State ex rel. Charlton v. Corrigan

• Decision Date: 13 April 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1969,86-1969
• Citation: 521 N.E.2d 804,36 Ohio St.3d 68
• Parties: The STATE, ex rel. CHARLTON et al., Appellees, v. CORRIGAN, Pros. Atty., et al.; Gaul, Treas., Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 68

36 Ohio St.3d 68

521 N.E.2d 804

The STATE, ex rel. CHARLTON et al., Appellees, v. CORRIGAN, Pros. Atty., et al.; Gaul, Treas., Appellant.

No. 86-1969.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 13, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

In determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists between a public official and his appointed employees pursuant to R.C. 124.11(A)(9), which would exempt such employees from civil service status, emphasis should be placed upon whether the assigned job duties require, as essential qualifications over and above technical competency requirements, a high degree of trust, confidence, reliance, integrity and fidelity.

The present cause of action arose from a taxpayer suit filed by appellees on October 19, 1982, against a number of public officials in Cuyahoga County. These officials included appellant, Francis E. Gaul, the Treasurer of Cuyahoga County. The lawsuit alleged a failure of these county officials to comply with the Ohio civil service statutes relating to the hiring and promotion of employees. Appellant asserted at the trial level that all county treasurer employees were exempt from application of the civil service laws under R.C. 124.11(A)(9). ¹ The office of county treasurer is comprised of the county treasurer himself, four chief deputy treasurers, two secretaries, and eighty-seven deputy treasurers. On September 28, 1983, appellant filed a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment, in support of which he submitted statements signed by each of the chief deputy and deputy treasurers describing his job duties and also an affidavit to the effect that the positions were all exempt from the classified civil service. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on January 19, 1984.

Upon appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed as to the deputy treasurer positions. This court, in case No. 85-447, denied further review at that time. The case was thereupon remanded for trial upon the merits.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on July 18, 1985, at which time nine deputy treasurers, selected at random by the trial court, were questioned under oath. Upon such testimony, the trial court found that the primary duties of the deputy treasurers encompassed "an administrative and fiduciary relationship" whereupon it was determined that all the deputy treasurers were in the unclassified civil service.

Appellees again perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. The court of appeals reviewed the testimony of the nine deputy treasurers and found that only one of them was properly within the unclassified civil service. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's determination as to the other eight. It also remanded the issue of classification of the remaining deputy treasurers to be determined upon their individual testimony.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

John C. Meros, Cleveland, for appellees.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Kevin Purcell, Cleveland, for appellant.

Anthony G. Pizza, Pros. Atty., and Louise A. Fender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Lucas County Treasurer.

HOLMES, Justice.

The instant action is one to compel the county treasurer to place his employees within the classified civil service and thus outside the treasurer's discretion to hire, fire, and promote. The treasurer has objected, asserting that his employees hold either an administrative or fiduciary relationship to him. The statutory authority for this contention is R.C. 124.11(A)(9) which excludes from the classified service, in pertinent part:

"The deputies and assistants of elective * * * officers authorized to act for and in place of their principals, or holding a fiduciary relation to such principals and those persons employed by and directly responsible to elected county officials and holding a fiduciary or administrative relationship to such elected county officials * * *." (Emphasis added.)

The court of appeals agreed that the statutory exemption applied to the administrator, all the chief deputy treasurers and the four deputy treasurers whose duties included investment and banking decisions. However, it felt the remaining deputy treasurers were not exempt because they held neither fiduciary nor administrative relationships to the treasurer. Having reviewed the testimony presented at trial, we must disagree in part with the conclusion of the court of appeals. We hasten to state that we also disagree with the standard of inquiry established at the trial level. Accordingly, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the appellate court.

Pursuant to the above statute, there are two types of relationships which would provide exemption from civil service. One is the administrative relationship, while the other is the fiduciary relationship. Generally, an administrative relationship is characterized by a position where one is "in charge of carrying out * * * policy in the supervision of the daily activities of subordinates * * *," Yarosh v. Becane (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 5, 12, 17 O.O.3d 3, 8, 406 N.E.2d 1355, 1360-1361. It involves the exercise of personal judgment and leadership abilities, and not merely the relaying of orders. Therefore, a deputy in charge of formulating official policy, or in charge of carrying out that policy in the supervision of the daily activities of subordinates, is in an administrative relationship with a county official. Id.

Cases which have analyzed the nature of the fiduciary relationship exception to classified civil service requirements have invariably characterized the relationship as one of trust and confidence. See, e.g., In re Termination of Employment (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 107, 69 O.O.2d 512, 321 N.E.2d 603; Yarosh v. Becane, supra; Rarick v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 34, 17 O.O.3d 21, 406 N.E.2d 1101. It is "more than the ordinary relationship of employer and em ployee,' In re Termination of Employment, supra, at 114, 69 O.O.2d at 516, 321 N.E.2d at 608; and exists where "special confidence * * * is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of another," id. at 115, 69 O.O.2d at 517, 321 N.E.2d at 609, citing 5 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, 119-132; see, also, Yarosh, supra, at 11, 17 O.O.3d at 7, 406 N.E.2d at 1360. It may be concluded that in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists between a public official and his appointed employees, pursuant to R.C. 124.11(A)(9), which would exempt such employees from civil service status, emphasis should be placed upon whether the assigned job duties require, as essential qualifications over and above technical competency requirements, a high degree of trust, confidence, reliance, integrity and fidelity.

One method of determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists in an employment situation is to examine the duties assigned to an employee. A great degree of discretion in carrying out one's assigned duties may indicate a trust relationship. Rarick, supra, at 37-38, 17 O.O.3d at 23, 406 N.E.2d at 1103-1104; see, also, Yarosh, supra. Of course, the trust relationship is among the highest of fiduciary relationships. However, there is a plethora of other circumstances within the law of fiduciaries which might also indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. For example, it is a rule that the actions of a fiduciary are those done, in good faith, for another's behalf and not merely because of legal obligations. Hence, it may also be inquired whether there is some element within the overall structure of the employment relationship which makes integrity and loyalty to the employer an essential job qualification, over and above technical or competency requirements. See, e.g., Piatt v. Longworth's Devisees (1875), 27 Ohio St. 159; 49 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1984), Fiduciaries, Section 2; Rarick, supra, at 37, 17 O.O.3d at 23, 406 N.E.2d at 1103; Yarosh, supra, at paragraph three of the syllabus.

In the present case, it appears, from the testimony presented at trial, that the parties misfocused their analysis upon the cashiering duty, which was the lowest common denominator among all deputy treasurers. Appellant asserted that since all deputy treasurers, regardless of their primary functions, must make disbursements and collect cash payments either at designated cashier windows or from a considerable volume of mail, they were all objects of reposed trust and thus fiduciaries. From the above assumed basis for decision, the trial court adopted the view that all deputy treasurers were fiduciaries, whereas the court of appeals concluded that all but one of those who testified were not fiduciaries.

This extreme divergence of opinion appears to have resulted in part from the narrow focus of the parties upon the cashiering duties; and was mistaken in light of Yarosh, supra, at 12, 17 O.O.3d at 7, 406 N.E.2d at 1360, wherein we stated that the mere act of handling...