State ex rel. Barrett v. May
| Decision Date | 30 November 1921 |
| Citation | 235 S.W. 124,290 Mo. 302 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. JESSE W. BARRETT, Attorney-General, v. ALLEN MAY |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Demurrer overruled.
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Merrill E. Otis, Assistant Attorney-General, for relator.
Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1875 vests the judicial power of the State in a "Supreme Court, St Louis Court of Appeals, circuit courts, criminal courts probate courts, county courts and municipal corporation courts." The Legislature has no power to create any other court or type of court than those enumerated in this section. The term "municipal corporation court," as used in Section 1 of Article VI, means only local city or police courts, primarily intended as forums for the enforcement of city ordinances, with subject-matter jurisdiction restricted to matters affecting the city and its inhabitants and essentially to matters relating to city ordinances and with territorial jurisdiction confined within the city limits. The proposed court, of which respondent has been appointed judge, is not a municipal corporation court within the meaning of the Constitution. Its territorial jurisdiction is not confined to any city. On the contrary, it is given jurisdiction co-extensive with the entire county. Its subject-matter jurisdiction is not confined to the enforcement of city ordinances. On the contrary, it is expressly denied such jurisdiction and is given jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court in civil matters up to the amount of one thousand dollars, with appeals lying directly to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. In attempting to create such a court the Legislature exceeded its constitutional authority and violated Section 1 of Article VI. Compare Section 1, Article V, Constitution of 1820; Section 1, Article VI, Constitution of 1865; Journals of Constitutional Convention, vol. 1, p. 338. See Cake v White, 91 Mo. 79; State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541, 555; Grand Rapids v. Gray, 38 Mich. 461; Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis. 510; Connors v. Gorey, 32 Wis. 518; Miller v. People, 230 Ill. 65; Morton v. Pusey, 237 Ill. 26.
G. L. Zwick for respondent; Allen May, respondent pro se.
(1) Legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional; and relator, having challenged this act, has the burden of showing its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Green County v. Lydy, 263 Mo. 77, 87; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; State ex inf. v. Merchants Exchange, 269 Mo. 346, 356. (2) The Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of legislative power; and the Legislature may pass any law not forbidden by the Constitution either in express terms or by irresistible inference. Ex parte Roberts, 166 Mo. 207, 212; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664, 687; State ex rel. v. Board of Curators, 268 Mo. 598, 619; Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 350. (3) It is the province of the Legislature to distribute the judicial power of the State among the courts provided by the Constitution, subject only to such restrictions as are expressed therein. State ex rel. v. Nast, 209 Mo. 708, 720; State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541; State v. Wilson, 265 Mo. 1, 13; State ex rel. v. Burton, 266 Mo. 711. (4) The exercise of other than police jurisdiction in municipal corporation courts is constitutional. State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 541; Cake v. White, 91 Mo. 79; Kansas City v. Land Co., 260 Mo. 395. (5) A county is a municipal corporation within the meaning of Article VI, Section 1, of the Constitution. Mo. Constitution, Art. 4, secs. 47, 51; Art. 9, secs. 6, 7, 18, 19; Art. 10, secs. 1, 9, 10, 12, 20; Art. 11, sec. 11; Bexar County v. Linden, 205 S.W. 478; State ex rel. v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458, 475; Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 23 L.Ed. 552; Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 23 L.Ed. 822; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 25 L.Ed. 699; Murphy v. Freeholders, 102 A. (N. J.) 896; Rathbone v. Hopper, 57 Kan. 240, 45 P. 610; Ex parte Selma & G. R. Co., 45 Ala. 496; Pacific Coast Ry. Co. v. Porter, 74 Cal. 261, 15 P. 774; In re Dowden, 36 Minn. 430, 31 N.W. 517; Lincoln County v. Brock, 37 Wash. 17, 79 P. 478. (6) The Constitution was designed by its framers to be a single, symmetrical and harmonious chart of government of the people of the State free from repugnancy or conflict in any of its provisions and presenting a single scheme of correlated parts for the control and regulation of all organs and departments of the state government. Calland v. Springfield, 264 Mo. 296, 301. (7) The Constitutional Convention intended that municipal corporation courts should be more than police courts, and that their jurisdiction should not be limited to cities and towns. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1875, Vol. 1, pp. 338, 390, 424; Mo. Constitution, Art. 9, sec. 7. (8) A court almost identical with this one, under a similar constitutional provision, was held constitutional in a sister state prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875. Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis. 510; State ex rel. Stark v. McArthur, 13 Wis. 383.
OPINIONIn Banc.
Quo Warranto.
-- The Attorney-General has exhibited to this court an information in the nature of a quo warranto, charging that, under the provisions of an act of the General Assembly approved March 28, 1921, entitled, "An Act Creating a Municipal Corporation Court in Certain Counties," etc. (Laws 1921, p. 226), the Governor appointed the respondent judge of said court in Buchanan County; that said respondent has duly qualified and is exercising the powers and duties of said office; that said act contravenes Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri; that respondent is unlawfully holding said office of judge of said municipal court, for the reason that said act is violative of the Constitution and is null and void. The respondent waived the issue of the writ, entered his appearance, and, agreeing that the petition may be treated as a writ of quo warranto, demurred thereto (1) as not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and (2) that under the allegations the respondent is lawfully holding the office of judge of said court.
The act creates a municipal corporation court in all counties in this State having a population of 90,000 and not over 150,000, and in which is located a city of not less than 75,000 inhabitants (which provisions spell Buchanan County only), said court to be a court of record with jurisdiction coextensive with the county in which it is located "in all actions at law or equity concurrent with justices of the peace and with the circuit court wherein the amount involved does not exceed the sum of one thousand dollars and the same jurisdiction of criminal cases as now given to justices of the peace and shall, within the limits thus given, exercise all the duties and powers now given by law to circuit courts and subject to such exceptions as herein enacted; the practice of law and procedure in said court shall be governed by the code of civil procedure as now in force as applied to the circuit court." The court is to be in continuous session and shall not have terms, but process shall be returnable in ten days and not more than thirty days, and cases shall be tried on the return day, or as soon thereafter as the court can hear them. The circuit clerk is clerk of the court and shall furnish a deputy clerk; appeals lie directly as from judgments of the circuit court. Cases may be removed from justices of the peace by either party to said court at any time before trial is commenced. Section 10 reads: "Nothing in this act shall be held to apply to or affect the conduct and business of city, police or municipal courts in this State." The foregoing synopsis is sufficient for the consideration of this case. If the court created by the act had been called a court of common pleas, it would not have been a misnomer.
Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution of 1820, reads: "The judicial power as to matters of law and equity shall be vested in a 'Supreme Court,' in a 'Chancellor,' in 'Circuit Courts,' and in such inferior tribunals as the General Assembly may, from time to time, ordain and establish."
Section 1, Article VI, of the Constitution of 1865, reads: "The judicial power, as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court, in district courts, in circuit courts, and in such inferior tribunals as the General Assembly may, from time to time, establish."
Section 1, Article VI, of the Constitution of 1875, reads: "The judicial power of the State, as to matters of law and equity, except as in this Constitution otherwise provided, shall be vested in a Supreme Court, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, circuit courts, criminal courts, probate courts, county courts and municipal corporation courts."
Under the Constitutions of 1820 and 1865, the judicial power of the State was not vested exclusively in the courts designated in the sections cited supra. In addition to those named, the General Assembly was empowered to ordain and establish other inferior courts. Accordingly, it created courts of inferior jurisdiction, such as courts of common pleas, recorder's courts, and doubtless other courts in many of the counties of the State. But the Legislature was shorn of this power by the Constitution of 1875, which provided a complete system of judicial tribunals for the State and vested in them all the judicial power of the State. The Constitution disposed of all the judicial power of the State in matters of law and equity and left nothing to be disposed of by the General Assembly. [State ex rel. v. Woodson, 161 Mo. 444, 61 S.W. 252; State ex rel. v. Locker, 266 Mo. 384, 390, 181 S.W 1001.] One circuit court, one county court and...
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