State ex rel. and to Use of Covington v. Wabash Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 March 1928
• Docket Number: 26339
• Citation: 3 S.W.2d 378,319 Mo. 302
• Parties: The State at Relation and to Use of Joe Covington, Collector of Revenue for Montgomery County, Appellant, v. Wabash Railway Company
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

3 S.W.2d 378

319 Mo. 302

The State at Relation and to Use of Joe Covington, Collector of Revenue for Montgomery County, Appellant, v. Wabash Railway Company

No. 26339

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 3, 1928

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court; Hon. Ernest S. Gantt Judge.

Affirmed.

Glover E. Dowell and Emil P. Rosenberger for appellants.

(1) The levy made in 1923 by the county court of fifteen cents for road purposes, under Section 10682, Revised Statutes 1919, as amended in 1921, Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) 172, did not constitute a part of the revenue for county purposes. State ex rel. Vaught v. Railroad Co., 270 Mo. 251; State ex rel. Philpott v. Railway Co., 247 S.W. 182; State ex rel. Road District v. Barry County, 258 S.W. 710. (2) That portion of House Bill No. 622, passed at the regular 1921 session, Laws 1921, p. 677, which provides in substance, that in no year may the county court, for county purposes, order a rate of tax levy that will produce mathematically more than ten per cent in excess of the taxes levied for the previous year, is unconstitutional. Board of Commissioners v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520.

Homer Hall, A. H. Drunert and W. C. Hughes for respondent.

(1) The levy in 1923 by the county court of fifteen cents for county purposes and fifteen cents for road purposes, or a total of 30 cents, was made under the three sections of the law, which should be read together, and constituted the annual tax on property for county purposes, to be apportioned to the five funds, one of which is designated the road and bridge fund. R. S. 1919, sec. 12865, amended, Laws 1921, pp. 667, 668; sec. 12866; sec. 10682, amended, Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 172. (2) A levy for road purposes as limited by Section 10682, as amended, Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 172, constitutes and is a part of the annual tax on property for county purposes, as authorized and limited by Section 12865, as amended, Laws 1921, pp. 667 and 668, and by Section 12866. Carthage Spec. Rd. Dist. v. Ross, 270 Mo. 76; State ex rel. v. Ry. Co., 270 Mo. 76; State ex rel. v. Ry. Co., 270 Mo. 251; State ex rel. v. Burton, 283 Mo. 41; State ex rel. v. Ry. Co., 310 Mo. 587. (3) Sec. 12865, R. S. 1919, amended, Laws 1921, p. 667, which provides that no county court shall order a rate of tax levy that will produce, mathematically, more than ten per cent in excess of the taxes levied for the previous year, is constitutional. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 247 S.W. 182; Birmingham Dr. Dist. v. Railroad Co., 274 Mo. 140; State ex rel. v. Railway Co., 310 Mo. 587; Wilson v. Washington County, 247 S.W. 185.

Ellison, C. Lindsay and Seddon, CC., concur.

OPINION

ELLISON

This is a suit to recover $ 801.98 delinquent taxes alleged to be due Montgomery County from the respondent. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts. Only two questions are involved: (a) the proper construction of two certain statutes; (b) the constitutionality of one of these statutes, if applicable.

The facts, very briefly, are that at the May term 1923, the County Court of Montgomery County made a levy of fifteen cents on the $ 100 valuation for county purposes and another levy of fifteen cents on the $ 100 for road purposes, the latter being under Section 10682, Revised Statutes 1919, as amended by Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 172. That fact should be remembered. The petition pleads and the agreed statement of facts is that the road tax was levied under the amended Section 10682. It is provided by Section 12865, Revised Statutes 1919, as reenacted by Laws 1921 (Regular Session) p. 678, that no county court in any year shall have power to order a rate of tax levy that will produce, mathematically, more than ten per cent in excess of the taxes levied for the previous year (except by vote of the people). The two tax levies in question here, taken together, did yield a mathematical excess above the allowed ten per cent maximum increase, in an amount such that the excess prorated to the respondent's 1923 tax was $ 801.98, the sum here in dispute.

The defendant-respondent invokes this provision of Section 12865 as precluding a recovery by plaintiff-appellant. The appellant says (1) a levy for road purposes under Section 10682 is not such a tax as comes within the meaning of Section 12865, and hence the ten-per-cent restriction in the latter section does not apply; (2) but that if, on a construction of the two statutes, we hold the ten-per-cent restriction does apply, the restriction is nevertheless not binding because in conflict with Sections 1 and 36 of Article VI, and Sections 1, 10, 11 and 22 of Article X, of the State Constitution. The circuit court ruled against the appellant on both points. We shall take up the two questions in the above order.

First, to what kinds of taxes does the ten-per-cent restriction in Section 12865 apply? The first twelve lines of the section (except for unimportant changes in punctuation and wording) are as they have stood for nearly fifty years since its original enactment as a part of Laws 1879, p. 193, shortly following the adoption of the present Constitution in 1875. These opening lines put in statutory form the provisions (almost the exact language) of that part of Section 11, Article X, of the Constitution imposing a limit on the rates of taxation "for county purposes." The proviso added by the reenactment in 1921 is as follows:

"The foregoing are maximum rates which may be levied in said counties. Provided, however, the county court shall not have power to order a rate of tax levy on real or personal property for the year 1921, . . . and in no subsequent year may any county court, or any officer or officers acting therefor, order a rate of tax levy that will produce, mathematically, more than ten per cent in excess of the taxes levied for the previous year. . . ."

On a surface reading, the natural interpretation of the proviso is that it refers to tax levies "for county purposes" in the comprehensive sense in which those words are used in the preceding lines of the section and in the Constitution; but in State ex rel. Philpott v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 296 Mo. 518, 525, 247 S.W. 182, this court, en banc, gave it as somewhat narrower application. It will be observed the proviso says the county court shall not have power to order a rate of levy, etc. Attaching significance to these words, evidently, the Philpott case in effect held the ten-per-cent restriction referred only to taxes which a county court would have power to levy in the absence of the restriction, in other words, taxes which the court may levy of its own initiative. The specific ruling was that the proviso did not reach a special tax levy which may be authorized only through the circuit court or circuit judge under Section 12860, Revised Statutes 1919, but it was conceded the limitation would apply to a general levy for county purposes, to pay "current county expenditures" under Section 12859, Revised Statutes 1919; and we think the reasoning of the decision leads to the broader conclusion above stated.

Now a levy for road purposes under Section 10682, Revised Statutes 1919, as amended by Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 172, is one which a county court may make on its own initiative without invoking outside aid, consent or authority, and, furthermore, "the payment of all necessary expenses for the building of bridges and repairing of roads," etc., is one of the objects and purposes for which a county court may exercise its general power to raise revenue by taxation, within the limits set by Section 11, Article X, of the Constitution (Sec. 12866, R. S. 1919.) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the levy for road purposes under amended Section 10682 in the instant case was a levy for county purposes within the meaning of the reenacted Section 12865, and that as a matter of construction the ten-per-cent restriction applies.

This brings us to the constitutional questions. The first to be considered is this -- to what particular constitutional provision is amended Section 10682 referable? Let us first set out the statute:

"The county courts in the several counties of this State, having a population of less than two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, at the May term thereof in each year, shall levy upon all real and personal property made taxable by law a tax of not more than twenty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation as a road tax, which levy shall be collected and paid into the county treasury as other revenue, and shall be placed to the credit of the 'county road and bridge fund.'"

The prototype of this section was enacted by Laws 1899, p. 340 (Sec. 9436, R. S. 1899), by which it was provided that county courts may levy a road tax of not less than five cents or more than twenty cents on the $ 100 valuation, to be deducted from the levy made for county purposes. The statute has come on down as Section 19, page 743, Laws 1909; Section 10481, Revised Statutes 1909; Laws 1913, page 667; Section 36, page 457, Laws 1917; Section 10682, Revised Statutes 1919; and Laws 1921 (Ex. Sess.) p. 172. The law of 1909 dropped the five cent minimum imposed by the law of 1899, and also omitted the specific provision that the road tax be deducted from the levy made for county purposes. The 1913 law put back a minimum of ten cents, which was carried in the statute until stricken out by the amendment in 1921. Now there is no minimum requirement, but the section during all this twenty years, nearly, has been regarded as a mandatory statute requiring the levy of a road tax within the limit (or limits) specified from time to time.

Turning aside for a minute to another line of legislation. Section 22 of Article X of the Constitution was adopted in 1908. It provides that in addition to taxes authorized to be levied...