State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 33349
| Decision Date | 08 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33349,33349 |
| Citation | 303 P.2d 290,49 Wn.2d 457 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, on the Relation of Don J. CLARK, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Yakima, State of Washington, Respondent. v. James S. HOGAN, Justice of the Peace in and for the County of Yakima, State of Washington, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
James B. Hovis, Yakima, for appellant.
Don J. Clark, Dean C. Smith, Yakima, for respondent.
Ralph Jim was charged in a justice court in Yakima county with the commission of two offenses, set out in a criminal complaint as follows: Count I, that he did '* * * unlawfully hunt game animals to wit: deer, during closed season,' and count II, that he did '* * * unlawfully have in his possession and under his control, a game animal, or parts thereof, to-wit: deer, during closed season.'
Russell Jim, Robert B. Jim, and Hadley F. Shilow were charged separately in identical manner.
All of the defendants were represented by the same counsel who, before trial, moved to make the criminal complaints more defendant and certain in the following manner: (1) that the complaints set forth whether the defendants were Indians, and (2) that the defendants be informed where the alleged illegal hunting and illegal possession of game animals occurred.
February 23, 1955, the justice of the peace ordered the state to make the complaints more definite and certain by informing the defendants where in Yakima county the alleged illegal acts were committed. The prosecuting attorney refused to make the complaints more definite and certain or to furnish a bill of particulars.
March 18, 1955, counsel for defendants moved for an order of dismissal. His motion was supported by the following affidavit:
No controverting affidavit was filed by the state and, after hearing arguments of counsel, the court entered an order of dismissal which read, in part:
'* * * that the plaintiff has not complied with the motion to make more definite and certain by either filing an amended complaint or bill of particulars, at their option, and being fully advised in the premises, it is
'Ordered, that the defendants' motion for dismissal is hereby granted, and the above entitled case is dismissed with prejudice.' (Italics ours.)
The state petitioned the superior court for a writ of certiorari. An order to show cause was issued. The justice of the peace appeared and moved to quash the writ. After argument of counsel on both the motion and the merits, the superior court denied the motion to quash, granted the writ, reversed the justice court, and remanded the causes for trial.
From the order of the superior court, the justice of the peace has appealed.
The appellant's assignments of error present two main contentions, (1) that the superior court has no authority to review, by writ of certiorari, the action of a justice of the peace in a criminal case, and (2) that the justice court's disposition of the causes was proper under the facts.
We find no merit in appellant's first contention. Amendment 28, Art. IV, § 6, state constitution, grants to the superior courts authority for the issuance of such a writ under these circumstances. This constitutional provision is, in part, as follows: '* * * Said courts [superior] and their judges shall have power to issue writs of * * * certiorari, * * *' The broad language of the constitutional provision is self-executing and needs no legislation to vest this power in the superior courts.
The superior court for Yakima county did not err in denying appellant's motion to quash the writ. The order of dismissal in the justice court was a final order and reviewable by certiorari
With reference to the second main contention, did the superior court err in reversing the justice dourt's order of dismissal and remanding the causes for trial?
The justice court's order of dismissal, which is the basis of this appeal, was predicated upon the state's refusal to make the complaints more definite and certain or to furnish a bill of particulars.
We have held that criminal complaints which charge defendants in the language of the statute defining the offenses alleged to have been committed, ordinarily are sufficient. State v. Randall, 1919, 107 Wash. 695, 182 P. 575; State v. Olsen, 1953, 43 Wash.2d 726, 263 P.2d 824. Likewise, we have held that
'* * * An information, or criminal complaint, may state a crime, but still be so vague as to be subject to a motion for a bill of particulars, or it may be so vague as to fail to state any crime whatsoever.' City of Seattle v. Morrow, 1954, 45 Wash.2d 27, 31, 273 P.2d 238, 241.
In this case, it is of no import that the motion was to make the complaints more definite and certain, rather than for a bill of particulars, because the state refused to furnish either. A formal request for a bill of particulars, after such a refusal, would be a vain and useless act. A fundamental rule in American jurisprudence is that the law requires on one to do a thing bain and fruitless.
We have treated a motion to make more definite and certain, which properly should have been a demand for a bill of particulars, as a request for a bill of particulars. See Goupille v. Chaput, 1906, 43 Wash. 702, 86 P. 1058. Under the circumstances of this case, we will treat the motion made as a request for a bill of particulars.
The granting or denying of a motion to make more definite and certain, or a request for a bill of particulars, requires the exercise of judicial discretion. State v. Bogardus, 1904, 36 Wash. 297, 305, 78 P. 942; Messick v. National Council of Knights & Ladies of Security, 1918, 103 Wash. 143, 147, 173 P. 940.
What is judicial discretion? Although it cannot be defined by a hard and fast rule, it means a sound judgment which is not exercised arbitrarily, but...
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