State ex Inf. Attorney-General v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
| Decision Date | 02 June 1904 |
| Citation | 81 S.W. 395,182 Mo. 284 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex inf. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ denied.
Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, and Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, for informant.
(1) In its popular sense, the term "railroad" includes all that are involved in the business of moving passengers and freight over a physical structure. Cent. Mo. Co. v Railroad, 89 F. 560; Railroad v. Railroad, 46 N. J. L. 289; Railroad v. Railroad, 123 Ill. 594. The spirit and object of the constitutional inhibition must be regarded. It will not do to juggle with its technical meaning. Railroad v. Jarvis, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R Cas. (N. S.) 459. The respondent, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway company, the St. Louis Terminal Railway Company and the St. Louis Transfer Railway Company were organized under the general railroad corporation laws of Missouri and their articles of incorporation characterizes them as railroads. Ch. 12, art. 2, R. S. 1899. The manner of incorporation, and the nature and character of the business to be transacted, is shown by their articles of incorporation, and place them under the head of railroad companies doing a railroad business, to-wit: the transfer and carrying of freight and passengers upon physical structures. The constitutional inhibition in question was adopted for the protection of the people and the general welfare of the State. It must be construed to mean the same thing at all times and under all circumstances. It does not mean one thing at one time and another thing at a subsequent time. The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed the words used in their natural sense and to have intended a natural and reasonable construction and interpretation to be placed upon them. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Beardstown v Virginia, 76 Ill. 34. It will be observed that there are no exceptions to the constitutional provision, and any corporation occupying the position of a public carrier and using facilities such as are ordinarily characterized as railroads, falls within the terms of this organic inhibition. Respondent is engaged in the business of a common carrier by moving passengers and freight over a physical structure suitable for the passage and conveyance of railroad cars from the lines of initial railroads over their own lines to and upon the roads of other companies. So far as the physical structure is concerned, it is identically the same as that of through trunk lines, employing and using the same facilities and the same means of transportation. It will not do, therefore, to say that the framers of the Constitution and the people who adopted it did not intend that the provisions of this inhibiting section should apply to corporations conducting the business transacted by respondent. There is no rule of law and no principle sound in reason that authorizes such an exception. That there can be competition between such companies does not admit of doubt. Railroad v. Jarvis, supra. A consideration of the objects sought to be accomplished or the mischief designed to be guarded against is to be observed in determining the meaning of a constitutional provision. People v. Potter, 47 N.Y. 375; Baltimore v. City, 15 Md. 376; People v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83. Constitutions are instruments of a practical nature to be construed in the light of common sense, so as to carry out the intention of the framers and adopters. Railroad v. Brick Co., 85 Mo. 307; State ex rel. v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 147. (2) The respondent, together with the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railroad Company, the St. Louis Terminal Railway Company, and the St. Louis Transfer Railway Company, as such, are competing roads, and as such have no right to consolidate. The Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis owns, in fact or under lease or contract, various lines of roadbed, side tracks and switches in various parts of the city of St. Louis. In this way it controls the traffic upon and over what is known as the Eads bridge. The lines of railroad formerly owned by the other companies above named traverse various parts of the city of St. Louis for terminal purposes. The St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company, prior to respondent's obtaining control of it, operated and controlled the traffic, both passenger and freight, over the Merchants bridge at St. Louis. Both of the above-named bridges span the Mississippi river opposite the city of St. Louis. These bridges are natural competitors for the freight and passenger business across the Mississippi river and into the city of St. Louis. The terminal facilities of the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company permeate various parts of the city, including the portion of the territory covered by the lines of the respondent. Both of these companies in their unfettered condition were rivals in business and were each doubtless making every effort possible to secure the switching and railroad transfer business in the respective localities where their lines were situated. Not only are the lines of roads of the respective companies parallel, as that term has been construed by the courts, but they are also competitive. Competitive, first, because parallel with each other; second, because they are engaged in that character of business which invites manufacturers, business men and corporations, warehousemen and others engaged in industrial enterprises to locate their establishments upon the line of switches and side tracks of the respective companies, or within a territory readily accessible thereto. In this way these companies, if free to act, were competitors with each other, by being able, of their own accord and without being bound by any agreement or understanding with its competitor, to make certain specific and reasonable concessions, contracts and agreements to industries of the character above mentioned. While these roads would not be parallel in a strict geometrical sense, yet there is no question but, in a decision of the courts on the subject, they would be considered as parallel and competing, because of their peculiar situation and the circumstances surrounding them. This principle applies to the case at hand, and in addition thereto, a large portion of the tracks of the several companies are parallel, one with the other, and as such are natural competitors in the business in which they are engaged. Pearsall v. Railroad, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. (N. S.) 503, 161 U.S. 646; Railroad v. Ashling, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. (N. S.) 549; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 11 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 353; State v. Railroad, 24 Neb. 154, 8 Am. State Rep. 164; Railroad v. Railroad, 66 N.H. 100; Currier v. Railroad, 48 N.H. 321; Railroad v. Jarvis, 15 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. (N. S.) 459; Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 240; Earle v. Railroad, 56 F. 909; Thomas v. Railroad, 101 U.S. 71. (3) The contract or agreement entered into on the seventeenth day of August, 1903, between respondent and the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company, is ultra vires. Railroad v. Railroad, 9 Hare 304; County v. Railroad, 50 Ind. 85; Abbott v. Railroad, 80 N.Y. 27; Gas Co. v. Light Co., 115 U.S. 650; Morrill v. Railroad, 55 N.H. 531; Railroad v. State, 72 Tex. 404; State v. Railroad, 24 Neb. 143; Pennsylvania Co. v. Railroad, 118 U.S. 316; Transportation Co. v. Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24. (4) Ownership of a majority of the stock of the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company by respondent is violative of the Constitution and statutes. Elkins v. Railroad, 36 N.J.Eq. 5; Railroad v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582; Railroad v. Commonwealth, 29 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 145, 29 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 154. (5) Legislatures can not authorize a contract or act of consolidation prohibited by the Constitution. Pearsall v. Railroad, 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 503; State v. Vanderbilt, 37 Ohio St. 590; State v. Railroad, 8 Am. St. 164.
M. F. Watts, H. S. Priest, Martin L. Clardy and W. M. Williams for respondent.
OPINION
In Banc
Quo Warranto.
This is a proceeding on information of the Attorney-General, the object of which is to exclude the respondent corporation from all corporate franchises, and to annul its charter, on the ground that it has violated the law of this State which prohibits a railroad company from consolidating with another company which owns or controls a parallel or competing line.
The information sets out in chronological order the several corporations that have been chartered to handle the terminal railroad business in St. Louis. From its statements the following facts may be gathered:
In 1874 the structure now known as the Eads bridge across the Mississippi was finished. The railroad tracks over that bridge, extending from the east to the west, entered a tunnel under Washington avenue in St. Louis, which ran west and southwest until it emerged at a point near Eighth and Poplar streets. In that year a Union Depot Company was chartered which erected a union depot and passenger station with switch tracks, yards, etc., at a point near Twelfth and Poplar streets. From that date on there were various companies chartered under the general railroad law whose object was to construct, maintain and use railroad tracks for the purpose of handling cars and trains of the various railroad companies coming into and out of the union depot from the south and the west, and also from the east over the Eads bridge. Through these corporations, rights-of-way were acquired, tracks and switch yards necessary for this business were constructed,...
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