Anderson v. State, 41755

• Decision Date: 28 March 1973
• Docket Number: No. 41755,41755
• Citation: 276 So.2d 17
• Parties: Earnest Eugene ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 17

276 So.2d 17

Earnest Eugene ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 41755.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 28, 1973.

Charles D. Edelstein, Miami, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Michael M. Corin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is a direct appeal from a jury verdict finding Appellant Earnest Eugene Anderson guilty of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sectiom 2(a), Fla.Const., F.S.A.; Anderson et al v. State, Fla.1972, 267 So.2d 8.

The following facts pertinent to the homicide were stipulated to at trial. Four teenage boys, including the deceased, Nathaniel Pollock, left a restaurant in an automobile and drove to Pollock's house. As they parked the car, Anderson, another teenager, approached them and said, 'Nate, come here.' Pollock got out of the car. The Appellant walked up to him and asked, 'Why did you sick the dog on me?' Anderson then shot Pollock once between the eyes, killing him. Following the shooting, Anderson wiped off the gun, put it in Pollock's left hand, and announced to the other three boys that it was an accident and that Pollock killed himself. The police were called and Anderson was arrested. It is not known whether Pollock ever 'sicked a dog' on him.

Several months after the arrest, two court-appointed psychiatrists determined Anderson was incompetent to stand trial. He was committed to the South Florida State Hospital for approximately one year, after which time he was returned to the Dade County Jail. Shortly thereafter he was tried.

Anderson's jury trial was short. It consisted solely of the stipulation of facts, each side's opening statements, the testimony of two psychiatrists called by the defense, one court-appointed and one from the South Florida State Hospital, and the closing statements. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of first, second, or third degree murder, or manslaughter, or it could return verdicts of not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. The jury found Anderson guilty of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy.

On appeal to this Court, Appellant raised six issues. Two, involving the death penalty, are now moot, Furman v. Georgia, 1972, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346; we previously reduced Appellant's death sentence to life imprisonment. Anderson, et al. v. State, supra. Two other issues involved questions of fact which were properly left to the jury's determination. The remaining two questions presented here are:

I. Whether the M'Naghten test for insanity is arbitrary, unreasonable and obsolete, and,

II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury as to the definition of 'premeditated design.'

Florida has expressly followed the M'Naghten Rule since 1902. Davis v. State, 1902, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822. See, e.g., Piccott v. State, Fla.1959, 116 So.2d 626; Van Eaton v. State, Fla.1967, 205 So.2d 298; Holston v. State, Fla.1968, 208 So.2d 98, and Campbell v. State, Fla.1969, 227 So.2d 873, cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801, 91 S.Ct. 7, 27 L.Ed.2d 33. We seem to have done so for lack of a better alternative. In Piccott v. State, supra, 116 So.2d at 627, we said:

'. . . we have not been convinced that the M'Naghten rule is not the best available rule for measuring the mental condition of the individual in terms of accountability for criminal acts. We therefore adhere to the Rule in M'Naghten's case as do all other jurisdictions except (New Hampshire and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) . . .'

In 1967 in Van Eaton, supra, 205 So.2d at 303, we said, 'Once again we reaffirm our adherence to the rule (M'Naghten) we have consistently followed and for the same reasons so ably expressed by Mr. Justice O' Connell in Piccott.' Once again we reaffirm our adherence to M'Naghten.

We now turn to the second question. The given charge, in its entirety, was:

'Murder in the first-degree is the unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being, or when committed in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, abominable and detestable crime against nature or kidnapping.'

'Premeditation' was not defined nor its meaning, as used in the charge, explained to the jury. We are in agreement with the District Court of Appeal, Second District, which has said:

'It is rudimentary, and should require no citation of authority, that the one essential element which distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder is premeditation. The term 'design' as mentioned in each of the two degrees, means the specific intent to kill, and in second-degree murder such specific intent may, or may not, be present. The difference is, that in second-degree murder, if it is present, it is not premeditated. Thus, premeditation is the Ever-present distinguishing factor; and no doubt should be left in the minds of the jury as to its complete and full legal import. No door should be left open for confusion as to what it means. Without the full and complete definition of premeditation, the jury would have neither an understanding of what they were looking for to determine it, nor what to exclude to reject it.' Polk v. State, Fla.App., 1965, 179 So.2d 236.

Failure to define 'premeditation' in a first degree murder charge is reversible error, even where no objection was made by the defendant. Rule 6.16, F.A.R. (a) and (b), 32 F.S.A.

The cause is reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Dade County for a new trial.

CARLTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, McCAIN, JJ., and DREW, J. (Retired), concur.

ERVIN, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with opinion.

BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.

DEKLE, J., dissents with opinion.

ERVIN, Judge (dissenting in part, concurring in part):

I must respectfully dissent. Florida courts have traditionally used the 'M'Naghten Rule' when instructing juries on insanity; it requires a finding that a defendant was sane at the time of criminal activity if he knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he committed the crime. ¹ The rule has its origins in ancient tests of criminal insanity; the Eirenarch of 1582, absolving from criminal responsibility 'a man or a natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of his lunacy, or a child who apparently has no knowledge of good or evil,' and the 'Wild Beast' test of 1724 providing 'for exculpation if the defendant 'doth not know what he is doing, no more than * * * a wild beast. '' United States v. Freeman, 2d Cir. 1966, 357 F.2d 606, 616; State v. White, 1969, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797. The rule obtained its current name and language following the 1843 trial of one Daniel M'Naghten, an Englishman with a persecution complex, who attempted to assassinate Robert Peel, the Prime Minister of England. By mistake, M'Naghten killed Peel's secretary. M'Naghten was tried and found not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense based a large portion of its case upon the 1838 work of Dr. Isaac Ray entitled Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, and 'the court was so impressed with this and other medical evidence of M'Naghten's incompetency that Lord Chief Justice Tindal practically directed a verdict for the accused.' United States v. Freeman, supra, 357 F.2d at 617. The verdict, however, enraged Queen Victoria, who directed the House of Lords to call the fifteen judges of the common law courts into session to answer certain questions regarding criminal responsibility. The judges gave their Queen the reply she wanted, and

'Significantly, it was Lord Chief Justice Tindal who responded for fourteen of the fifteen judges, and thus articulated what has come to be known as the M'Naghten Rules or M'Naghten test. Rather than relying on Dr. Ray's monumental work which had apparently impressed him at M'Naghten's trial, Tindal, with the Queen's breath upon him, reaffirmed the old restricted right-wrong test despite its 16th Century roots and the fact that it, in effect, echoed such uninformed concepts as phrenology and monomania.' ² United States v. Freeman, supra, 357 F.2d at 617.

Because of an angry Queen, therefore, the M'Naghten Rule became the common-law test for criminal insanity, even though at the time of its adoption the 'right-wrong' concept of criminal responsibility was becoming obsolete. Almost every United States jurisdiction followed M'Naghten; the sole nineteenth century exception seems to be New Hampshire, which in State v. Pike, 1870, 49 N.H. 399, approved an instruction permitting a finding of insanity if the jury found the defendant suffered a 'mental disease' which was responsible for his criminal act.

The first twentieth century break from M'Naghten came in 1954 with a decision of the United States Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit. Durham v. United States, 1954, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862. That decision adopted what has become known as the Durham rule, i.e., 'an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.' Id. at 874--875. It is virtually identical to the 1870 New Hampshire test.

Florida has expressly followed the M'Naghten Rule since 1902. Davis v. State, 1902, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822. See, e.g., Piccott v. State, Fla.1959, 116 So.2d 626; Van Eaton v. State, Fla.1967, 205 So.2d 298; Holston v. State, Fla.1968, 208 So.2d 98, and Campbell v. State, Fla.1969, 227 So.2d 873, cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801, 91 S.Ct. 7, 27 L.Ed.2d 33. We seem to have done so for lack of a better alternative. In Piccott v. State, supra, 116 So.2d at 627, we said:

'. . . we have not been convinced that the M'Naghten rule is not the best available rule for measuring the mental condition of the individual in terms of accountability for criminal acts. We therefore adhere to...