State ex rel. Boyle v. Ernst

• Citation: 78 P.2d 526,195 Wash. 214
• Decision Date: 17 June 1938
• Docket Number: 27149.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOYLE v. ERNST, Director of Department of Social Security.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

78 P.2d 526

195 Wash. 214

STATE ex rel. BOYLE v. ERNST, Director of Department of Social Security.

No. 27149.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 17, 1938

Department 2.

Original proceeding for writ of mandate by the State of Washington, on the relation of Harry J. Boyle, to require Charles F. Ernst Director of Department of Social Security, to expend moneys appropriated for child welfare, assistance for blind persons and old age assistance.

Writ denied.

Mark M. Litchman, of Settle, for relator.

G. W Hamilton, Harry L. Parr, and W. A. Toner, all of Olympia, for respondent.

BLAKE Justice.

The relator seeks a writ of mandate requiring Charles F. Ernst director of the department of social security, to expend, as directed by the provisions of chapter 180, p. 697, Laws of 1937, monies appropriated for the purposes defined in chapter 114, p. 452, Laws of 1937 (child welfare), chapter 132, p. 489, Laws of 1937 (assistance for blind persons), and chapter 156, p. 548, Laws of 1937 (old age assistance). He alleges that he is a taxpayer and resident of King county; that respondent has under his control at the present time approximately $20,000,000, which he is required to expend for the purposes enumerated in the above mentioned acts; that although demand has been made upon him by persons entitled to relief under such acts, he has refused to expend such money in accordance with such demands; that he has dropped from the lists thousands of persons entitled to relief, and reduced the allotments of thousands of others; that the director assigns, as his reasons for such action, the insufficiency of the remainder of the appropriation to provide relief to all entitled to it under the above mentioned acts until the next session of the legislature, and that the governor has failed to make allotments sufficient to provide such relief.

Relator further alleges that in consequence of such action by the director, the burden of relief is thrown back upon the counties, whose constitutional obligation it has been held to be ( Rummens v. Evans, 168 Wash. 527, 13 P.2d 26); that in performance of that obligation, King county incurred indebtedness in the month of April in excess of $150,000; that unless the relief prayed for be granted, it will be necessary for King county, between now and the next regular session of the legislature, to incur indebtedness in the sum of $2,000,000, in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation.

The relator further alleges that under the Federal and state social security program, the state is reimbursed by the United States in various percentages of all minies paid out for the relief of persons entitled thereto under the above mentioned acts; that King county will not be reimbursed in any amount for monies paid by it in the fulfillment of its constitutional obligation to care for the needy; that by reason of such facts, the burden of the taxpayers of King county will be measureably increased.

To the petition, respondent interposed a demurrer, upon which he stands, thus admitting the facts well pleaded.

At the outset, it should be noted that this case is not brought by one entitled to participate in the funds appropriated for the purposes provided for in the above mentioned acts of the legislature. Hence such cases as State ex rel. McDonald v. Stevenson, 176 Wash. 355, 29 P.2d 400; State ex rel. Frost v. Eaton, 182 Wash. 7, 44 P.2d 803; State ex rel. Robbins v. Scofield, 184 Wash. 270, 50 P.2d 1022; and State ex rel. Hart v. Gleeson, 189 Wash. 292, 64 P.2d 1023, are not decisive of the present problem. It was held in those cases that persons entitled to blind and old age pensions could resort to mandamus to compel action upon their applications and the issuance of warrants, notwithstanding the appropriations made for their relief were exhausted. Nor, in the solution of our present problem, can we find help in those cases (of which Rummens v. Evans, supra, is typical) holding that counties may exceed their constitutional debt limit when necessary to the performance of their obligation to care for the needy.

So, for an answer to the problem presented here, we must turn to the statute itself (chap. 180, p. 697, Laws 1937), bearing in mind that, in the absence of capricious or arbitrary action, mandamus does not lie to control the discretionary power of administrative or executive officers. State ex rel. Cowles v. Schively, 63 Wash. 103, 114 P. 901; Morris v. Favor, 134 Wash. 75, 234 P. 1040.

The administration of the division of public assistance by the department of social security is governed by chapter 180, p. 697, Laws of 1937. In § 1, p. 697, the purpose is declared 'to establish a single administrative agency which will preserve local autonomy in its administration yet retain the state-wide supervision necessary to equity, uniformity, and the adherence to rules and regulations of the Federal government.' Pursuant to this declaration, provision is made (§ 2, p. 698) for the executive head of the department (director) and 'administrative board,' which 'means the Board of County Commissioners in each county.'

In § 5, p. 700, it is provided that administration of public assistance under the act shall conform with such specific acts as have been enacted by the legislature and the Congress with respect to public assistance, including acts for the allocation of Federal grants to aid states whose plans are approved by the Federal government, 'and shall conform with the laws of the State of Washington, and such rules and regulations as are vested in the director of social security in relation to all other public assistance.'

By § 6 p. 701, the state department of social security is empowered to serve as the single...