State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission

• Decision Date: 30 July 1928
• Docket Number: 28648
• Citation: 8 S.W.2d 897,320 Mo. 893
• Parties: The State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Company v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, Alroy S. Philips et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

8 S.W.2d 897

320 Mo. 893

The State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Company v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, Alroy S. Philips et al

No. 28648

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 30, 1928

Provisional writ discharged.

Mosman Rogers & Buzard for relator.

(1) Section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act which provides that the act shall be extra-territorial in effect is null and void, because there is no provision for enforcing an award for injuries occurring outside of the State. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn. v. Price, 291 S.W. 287; Oilmen's Reciprocal Assn. v. Franklin, 286 S.W 195; Sec. 45, Laws 1927, p. 498. (2) Section 45 of the act provides that any party interested may file in the circuit court of the county in which the accident occurred a certified copy of the Commission's award and have judgment entered thereupon. The section is exclusive in its provision for the enforcement of the award, and the court has no power to read into the statute any provision claiming a power to enforce an award of the Commission. Dworkin v. Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 342; State v. Water Co., 212 Mo. 101; Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 57; Kehr v. City of Columbia, 136 Mo.App. 322; Hodge v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583; State ex rel. Tracy v. Taaffe, 25 Mo.App. 567; Hewitt v. Truitt, 23 Mo.App. 443; State ex rel. Mickey v. Reneau, 75 Nebr. 1. (3) The title of the act contains more than one subject and contravenes Section 28 of Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri, in that there is no reference in the title of the act to the fact that it was intended to make the act extraterritorial in effect and therefore that provision of the act is null and void. Niedermeyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742. (4) The legislative power cannot be exercised to control a cause of action arising beyond the boundaries of the state. Gardner v. Constr. Co., 156 N.Y.S. 899; Smith v. Safety Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9; Johns-Manville Co. v. Thrane, 141 N.E. 229; Anderson v. Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106; Union Bridge Co. v. Industrial Comm., 298 Ill. 396. (5) Prohibition is the proper remedy to arrest the action of respondents. (a) Respondents act in a judicial capacity. State ex rel. v. Harty, 208 S.W. 835; State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514; State ex rel. Willys-Overland Co. v. Clark, 147 N.E. 33; Bee Hive Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 132 S.E. 177; Sec. 41. Workmen's Compensation Act. (b) Respondents are attempting to proceed in a case where they do not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter and hence prohibition will issue to arrest their action. State ex rel. Kaiser v. Miller, 289 S.W. 898. (c) The court, having issued its preliminary writ, may retain the case, although relator may have a remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Mueller v. Wurdeman, 232 S.W. 1002.

North T. Gentry, Attorney-General, L. Cunningham and T. H. Antrobus, Assistant Attorneys-General, for respondents.

(1) Prohibition is not a proper remedy in this case. It will only go to keep an inferior court or tribunal or body from exercising judicial functions without the orbit of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction except on a clear showing of lack of jurisdiction in the inferior court as a matter of law as distinguished from a matter of fact and that the ordinary remedies by appeal, writ of error or certiorari are absent. State ex rel. Warde v. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256. This court should assume that the inferior court, tribunal or body will conduct the proceedings before it according to correct principles of law. If such court, tribunal or body has authority to act, its jurisdiction is in no way impaired by a consideration of the fact that it might act erroneously. Such would be a matter of error to be corrected on appeal. State ex rel. Fenne v. McQuillin, 256 Mo. 693; State ex rel. Warde v. McQuillin, 262 Mo. 256. The Workmen's Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to hear a claim of an injured employee for injuries received by him arising out of and in the course of his employment; and even if prohibition would lie against the Commission on the theory that it exercised judicial functions, it should not lie in this case. An inferior court has as much right to determine the facts going to its jurisdiction as it has to determine any other fact. State ex rel. v. Shields, 237 Mo. 329. Prohibition does not lie against the Workmen's Compensation Commission because it is not a court or body exercising judicial functions. Its duties and powers are purely administrative. It is well-settled law that the writ of prohibition must be directed to some judicial officer or body. Its purpose is to restrain judicial action and not legislative, executive or administrative action. State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514; State ex rel. v. Goodier, 195 Mo. 561. (2) The Workmen's Compensation Act, provides a complete scheme for the payment of compensation to injured employees, and defines the authority and power of the Commission. Secs. 3, 6, 7, 12, Laws 1927, p. 492. The contract of employment was made in the State of Missouri. It contained no provision that the Workmen's Compensation Act should not apply to injuries received in another state. The employment was for the employee to travel as a salesman in Missouri, Oklahoma and Kansas. The injury was received while he was engaged in such employment in the State of Oklahoma and arose out of the employment. 1 Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, par. 101, p. 320. The act contemplates voluntary arbitration or settlements by agreement rather than suits at law. It presumes that the parties elect to accept the provisions of the act. Such election is in the nature of a contract and the law should be considered as read into and made a part of the contract of employment. State Ind. Comm. v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263; Crane v. Leonard, 214 Mich. 218; Reutenik v. Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108; Berry v. Donovan, 120 Me, 457.

Ragland, J. All concur, except Gentry, J., not sitting, and Walker, C. J., absent.

OPINION

RAGLAND

Original proceeding in prohibition. The facts are not in dispute, and the parties agree as to the questions of law involved. An adequate statement of both appears in relator's brief as follows:

"Relator filed in this court its petition for writ of prohibition, in which it alleged its corporate existence and the proper legal status of respondents, and that W. M. Amick, a resident of Jackson County, Missouri, entered the employ of relator under contract dated January 1, 1926, as a traveling salesman to travel in the States of Missouri, Kansas and Oklahoma; that at a date after the Compensation Act became a law, and prior to January 1, 1927, in the State of Missouri, said employee was directed by relator to make a trip to Bartlesville. Oklahoma, and said Amick claims that while on said trip he received an injury due to slipping upon ice upon a public sidewalk in the city of Bartlesville, State of Oklahoma; that Amick claims that said accident and the injuries resulting therefrom arose out of and in the course of his employment and he claims that he is entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Missouri; that respondents have notified relator that claim for compensation has been made by Amick, and respondents have required relator to make answer to said claim, and respondents have assumed jurisdiction of said claim; that relator has filed an answer to said claim with respondents, by which answer relator denies that Amick is entitled to compensation, because the injury occurred in Oklahoma, and is therefore to be governed by the laws of that State and is not subject to the Compensation Act of Missouri; that respondents intend to and are about to proceed with an adjudication of the rights of Amick and to an award of compensation. . . .

"The prayer of the petition is for an order of prohibition directed to respondents prohibiting them from further proceeding in the matter of Amick's claim for compensation.

"The issues of law are:

"1. Does the respondent commission have the power to make a valid and enforcible award for compensation to an employee working under a contract of employment made in this State, when such employee is injured while performing his duties for his employers, in a foreign State?

"2. Is prohibition the proper remedy to determine the question?"

I. Respondents insist that prohibition does not lie in this case, for the reason, as they alleged, "that the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission is not a court, tribunal or body exercising judicial functions, but that its duties and powers are purely administrative." It must be conceded that the Commission is not invested with judicial power in the sense in which that term is used in Article III of the Constitution, providing for the distribution of the powers of government. [Underwood v. McDuffee, 15 Mich. 361; Hunter v. Coal Company, 175 Iowa 245, 307-318.] But it is authorized to hear and determine controversies between employer and employee; and while it cannot in any case enforce its findings and award, such findings and award have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury and in the same way become the basis for a court judgment. [Secs. 40, 41, 44 and 45, Workmen's Compensation Act, Laws 1927, pp. 511-512.] In hearing and determining the facts the Commission clearly performs a judicial function. And we have long held that the writ of prohibition is applicable whenever judicial functions are assumed which do not right-fully belong to the person or court assuming to exercise them; that it is the nature of the act, and not the character of the board or tribunal proceeded against, which determines the propriety of the writ. [State ex rel. v. Harty, 276 Mo. 583, 208 S.W. 835.]

It is also true, as respondents contend, that relator...