State ex rel. Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Moriarty

• Citation: 589 S.W.3d 567
• Decision Date: 24 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. SC 97845,SC 97845
• Parties: STATE EX REL. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC, Relator, v. The Honorable Joan L. MORIARTY, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

589 S.W.3d 567

STATE EX REL. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, LLC, Relator,
v.
The Honorable Joan L. MORIARTY, Respondent.

No. SC 97845

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued December 24, 2019

Anheuser-Busch was represented by James F. Bennett, Elizabeth C. Carver, Michelle D. Nasser and Arsenio L. Mims of Dowd Bennett LLP in St. Louis, (314) 889-7300.

Esser was represented by Jerome J. Dobson and Gregory A. Rich of Dobson, Goldberg, Berms & Rich LLP in St. Louis, (314) 621-8363.

Zel M. Fischer, Judge

Anheuser-Busch, LLC ("A-B"), filed a petition for a writ of prohibition directing the circuit court to vacate the portion of its March 5, 2018, order overruling A-B's motion to dismiss and to dismiss the underlying plaintiff's first amended petition with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. Because the plaintiff, John Esser, was neither aggrieved nor adversely impacted in Missouri, the MHRA does not provide a remedy for his claims. Considering neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of this Court's opinion in Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers, Inc. , 590 S.W.3d 307 (Mo. banc 2019), also issued today, and because an adequate remedy can be provided by appeal, the preliminary writ is quashed.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Esser, a resident of Urbandale, Iowa, has worked for A-B since 1983, holding several different positions since that time.¹ In 2007, Esser became a retail sales director over a sales territory that included Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.² While Esser was a retail sales director, his direct supervisor, secretary, and other support staff were located in A-B's regional sales office in St. Louis, Missouri. While employed as a retail sales director, Esser made monthly trips to the St. Louis office for meetings, reviews, and training.

Beginning in 2012, Esser alleged A-B began a pattern and practice of discriminating against its older employees in favor of its younger employees.³ Specifically, Esser alleges the following in his first amended petition:

589 S.W.3d 569

(1) In 2012, while in St. Louis, A-B's vice president of sales for the Midwest region informed Esser he was going to receive a performance rating of 3B⁴ on his annual performance review, which was lower than his rating the year before;

(2) In 2013, Esser attended a meeting in St. Louis at which A-B's chief financial officer—and later vice president of sales—made questionable remarks about "experienced" and "mature" A-B employees;

(3) In 2013, A-B's vice president of sales for the midwest region informed Esser he was going to receive a performance rating of 1A⁵ on his annual performance review;

(4) In 2013, Esser was given an "Expectations Letter" stating he could face termination or other disciplinary action if his performance did not improve in 90 days;

(5) In 2014, during a meeting in St. Louis, Esser was given another 3B rating in his annual performance review, meaning Esser would not receive a pay increase or stock options;

(6) In 2015, Esser's superior—who was located in St. Louis—informed him via telephone call he was receiving a downgraded 1A performance rating on his annual performance review;

(7) In 2015, Esser was informed via telephone call by three A-B directors—two of whom were located in St. Louis—he could not keep his current job as a retail sales director;

(8) In 2016, a memo was sent from the St. Louis office to all employees in Esser's region stating, effective immediately, Esser was moving to a non-equity market manager position.

Esser filed a charge of discrimination against A-B with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("MCHR"). The MCHR provided Esser with a notice of right to sue, and Esser filed suit in the St. Louis City circuit court, alleging age discrimination in violation of § 213.055⁶ and retaliation in violation of § 213.070.⁷ A-B filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative to compel arbitration. After the first motion to dismiss was filed, Esser amended his petition to include new allegations pertaining to his contacts with Missouri. A-B filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing Esser could not invoke the protections of the MHRA as an Iowa resident and employee. The circuit court overruled both the motion to dismiss and the motion to compel arbitration.⁸

589 S.W.3d 570

The circuit court's order recognized Missouri's presumption against extraterritorial application of laws, but ultimately concluded Esser stated a claim under the MHRA because "the acts alleged did not occur wholly outside of Missouri." After the court of appeals denied writ relief, A-B sought a writ of prohibition from this Court directing the circuit court to vacate the portion of its order overruling A-B's motion to dismiss and to dismiss Esser's first amended petition with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. At the time of these rulings neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of this Court's opinion in Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Centers, Inc. , 590 S.W.3d 307 (Mo. banc 2019). It is argued this Court could exercise its discretion to make the preliminary writ permanent or, in the alternative, quash the preliminary writ to give the circuit court the opportunity to reconsider the motion to dismiss in light of Tuttle. As demonstrated by Tuttle , A-B has an adequate remedy on appeal. See Rule 84.22(a).

Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs. Mo. Const. art. V, § 4.1.

A writ of prohibition is appropriate: (1) to prevent the usurpation of judicial power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction; (2) to remedy an excess of authority, jurisdiction or abuse of discretion where the lower court lacks the power to act as intended; or (3) where a party may suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted.

State ex rel. Key Ins. Co. v. Roldan , No. SC97623, 2019 WL 5558334, at *1 (Mo. banc Oct. 29, 2019).

Analysis

I.

"The MHRA protects important societal interests by prohibiting unlawful employment practices on the basis of ... age." Tuttle , at ––––, at *4 (alterations in original). "It shall be an unlawful employment practice ... [f]or an employer, because of the ... age ... of any individual ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... age." § 213.055.1(1)(a). The MHRA requires a person be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice before filing a complaint with the MCHR. See § 213.075.1 ("Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice may make, sign and file with the commission a verified complaint in writing[.]" (emphasis added)); § 213.111.1 ("[T]he commission shall issue to the person claiming to be aggrieved a letter indicating his or her right to bring a civil action[.]" (emphasis added)).

The MHRA defines the phrase "unlawful discriminatory practice" as "any act that is unlawful under this chapter." § 213.010(18). "Aggrieved" is not defined by the MHRA. "In the absence of statutory definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of a term may be derived from a dictionary, and by considering the context of the entire statute in which it appears." Mantia v. Mo. Dep't of Transp. , 529 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Mo. banc 2017) (emphases omitted). The word aggrieved means "showing grief, injury, or offense; having a grievance; specif: suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 41 (3d ed. 2002). This Court held in

589 S.W.3d 571

Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University , 565 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. banc 2019), and reaffirmed most recently in Tuttle that "an allegedly discriminatory act must have had some adverse impact on the plaintiff before it becomes actionable." Tuttle , ––– S.W. 3d at ––––, at *5 (internal quotation and emphasis omitted); see also Kader , 565 S.W.3d at 189. "Said another way, it is the adverse impact that is actionable under the MHRA, but only if that adverse impact resulted from a prohibited discriminatory practice." Tuttle , ––– S.W. 3d at ––––, at *5.

The relevant facts of this case are similar to Tuttle. In Tuttle, the plaintiff, an Illinois resident, worked exclusively in Illinois for Dobbs Tire as a store manager. Tuttle alleged Dobbs Tire discriminated against him because of his age by transferring him to a lower performing store, transferring a number of illegitimate expenses to Tuttle's store to distort its profit numbers, and making him sign certain documents younger store owners did not have to sign. Tuttle alleged Dobbs Tire's actions amounted to his constructive discharge from the company. Tuttle tendered his resignation and filed a lawsuit in the circuit court of St. Louis County, claiming both age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the MHRA.

In evaluating Tuttle's claims, this Court first looked to the language of the MHRA, noting that a plaintiff must be aggrieved before having an...