State ex rel. Bd. of Ed. of City of Waterbury v. Quinn
| Decision Date | 08 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 32856,32856 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF WATERBURY v. Raymond J. QUINN, Jr. |
William J. Secor, Jr., Waterbury, for plaintiff.
Vincent P. Matasavage, Corp. Counsel, and John F. Phelan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, of Waterbury, for defendant.
Robert L. Krechevsky, Hartford, filed a brief as amicus curiae.
In this action of mandamus, brought by the state's attorney at Waterbury, the relator, or real plaintiff, is the board of education of the city of Waterbury, which seeks to require the defendant Quinn, as comptroller of the city of Waterbury, to pay increased salaries to certain teachers in accordance with a schedule contained in a contract entered into between the board of education and the Waterbury Teachers Association under the provisions of § 10-153d of the General Statutes. The case has been submitted to the court on a stipulation of facts.
The narrow and overriding issue presented to the court is whether the charter provisions of the city of Waterbury take precedence over a contract executed pursuant to and under the limitations of § 10-153d of the General Statutes. More specifically, does the charter, with particular reference to §§ 903(a), 1336, and 1338, grant to the Waterbury board of finance and board of aldermen, respectively, the ultimate review and control of the teachers' salaries and the amounts thereof, regardless of an agreement negotiated and executed by the Waterbury board of education and the Waterbury Teachers Association pursuant to $ 10-153d of the General Statutes? The defendant's first special defense argues that the Waterbury charter controls the funding of the budget of the department of education and requires that the teachers be paid in accordance with the specific limitations on appropriations made by the board of aldermen. The third special defense claims specifically that a contract entered into under § 10-153d does not take precedence over charter requirments. The following discussion will encompass both of these special defenses and would appear strongly to support the position of the defendant for the several major reasons hereinafter considered and stated.
An analysis of the specific language of the statutory provisions involved, their legislative history and the recognized rules of statutory construction all support the position of the defendant.
It has been stipulated that the contract in this case was executed by the board of education and the teachers association pursuant to the provisions of §§ 10-153b, 10-153c, and 10-153d and that the act which includes those sections contains no express provision indicating that the terms of such a contract take precedence over any general statute or charter. Section 10-153d in its original form was § 3 of Public Acts 1965, No. 198, entitled 'An Act concerning the Right of Teachers' Representatives to Negotiate with Boards of Education.'
It is extremely interesting to compare the act just mentioned, which directly concerns this case, with another act passed at the same session of the legislature, Public Acts 1965, No. 159, entitled 'An Act Establishing a Municipal Employee Relations Act,' now designated as §§ 7-467 through 7-477 of the General Statutes and containing the following pertinent provisions: (1) Excluding certified teachers from the definition of 'employee' for purposes of that act § 7-467(2)). (2) Requiring that an agreement negotiated thereunder 'shall be reduced to writing' (§ 7-474(b)). (3) Requiring that 'a request for funds necessary to implement such written agreement and for approval of any provisions of the agreement which are in conflict with any charter, special act, ordinance, rule or regulation adopted by the municipal employer or its agents * * * shall be submitted by the bargaining representative of the municipality within fourteen days of the date on which such agreement is reached * * *' (§ 7-474(b)). (4) Stating that '(n)otwithstanding any provision of any general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, the budget-appropriating authority of any municipal employer shall appropriate whatever funds are required to comply with a collective bargaining agreement, provided the request called for in subsection (b) of * * * (§ 7-474) has been approved by the legislative body of such municipal employer' (§ 7-474(c)). (5) Stating that (n)o provision of any general statute, charter, special act or ordinance shall prevent negotiations between a municipal employer and employee organization * * *' (§ 7-474(e)). (6) Providing that '(w)here there is a conflict between any agreement teached by a municipal employer and an employee organization and approved in accordance with the provisions of sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, on matters appropriate to collective bargaining, as defined in said sections, and any charter, special act, ordinance, rules or regulations adopted by he municipal employer * * *, the terms of such agreement shall prevail' (§ 7-474(f)).
By contrast with the above provisions of the municipal employees' bargaining law, § 10-153d of the teachers' negotiating law (1) states that the 'execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party' is an obligation on the part of the board of education, instead of being mandatory, and (2) completely omits the repealer language of §§ 7-474(c), (e) and (f).
In summary, the legislature, in its wisdom, at the same session decreed (1) that municipal employees other than teachers, through the collective bargaining process, could effect with the municipal employer agreements which must be funded and implemented, any charter or other requirement to the contrary notwithstanding; and (2) granted teachers only the mechanism of selecting duly authorized representatives for the purpose of negotiation and only the right to demand that the board of education negotiate with such duly authorized representatives. A contrast of the so-called 'strong arm' repealer langauge of §§ 7-474(c), (e) and (f) with that portion of § 10-153d stating, '* * * but such obligation shall not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession,' seems to indicate a definite legislative direction that agreements with municipal employees other than teachers, once ratified, must be funded and paid in accordance with the terms thereof, but that in the case of agreements with teachers, there is no such requirement of funding and no requirement that either party agree to any proposal or make a concession. The refusal or, at least, failure of the legislature to grant the repealer language of § 7-474 to a § 10-153d contract strongly supports the defendant's position.
The conclusion stated above likewise is supported by the fundamental rules of statutory construction, for it is well settled that a special statute is not affected -either wholly or even partially repealed- by a general statute unless there is a plain indication of intent that the general act shall repeal the special act. State ex rel. Wallen v. Hatch, 82 Conn. 122, 124, 72 A. 575; New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Bridgeport Traction Co., 65 Conn. 410, 429, 32 A. 953, 29 L.R.A. 367; Galliot v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 26 Conn.Sup. 260, 218 A.2d 540; Laurel Beach Assn. v. Gilli, 15 Conn.Sup. 69, 72. As repeatedly stated by our Supreme Court, the question for the court is not what the legislature intended but what intention it expressed. Mad River Co. v. Wolcott, 137 Conn. 680, 686, 81 A.2d 119; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 57 A.2d 128, 1 A.L.R.2d 453; Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 385, 34 A.2d 636; Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 438, 28 A. 540.
Inasmuch as the legislature at the same session gave very limited rights to teachers and very sweeping and powerful rights to other municipal employees, there is particular significance to the line of cases in which it has been stated that there is a presumption that the legislature, in enacting a law, did it in view of existing relevant statutes and intended the enactment to be read with them so as to make one consistent body of law. State v. Jordan, 142 Conn. 375, 378, 114 A.2d 694; Jennings v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 657, 103 A.2d 535; Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 646, 146 A. 70.
The budget-making process of the city of Waterbury is outlined in §§ 1336, 1337 and 1338 of its charter, and § 903(a) specifically empowers the board of finance to approve teachers' salaries prescribed by the board of education. 31 Spec.Laws 249, No. 245; 26 Spec.Laws 693, No. 7 § 1; 29 Spec.Laws 320, No. 371; 23 Spec.Laws 173, No. 244. In accordance with its budget-making responsibilities, the board of finance exercised its powers under § 903(a) by disapproving the pension provisions and the ratio schedule for administrative- supervisory personnel detailed in the contract at its budget meetings of November 21 and 22, 1967, and the board of aldermen recognized its responsibility as the ultimate authority in the proper overall fiscal management of the affairs of the city of Waterbury, as indicated in the minutes of its meeting of December 21, 1967, in which appears the statement of the minority leader containing the following words: 'When we get through with these deliberations, we will have put together a Budget which is less than the amount recommended by the Board of Finance with the tax rate lower than recommended by the Board of Finance but to the best of our knowledge will not impair to any great extent the reasonable efficient operation of our City government * * *.'
These words compare rather strikingly with the criteria outlined in Board of Education of Town of Stamfors v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 350, 16 A.2d 601, 604: 'Where a town board of education...
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...decidendi of the decision was set out in another memorandum of decision filed in a companion case entitled State ex rel. Board of Education v. Quinn, 28 Conn.Sup. 265, 258 A.2d 476. A copy of the latter memorandum was annexed to the short memorandum of decision filed in this case. No appeal......
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