State Division of Human Rights v. Syracuse City Teachers Ass'n, Inc.

Decision Date19 January 1979
Citation66 A.D.2d 56,412 N.Y.S.2d 711
Parties, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9149 STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS on the Complaint of Carolyn Bratt and Marilyn Patrick, Respondents, v. The SYRACUSE CITY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and Margaret Hanley, Petitioners. STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS on the Complaint of Carolyn Bratt and Marilyn Patrick, Respondents, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Bernard Ashe, Albany, for petitioners in Appeal No. 1; Gerard J. DeWolf, Albany, of counsel.

Ann Thacher Anderson, New York City, for State Division of Human Rights; Elaine R. Berger, New York City, of counsel.

Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove & Hust, Syracuse, for petitioner in Appeal No. 2; James P. Burns, Syracuse, of counsel.

Before CARDAMONE, J. P., and SIMONS, DILLON, SCHNEPP and WITMER, JJ.

SIMONS, Justice:

Complainant Bratt was formerly a ninth grade Social Studies teacher at the Eastwood Junior High School in the Syracuse School District. In December, 1968 she was asked by the school's Physical Education teacher whether she would coach the girls' basketball team. She agreed and enlisted the aid of complainant Patrick, a Mathematics teacher. The two started their coaching duties in January, 1969, with about 70-80 girls trying out for the team. This number was reduced to a group of 15 which practiced twice per week, played four games and won one scheduled game by forfeit. Complainants concluded their coaching duties in February, 1969. They were promised no additional pay for this activity and received none. When they discovered later in the year that the boys' basketball coach had been paid $308 for coaching the boys' basketball team, they filed a grievance pursuant to the employment contract between petitioners, the Board of Education and the Association, but that grievance was not pursued. Instead, on June 13, 1969 complainants initiated proceedings with respondent, Division alleging that they had been the subject of unlawful discriminatory practices in their employment because they were female. 1 The complaints were later amended to charge petitioners with additional acts of discrimination in negotiating and executing the employment contracts for 1970-1971, 1972-1973 and the supplementary agreement of 1973.

The Commissioner found that the Board of Education had discriminated against complainants by failing to pay them for coaching the girls' basketball team in 1969. He ordered payment of an amount equal to that received by the coach of the boys' basketball team, $308, to be divided $154 for each complainant, plus interest. The Commissioner also ordered petitioners to desist from discriminatory practices and, finding the 1973 supplemental agreement discriminatory, he ordered the Board to compensate female employees coaching girls' athletic programs at rates which it pays male employees for coaching high school interscholastic teams in gymnastics, basketball, soccer, track and tennis, and junior high school interscholastic teams in basketball and track. Presumably, the order referred to females coaching girls' teams in the enumerated sports and directed that their pay equal that of males coaching boys' teams in the enumerated sports. The Commissioner's order was affirmed by the Human Rights Appeal Board and petitioners instituted this proceeding pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law.

The contract for the year 1968-1969 was facially neutral and the first issue for determination is whether that contract, as applied, discriminated against females. The second issue concerns the supplementary agreement of 1973 which expressly differentiated in pay scales between coaches of girls' and boys' teams. Petitioners challenge the Commissioner's order which in essence found the 1973 contract discriminatory Per se. The problem arises because of the admittedly disparate treatment accorded to established boys' athletic programs and developing girls' athletic programs. For example, the coach of the boys' football team engaged in a school function which had matured over a number of years and which had well defined responsibilities and time requirements. Conversely, in 1968 the girls' athletic program in the Syracuse Junior High School was undeveloped and subordinated to the boys' program with respect to budget priorities and the use of school facilities. Throughout the testimony in the record it is apparent that one of the main irritants in the situation was that the girls' athletic program played a role secondary to the boys' program and that because of its slower development, female coaches had fewer paid coaching opportunities. Nevertheless, the proof in the record establishes that the coaches of girls' junior high teams spent less time and undertook less responsibility in this extra-curricular activity than the coaches of similar boys' junior high teams. In the case of junior high basketball the boys' coach spent approximately twice as much time in the activity. The dispositive issue, therefore, is whether an employer may compensate coaches of girls' teams performing duties of the same nature as coaches of boys' teams but to a lesser degree differently from the coaches of boys' teams. We hold that it may and we grant the petition and annul the determination appealed.

The scope of our review is spelled out in the statute We must confirm if the Commissioner's determination is supported by "sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole." "Sufficient evidence" is substantial evidence (State Div. of Human Rights v. Columbia University, 39 N.Y.2d 612, 385 N.Y.S.2d 19, 350 N.E.2d 396; State Div. of Human Rights v. City of Syracuse, 57 A.D.2d 452, 394 N.Y.S.2d 948, affd. 43 N.Y.2d 958, 404 N.Y.S.2d 343, 375 N.E.2d 409), i. e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 274, 26 N.E.2d 247, 255, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126; and see Matter of Collins v. Codd, 38 N.Y.2d 269, 270-271, 379 N.Y.S.2d 733, 734, 342 N.E.2d 524, 525).

The contract governing the 1968-1969 school year contained an appendix itemizing the pay for coaching certain enumerated junior high teams. The appendix was entitled "Extra-curricular Activities (Junior High Coaching Salary Schedule)". The stated pay for coaching basketball was $308 for the season. The contract made no distinction between girls' or boys' teams and it did not specify the degree of competition required before payment was earned. Complainants contend therefore that they were entitled to be paid as was the male coach of the boys' teams regardless of the time or responsibility involved. Having proved that the coach of the boys' basketball team was paid $308, they maintain that they have established a prima facie case and the burden has shifted to petitioners to justify the disparity in pay and prove that it was not an act of unlawful discrimination (see Matter of Pace Coll. v. Commission on Human Rights of City of N. Y., 38 N.Y. 28, 39, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471, 479, 339 N.E.2d 880, 885).

Petitioners' witnesses met that burden. It was their testimony that the pay schedule was applicable only to interscholastic level teams. The boys' team was an interscholastic team because it practiced daily, it played a fixed round-robin schedule with the other eight Syracuse junior high schools, pursued a season considerably longer than the girls' team and required a substantially greater amount of the coach's time and attention. Furthermore, there had been a boys' junior high interscholastic program for several years which had matured and developed to the degree that coaches received pay after 1967.

By contrast, interest in the girls' program was still developing from the "invitational", "play day" or intra mural stage of competition. In 1969 the girls' basketball team was...

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4 cases
  • Erickson v. Board of Educ., Proviso Tp. High School, Dist. No. 209, Cook County, 83-0857
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 12, 1983
    ...No. 5 v. State Division of Human Rights (1980), 74 A.D.2d 570, 424 N.Y.S.2d 293; State Division of Human Rights v. Syracuse City Teachers Association, Inc. (1979), 66 A.D.2d 56, 412 N.Y.S.2d 711. The same result was very recently reached by this court in connection with an alleged violation......
  • Speller v. State Drug Abuse Control Commission
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • February 16, 1979
    ...394, 380 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632, 343 N.E.2d 274, 275; State Div. of Hum. Rights (complaint of Bratt, et al.) v. Syracuse City Teachers Assn., et al., 66 A.D.2d 56, 412 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1979); Matter of Perry v. Blair, 64 A.D.2d 870, 407 N.Y.S.2d 371; Matter of Gristmacher v. Felicetta, 57 A.D.2d 44......
  • Mountleigh v. City of New York
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • March 16, 1993
    ...are fully supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole (see, State Division of Human Rights v. Syracuse City Teachers Association, 66 A.D.2d 56, 59, 412 N.Y.S.2d 711). Also duly supported by the record are respondents' findings that petitioner's voluntary resignatio......
  • Kings Park Central School Dist. No. 5 v. State Division of Human Rights
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • February 4, 1980
    ...is not supported by substantial evidence and the order must be annulled insofar as reviewed. (See State Div. of Human Rights v. Syracuse City Teachers Ass'n., 66 A.D.2d 56, 412 N.Y.S.2d 711.) It may well be that the root of the complainants' grievance lies in a regrettable and discriminator......

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