effect of the decree of annulment. Unless the judgment is void, it is binding upon the commission and may not be attacked collaterally. On the other hand, a void judgment is no judgment at all and may be attacked in a collateral proceeding. This court has repeatedly stated that...