State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. City of Milford

• Decision Date: 15 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 1008-K,1008-K
• Citation: 576 A.2d 618
• Parties: The STATE of Delaware, upon the relation of the DEPARTMENT of TRANSPORTATION, and George W. Williams, Utley W. Roberts and Wilma W. Roberts, individuals, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MILFORD, Municipal corporation of the State of Delaware, Joseph R. Rogers, as Mayor of the City of Milford, and John F. Frederick, as City Manager of the City of Milford, Defendant. Civ. A. . Submitted:
• Court: Court of Chancery of Delaware

Page 618

576 A.2d 618

The STATE of Delaware, upon the relation of the DEPARTMENT of TRANSPORTATION, and George W. Williams, Utley W. Roberts and Wilma W. Roberts individuals, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MILFORD, Municipal corporation of the State of Delaware, Joseph R. Rogers, as Mayor of the City of Milford, and John F. Frederick, as City Manager of the City of Milford, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1008-K.

Court of Chancery of Delaware Kent County.

Submitted: June 15, 1989.

Decided: Aug. 7, 1989.

Frederick H. Schranck, Deputy Atty. Gen., for State, plaintiff, upon the relation to Dept. of Transp.

William J. Walls, Jr., Hindman & Walls, Dover, for individual plaintiffs.

James A. Fuqua, Jr., Fuqua and Graves, Georgetown, for defendants.

OPINION

JACOBS, Vice Chancellor.

At issue on the pending cross motions for summary judgment is the validity of an annexation of land by the City of Milford ("the City"). The plaintiffs are the State of Delaware, which brings this action on behalf of its Department of Transportation, and certain individuals whose property is the subject of the challenged annexation.

On July 21, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, and injunctive and other relief, to invalidate the annexation of certain properties, roads, and rights of way, which the defendants (who are the City, its Mayor, and its City Manager) have proposed. On August 13, 1988, the parties formally stipulated that the defendants would take no action in furtherance of the annexation without giving plaintiffs thirty days' prior notice of their intent to do so.

Defendants subsequently gave notice of their intent to annex, and on February 16, 1989, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to block the proposed annexation. Oral argument on that motion took place on February 27, 1989, but the parties subsequently agreed to, and the Court approved, a procedure for expedited final determination. It was agreed that the status quo would be preserved during the interim, and in accordance with that agreement, all parties moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. This is the decision of the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. ¹

I.

The material facts are undisputed. The City of Milford is a municipal corporation of the State of Delaware. Under its Charter, which is codified at 61 Del.Laws, ch. 156 (1977), the City is authorized to annex territory "contiguous" to its then existing limits and boundaries. Pursuant to Article X(b) of that Charter, the Milford City Council adopted an annexation proposal by a two thirds majority vote on June 13, 1988, and, on July 14, 1988, it caused a special election to be held among the residents and property owners in the territories to be annexed. That election resulted in an eight to three majority vote in favor of the annexation. ²

At issue is whether the land proposed to be annexed is "contiguous" to the City's existing boundaries, within the meaning of Article X(b) of the Milford City Charter. To better understand the significance of the facts creating that issue, the existing city boundaries (which are shown in boldface black) and the areas proposed to be annexed (which are shown in crosshatching) are depicted on the diagram below.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

As the foregoing diagram indicates, the areas sought to be annexed consist of both privately owned, rectangular shaped properties (Plats 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) and of rights of way that are owned by the State (U.S.Rt. 113, Rt. 1 Bypass, Rt. 1 BR, and Rd. 211). With one exception (Plat 7), none of the rectangular-shaped properties is contiguous to (i.e., none of them touches) the City's existing boundaries. Rather, those properties are contiguous only to other to-be-annexed areas, namely, the rights of way, of which only a narrow, few-feet-wide portion physically touches existing City boundaries. The overall effect is that the to-be-annexed parcels of land are connected only remotely to the City, as part of a "spiderweb" of annexed roadbeds radiating out from the City's boundary line from four separate--and quite narrow--connecting points.

The use of a thin strip of land to connect a disembodied parcel of land to a municipality has been variously characterized as "corridor," "strip," "shoestring," or "long lasso" annexation. Those descriptions are a shorthand reference to the use of long, radiating strips which intersect municipal boundaries for only a relatively narrow, short distance, as a means of annexing an otherwise disembodied, distantly-placed territorial area. The resulting appearance has been described as a balloon on a string, a dumbbell, or a spider-web.

II.

Cross motions for summary judgment will be granted only where no genuine issue of material facts exists and one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Empire of America Relocation Services, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., Del.Supr., 551 A.2d 433, 435 (1988); Wilson v. Joma, Inc., Del.Supr., 537 A.2d 187, 188 (1988). Because in this case the pertinent facts are undisputed, those conditions are here satisfied. Thus, this case is appropriate for summary judgment, a procedure whose purpose is to prevent needless trials where there is no material fact issue. Wilmington Sixth Dist. v. Pettinaro Enterprises, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 8668, Hartnett, V.C., 1988 WL 116496 (Oct. 27, 1988), slip op. at 7.

The sole issue on these motions is legal, and may be stated thusly: in what manner does the term "contiguous," as used in the City Charter of Milford, delimit the configuration of territory that the City may validly annex? The sole limiting principle imposed by the City's Charter is that the annexed territory must be "contiguous to the then limits and territory of the City of Milford." Article X, Subsection (b), 61 Del Laws, ch. 156 (1977) at 521. Because the word "contiguous" is neither defined nor otherwise explained, and because no Delaware court has yet interpreted that term in this context, a clear legal dispute exists as to the meaning of that word.

The plaintiffs contend that "contiguous" should be interpreted to require more than that the to-be-annexed territory and the existing municipal boundary physically touch at some narrow point. To satisfy the contiguity requirement, plaintiffs argue, the annexed territory should share a common boundary with the existing city boundary; that is, the boundaries of the annexed land and of the City should either touch at every point, or, at the very least, should share a substantial common boundary. As discussed more fully in Part III below, the majority of courts that have addressed this issue adopt the plaintiffs' point of view. See Annot., Municipal Corporations--Annexation, 49 A.L.R.3d 589, 613 (1973).

The defendants disagree, arguing that the required degree of "contiguity" is a legislative, not a judicial, determination. They urge that in the absence of a specific Charter provision prescribing the required degree of "contiguity," any annexation that satisfies that term's literal, dictionary definition (i.e., touching at any single point) must be judicially validated. Stated differently, the defendants argue that so long as the to-be-annexed land touches the City's boundaries at some point, the annexation must be upheld, no matter how small or narrow that common point may be. That position represents the so-called "minority" view. Id.

For the reasons now discussed, this Court concludes that an interpretation of the "contiguity" requirement that proscribes corridor annexation is the more sound construction of the contested City Charter provision. Accordingly, the annexation proposed by the City must be deemed invalid as not complying with the contiguity requirement of the City Charter.

III.

I first address a threshhold issue, which is whether this court should intervene further in this controversy. That issue flows from the City's argument that the term "contiguous" is clear and unambiguous, and, accordingly, that any restriction upon the City's ability to annex land can be imposed only by the legislature.

The Court agrees that the requirements for a valid annexation are for the legislature to prescribe. It is the function of the General Assembly, not the courts, to determine as a matter of policy what annexation powers, and what limitations on those powers, are appropriate for a municipality to adopt. Only if the legislative enactment is ambiguous and susceptible of different conclusions or interpretations will the courts have any role. Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd., Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985).

In this case it is regrettably apparent that the term "contiguous," as used in the Milford City Charter, is ambiguous. The legislature has not defined that term, and existing Delaware case law has not afforded guidance as to the degree of contiguity required for a land configuration to be validly annexable. As evidenced by this very case, the Charter provides no guidance as to whether, to be validly annexable, the outlying land must share a common boundary with the existing City boundary for (i) all of the annexed land's length, (ii) for a substantial portion of that length, (iii) or at any single point, however insignificant that point may be in relation to the overall dimensions of the annexed parcel.

Finally, the differing conclusions reached by other jurisdictions demonstrate that "contiguous" has a meaning that is far from clear. As earlier noted, a majority of courts have interpreted "contiguous" to disallow "corridor" or "shoestring" annexation. See, e.g., City of Fultondale v. City of Birmingham, Ala.Supr., 507 So.2d 489 (1987); Clark v. Holt, 218 Ark. 504, 237 S.W.2d 483 (1951) (construing the term "contiguous and adjoining"); Potvin v. Village of Chubbuck, 76 Idaho 453, 284 P.2d 414 (1955); Spaulding School Dist. No. 58 v. City of Waukegan, 18 Ill.2d 526, 165...