Van Eaton v. State

• Decision Date: 13 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. 36381,36381
• Citation: 205 So.2d 298
• Parties: Richard VAN EATON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 298

205 So.2d 298

Richard VAN EATON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 36381.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 13, 1967.

John E. Watson, St. Petersburg, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

DREW, Justice.

This appeal from a verdict of guilty and sentence of death presents two questions for determination. The first is whether this Court will continue to follow the M'Naghten 'right and wrong' rule with relation to the defense of insanity in criminal cases, and the second is whether the jury determined the question of whether it would grant or withhold a recommendation of mercy in the same fair and impartial manner as the question of guilt or innocence. ¹ We shall deal with the second question first.

The trial judge in his written charges to the jury ² very carefully pointed out that it was to decide the case solely upon the evidence given from the stand and the law as charged by the court. In his concluding remarks the trial judge said:

'You should do your whole duty as citizens worthy of the high responsibility of citizenship and jury duty and leave the consequences where they rightfully belong. With your whole duty performed you have no concern with the consequences.'

There is nothing in the general charge with reference to the impropriety of considering, in connection with the determination of the question of mercy, the probability or possibility of parole or pardon. In Burnette v. State ³ this Court dealt with a situation somewhat like that which appears in the record of this case and in that opinion stated:

'* * * In the trial of every capital case, therefore, as a part of his general charge concerning the power of the jury with reference to a recommendation of mercy, the trial judge should admonish the jury that provisions for probation, parole, pardon or commutation of convicted persons are incorporated in and are a part of the laws of this State that such laws are administered by public officials of this State in a manner authorized by the Legislature; that the question of whether mercy should be recommended is to be determined, under their oaths, in a fair and impartial manner, and that the question of whether the defendant would be subject to such procedures after conviction is a matter that they should not consider or discuss in connection therewith.'

Had such a charge been included in the general charges of the eminent trial judge in this case, and had a copy of the written charges been delivered to the jury to be used in its deliberations, it is improbable that the question now presented would have arisen.

While this Court in Burnette suggested the giving of the charge before the case is submitted to the jury, we were careful to point out 'that the failure to give such a charge would not, in itself and standing alone, constitute harmful error.' ⁴ In that case the central question was not so much what was said by the trial court when the jury returned to the room for further instructions but what was not said. The brief and inadequate reply of the trial court quoted in that case could easily have been and probably was interpreted by the jury as meaning that the defendant there could possibly, even though convicted by the jury and sentenced to life imprisonment, be released from the penitentiary in a few months. In disposing of this question the court in that case very carefully pointed out the manner in which such a situation as there revealed had been dealt with in other courts. We said:

'* * * Some courts have held that when a situation arises such as exists in this case, the court should promptly declare a mistrial and submit the cause to another jury. Other courts have held that the jury should simply be instructed that the question of probation and parole was not a matter for their consideration and should not in any way influence them in the rendition of their verdict. Others have held that where the question is asked the court should fully and fairly advise the jury at length concerning the laws of the state with reference to probation and parole.'

The opinion in that case rejected the view that a mistrial should be promptly declared and the cause submitted to another jury. We approved either of the other two methods, that is to say, advising the jury without further explanation that probation and parole was not a matter for its consideration or advising the jury fully and fairly concerning the laws of the state with reference to probation and parole. In that case we adhered to the well established, often repeated and universal rule that the mental processes by which a juror arrives at his conclusion in any given case is not a matter that may be inquired into. The basic question with which we are confronted in this case is whether after this cause was submitted to the jury and it returned to the courtroom the trial court properly charged the jury with reference to the question of probation and parole as outlined in the Burnette case, and, if so, whether such charge given after submission of the cause to the jury rather than in the general charges of the court constituted reversible error. In reaching a conclusion on this question we turn to the record in this case to see what actually did transpire. ⁵ We have carefully examined the record and considered the events noted in the footnote and are of the view that the court charged the jury in accordance with the suggestions of this Court in Burnette heretofore quoted. The language of the trial court's charge is quite similar to that suggested by this Court. It would have been the better practice as suggested in Burnette to have given a similar charge in the general charges of the court and to have sent the general charges to the jury for consideration in its deliberations. The failure to do so, however, in the light of the full charge of the court given in this case after the jury returned cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the defendant or to establish in any way that the jury did not try this issue in the same fair and impartial manner as it tried the issue of guilt or innocence. There is nothing in the record before us in this case or in the events which transpired in the courtroom after the submission to the jury, either by omission or commission, that is sufficient to overcome the presumption that the jury faithfully discharged its duties in accordance with the charges of the court. Any contrary conclusion on the record here would necessarily be predicated upon supposition as to the mental processes of the jury in arriving at its verdict.

We now direct our attention to the remaining issue.

The psychiatrist produced as a witness for the defendant in this case testified that the defendant Richard Van Eaton had 'a sociopathic personality disturbance. Antisocial in type.' When asked to describe a person having such mental condition, the psychiatrist said:

'Well, (he is) a person that doesn't respect society, and doesn't abide by the rules and regulations of the laws that society presents to the individual to follow. And these people consistently get into difficulty because they are not able to profit by any experiences when they do something that is wrong. Apparently they forget the pain that they went through, or they rationalize and they just continue to continually make the same mistake over and over again.'

Further the psychiatrist stated that it was possible that such an individual could have planned and premeditated the murder of the victim in this case. The psychiatrist was unequivocal in his testimony that the defendant knew right from wrong, the requirement of the M'Naghten rule which has been consistently and uniformly applied as the law of this state for more than 100 years.

While the testimony of the psychiatrist was somewhat inconclusive on the question of 'irresistible impulse', it could be said from an examination of all of his testimony that it was his opinion that, while the defendant in this case knew right from wrong and was legally sane when measured by the M'Naghten rule, he was, because of mental disease, incapable of controlling his actions. This witness stated in part:

'Q. In other words he knew right from wrong at the time the he committed the offense?

A. Yes, he knew right from wrong, but I don't know if he could control it.

Q. You are talking about impulse?

A. The impulse, yes, sir.'

The testimony of the psychiatrist seems to us to establish the existence of what is commonly referred to as a 'violent and ungovernable temper' rather than a mental disease making it impossible for the defendant to resist the impulse to commit an act which he recognizes as wrong. ⁶ Even if we were inclined in this case--which we are not--to recede from or to further amplify or supplement the M'Naghten rule as has been done in some other states, and extend it to include cases involving the 'irresistible impulse' theory, the jury in this case could well have concluded from the evidence before it that this defendant did not fall in that category. The evidence of the psychiatrist on this question is wholly inconclusive and such a finding of the jury would certainly be supported by sufficient evidence.

It is argued to this Court that the M'Naghten rule is outdated and should be replaced by a rule more consistent with modern knowledge in the field of insanity. ⁷ There has been no subject in the field of law that has provoked more extended discussions than the M'Naghten rule and the many other rules which have grown out of this early case. Volumes have been written upon the subject and it is one which today is an unsettled as it was in the beginning. ⁸ Moreover, as recently as in 1960 ⁹ this Court was urged to abandon the 'right of wrong' test (the rule in M'Naghten) in favor of the 'irresistible impulse' or 'moral insanity' test adopted by New Hampshire and the similar rule adopted by the court of appeal for the District of...