State ex rel. Boyd v. Green

• Decision Date: 16 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 52678,52678
• Citation: 355 So.2d 789
• Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Jeffrey Michael BOYD, Petitioner, v. R. A. GREEN, Jr., etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 789

355 So.2d 789

STATE of Florida ex rel. Jeffrey Michael BOYD, Petitioner, v. R. A. GREEN, Jr., etc., Respondent.

No. 52678.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 16, 1978.

Alan R. Parlapiano, Public Defender, Gainesville, for petitioner.

R. A. Green, Jr., in pro. per.

HATCHETT, Justice.

The principal issue presented for our consideration is whether the bifurcated trial system established by statute for the adjudication of guilt and insanity in criminal trials denies a defendant his right to due process of law under the state or federal constitutions. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and hold Chapter 77-312, Section 1, Laws of Florida (codified as Section 921.131(1), Florida Statutes), creating that procedure unconstitutional. ¹

Petitioner was charged by information with burglary and entered a plea of not guilty with intent to rely on the defense of insanity. By motion to dismiss, petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the newly enacted insanity statute which (1) repeals Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.210 and (2) provides for a separate trial on the issue of insanity following trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. The trial judge ruled that Section 1 of the statute which provides for a separate trial on insanity constitutes a denial of due process of law, but upheld the constitutionality of Section 10 of the statute which repeals Rule 3.210, finding it a valid exercise of the Legislature's authority pursuant to Article V, Section 2, Florida Constitution. ² The trial judge concluded that, as a result of his rulings above, the defense of insanity no longer exists in Florida and ordered the case to proceed to trial without benefit of that defense.

To fully resolve the issues presented we must also determine whether insanity as a defense existed at common law and whether Section 10 of Chapter 77-312, ³ repealing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.210, is so dependent upon Section 1 as to be inseparable from it.

By declaring that there is no defense of insanity in Florida, absent statute or rule, the trial court failed to recognize the common law defense as adopted by this court in Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902):

Section 2369 of our Revised Statutes provides that "the common law of England in relation to crime, except so far as the same relates to modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full force in the state where there is no existing provision by statute on the subject." There is no statute defining what degree of irresponsibility shall constitute incapacity to commit a criminal act, and hence the common law rule must govern. The rule announced in M'Naghten's case is substantially the rule laid down in all the modern English authorities, and the weight of authority in this country supports the English rule. At 827.

The origin and history of the common law defense is discussed more fully in an annotation on criminal responsibility found at 45 ALR2d 1451.

The concept of insanity as an excuse for conduct which would otherwise be punishable as a crime developed early in the history of English law. While it has been said that originally insanity was not a defense in the courts, the procedure being for the jury to find the accused guilty with a special verdict that he was mad, whereupon he would receive a royal pardon, it was early decided that there could be no crime where at the time of the act charged the accused was so insane as to be unable to form a guilty intention, although the court emphasized that insanity must be clearly shown and that not "every frantic and idle humour" would exempt from punishment. Ability to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the act charged was soon recognized as the test to be applied, and this test received its classic formulation in the advisory opinion of the judges in M'Naghten's Case, stating that the test of mental responsibility is whether the accused "was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." (footnotes omitted)

Florida courts have continued to adhere to the common law defense of insanity and intervening procedural rules and statutes relating to the mechanics for raising this defense have not altered its existence. ⁴ Wheeler v. State, 344 So.2d 244 (Fla.1977); Anderson v. State, 276 So.2d 17 (Fla.1973); Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla.1969); Holston v. State, 208 So.2d 98 (Fla.1968); Van Eaton v. State, 205 So.2d 298 (Fla.1967); and Piccott v. State, 116 So.2d 626 (Fla.1959). We therefore find that the conclusion reached by the trial judge, that his ruling effectively abolished the defense of insanity, constitutes reversible error.

We are in agreement with the trial court that the bifurcated trial procedure established by the Legislature for the adjudication of guilt and insanity denies a defendant his right to due process of law. The bifurcated trial system is not a new one. California, Arizona, Texas, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Colorado, and Wyoming have, in an effort to provide greater safeguards for a defendant, adopted by rule or by statute, systems whereby the issue of insanity is tried separately from the issue of guilt or commission of the acts charged. ⁵ Legal scholars report that these states have recognized the potential prejudice which may result from the introduction of the wide range of evidence relevant to an insanity defense in a case where the defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double-Edged Sword. 66 N.W. Law Rev. 327 (1971). Their position is that where evidence going to the defense of insanity is withheld from that portion of the trial in which guilt is determined, any potential prejudice is eliminated. If the jury finds that the defendant is guilty his insanity defense is explored in a separate trial. ⁶ Such a procedure is not without its problems. Criminal responsibility results when each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Coachman v. State, 114 So.2d 189 (Fla.App.1959), Kilbee v. State, 53 So.2d 533 (Fla.1951). Only then is the State authorized to exercise its power to impose certain specified sanctions against the offender. The basis of an insanity defense is that a person is unable to form the requisite intent. Since intent is an element of most crimes, lack of intent precludes criminal responsibility. Under the bifurcated system established by our Legislature, no evidence of insanity is admissible during that phase of the trial in which guilt or innocence is determined. Sanity is, in effect, presumed, giving rise to an irrebuttable presumption of the existence of the requisite intent. Thus, the State is relieved of its burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant is precluded from offering evidence to negate the presumption of intent. In reviewing its bifurcated trial statute, in light of the due process argument suggested above, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded:

To prohibit the introduction of any or all the evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial of guilt or innocence would deprive a defendant of the opportunity of rebutting intent, premeditation, and malice, because an insane person could have none. The first trial then would involve only proof that an act of a criminal nature had been committed, and that the defendant committed it. In effect, this gives rise to a presumption of intent, premeditation, or malice, which runs counter to the common-law and constitutional concepts of criminal law. The second trial is limited solely to the question of legal insanity, the guilt of the defendant having already been determined. There is no provision, nor realistically would there be, to determine also intent, premeditation, or malice in reduction of the degree of the crime. Thus, the presumption raised in the first trial becomes an irrebuttable presumption. Such a presumption is in violation of due process, as was pointed out in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 255, 96 L.Ed.2d 288:

Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (Ariz.1970), at 724.

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held its bifurcated trial procedure unconstitutional on similar grounds. Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo.1977). Under Wyoming's procedure, like that of Arizona's, any evidence going to the issue of insanity is precluded at the trial on guilt or innocence. The court, citing to Shaw, held that a defendant is denied due process of law under the state and federal constitutions, when he is precluded from offering evidence to negate the presumption of intent arising from the fact of the commission of the acts charged. The court concluded that the sanity of an accused is an integral part (element) of a determination of guilt and the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged.

In meeting this burden, the State was impermissibly aided by a presumption of intent which arose before appellant had an opportunity to present his defense of insanity. State v. Shaw, supra. Such a manner of proceeding in criminal cases would reduce the trial to a meaningless sham which operates by tying both of the defendant's hands behind his back. Sanchez, supra, at 280.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld its bifurcated system holding that it does not violate the requirements of due process of law. State v. Hebard, 50 Wis.2d 408, 184 N.W.2d 156 (Wis.1971). It is important to note, however, that under Wisconsin law a finding of insanity "is not a finding of inability to intend; it is rather a finding that under the applicable standard or test, the defendant is to be excused from criminal...