State Dept. of Rev. V. Union Tank Car Co., 2050652.
Decision Date | 13 April 2007 |
Docket Number | 2050652. |
Citation | 974 So.2d 1024 |
Parties | STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
William B. Sellers and JoClaudia Moore of Balch & Bingham, LLP, Montgomery, for appellee.
The State Department of Revenue ("the Department") appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Montgomery Circuit Court in favor of Union Tank Car Company ("UTCC") in judicial-review proceedings concerning the correctness of an administrative determination that UTCC was not subject to Alabama income tax for the tax years 1994-1998.
The facts of this case are virtually undisputed. UTCC, a Delaware corporation with its corporate headquarters located in Illinois, is in the business of manufacturing and leasing specialty railcars to customers throughout the United States. UTCC had one Alabama-based lessee, Vulcan Materials Company ("Vulcan"), during the pertinent tax years. UTCC maintains regional sales offices and repair and service centers throughout the country, although none are located in Alabama. UTCC manufactures its railcars in Illinois and Texas, and its leasing agreements are all executed in Illinois.
The terms of UTCC's standard lease require that UTCC's lessees remit payment of a fixed monthly amount to UTCC in Illinois and arrange for a railroad carrier to pick up the leased railcars from UTCC's manufacturing facility and haul them to a location designated by the lessee. The lessee is also responsible for returning the railcars to UTCC after the lease term expires. UTCC has no control over where the leased railcars are used and does not track where the railcars travel throughout the United States; however, UTCC is responsible for maintaining and repairing the railcars. The repair and maintenance of its railcars would be performed at one of UTCC's repair facilities located at sites outside Alabama.
UTCC conducted no business, had no employees, and owned no property in Alabama during the 1994-1998 tax years. Some of UTCC's leased railcars were used to transport materials through Alabama and to destinations within Alabama. None of the railcars were used strictly intrastate. For the pertinent tax years, UTCC paid the Department an Alabama license tax pursuant to §§ 40-21-52 and 40-8-1(b)(5), Ala.Code 1975, in lieu of paying a property tax on the railcars that traveled in Alabama. The license tax remitted by UTCC was based on the market value of the railcars and the number of miles that the railcars traveled in Alabama.
The Department had previously assessed UTCC for the Alabama franchise tax for the tax years 1983-1986. UTCC had operated in substantially the same manner during those years as it had during the tax years 1994-1998. UTCC had appealed the franchise-tax assessment to the Department's Administrative Law Division, which held that UTCC was not doing business in Alabama and thus was not subject to the Alabama franchise tax. The Department did not seek judicial review of that order.
UTCC stopped filing Alabama corporate income tax returns after 1993, and, thus, it did not report any of its income to Alabama for the tax years 1994-1998. Following an audit, the Department determined that UTCC's leased railcars had been used by lessees to haul materials within and outside Alabama during the tax years 1994-1998; thus, according to the Department's auditors, UTCC's lease income was subject to Alabama income tax pursuant to the application of § 40-18-2(a)(2) and (a)(3), Ala.Code 1975.1 The Department apportioned UTCC's lease income to Alabama based on the proportion of the miles that all of UTCC's leased railcars traveled in Alabama compared to the total miles the railcars traveled throughout the United States; based on that determination, the Department assessed UTCC taxes, interest, and penalties in the amount of $442,782.00.
UTCC appealed from that assessment to the Department's Administrative Law Division. The Department's administrative law judge ("ALJ") conducted a de novo hearing, and after considering the evidence, the ALJ entered a judgment declaring void the assessment against UTCC. The Department sought judicial review of the ALJ's decision in the Montgomery Circuit Court. UTCC filed a motion for a summary judgment, which was opposed by the Department; both parties filed evidentiary documents and briefs in connection with the summary-judgment motion. After a hearing, the circuit court adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and legal analysis and entered a summary judgment in favor of UTCC.
The ALJ (and, thereby, the circuit court) concluded that UTCC was not subject to income tax during the tax years 1994-1998 because (1) those cases decided by courts in other states deemed by the ALJ to be better reasoned indicated that UTCC was not subject to an income tax pursuant to § 40-18-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975, for the tax years 1994-1998; and (2) the Department had failed to present any evidence indicating that UTCC was qualified to do business in Alabama or was otherwise licensed to do business in Alabama during the tax years 1994-1998 such that UTCC could be said to be subject to income tax pursuant to § 40-18-2(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975.2 The Department timely appealed from the circuit court's judgment to this court.
The circuit court's judgment in this case is accorded no presumption of correctness.
Carlisle v. Golden Rod Feed Mill, 883 So.2d 710, 711-12 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).
The Department first contends that UTCC was liable for income tax pursuant to § 40-18-2(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975, on the income UTCC derived from the lease of its railcars that traveled within and outside Alabama because, the Department argues, UTCC's payment of a license tax in accordance with § 40-21-52, Ala.Code 1975, licensed UTCC to transact business in Alabama.
"It is [an appellate court's] responsibility to give effect to the legislative intent whenever that intent is manifested." Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 855 So.2d 513, 517 (Ala.2003); see also State v. Union Tank Car Co., 281 Ala. 246, 248, 201 So.2d 402, 403 (1967). The commonly accepted definition of a term in a statute should be applied when a term is not defined in the statute. Bean Dredging, L.L.C., 855 So.2d at 517. "If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect." IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992).
Section 40-18-2, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Section 40-21-52, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
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