State ex rel. Donaldson v. Alfred, s. 91-1760

• Decision Date: 02 June 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 91-1760,91-2247,s. 91-1760
• Citation: 66 Ohio St.3d 327,612 N.E.2d 717
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. DONALDSON, Judge, v. ALFRED, Mayor, et al. In re Providing Counsel for Shaker Heights Municipal Court; City of Shaker Heights, Appellant; Donaldson, Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 327

66 Ohio St.3d 327

612 N.E.2d 717

The STATE ex rel. DONALDSON, Judge, v. ALFRED, Mayor, et al. In re Providing Counsel for Shaker Heights Municipal Court; City of Shaker Heights, Appellant; Donaldson, Judge, Appellee.

Nos. 91-1760, 91-2247.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Feb. 3, 1993.

Decided June 2, 1993.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Where an investigation of municipal court personnel has not yet resulted in criminal charges, where the acts for which counsel is requested fall within the court's normal duties, where a funding order explicitly states the nature of the services being requested, and where a conflict prevents the municipality from providing representation, the court is entitled to funding for such representation.

On August 12, 1991, the Honorable Paul R. Donaldson, Judge of the Shaker Heights Municipal Court ("relator"), ordered the city of Shaker Heights ("the city") to deposit $10,000 with the clerk of the municipal court. The stated purpose of the order was to fund representation of the court in responding to a public records request by the Cleveland Plain Dealer, two subpoenas issued in connection with a grand jury investigation of certain court personnel, and an informal request for court documents by the Shaker Heights Police Department. The order asserted that an ongoing conflict between relator and the executive and legislative branches of the city disqualified the city law director from representing the court.

Relator alleges that the grand jury investigation was part of a campaign to discredit him and other court employees prompted by the court's refusal to allow Mayor Stephen J. Alfred to influence certain cases before the court. Mayor Alfred and members of the city council ("respondents") deny that the grand jury investigation into theft in office and other crimes had any ulterior motive. The grand jury eventually returned indictments against relator; however, the state ultimately dropped all charges against him.

On August 30, 1991, relator filed with this court a complaint in mandamus for the enforcement of his funding order (case No. 91-1760). The city attempted to appeal the funding order to the Eighth District Court of Appeals but, on September 16, 1991, that court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. The city appealed that judgment to this court (case No. 91-2247). The appeal and mandamus action have been consolidated in this court.

Gold, Rotatori, Schwartz & Gibbons Co., L.P.A., Niki Z. Schwartz and Orville E. Stifel II, Cleveland, for relator/appellee Honorable Paul R. Donaldson.

Kelley, McCann & Livingstone, Margaret Anne Cannon, Thomas J. Lee, Steven A. Goldfarb and Robert A. Brindza, Cleveland, for respondents in case No. 91-1760 and for appellant city of Shaker Heights in case No. 91-2247.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

Relator has requested, by entering an order on his docket, payment for legal representation in responding to certain document requests served upon the municipal court. The city refused to comply with the order. In the mandamus action before us, we are asked to decide whether relator's funding order is sufficiently akin to the court funding orders that this court has repeatedly and consistently enforced in mandamus. We hold that it is. Because we grant the writ, the appeal in case No. 91-2247 is moot, and we do not address the issue therein.

Mandamus lies when the relator demonstrates a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, the respondent has a clear legal duty to perform the act requested, and the relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc. v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus. It is well settled that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for enforcing a court's funding order. See, e.g., State ex rel. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hoose (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 220, 569 N.E.2d 1046; State ex rel. Musser v. Massillon (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 42, 12 OBR 36, 465 N.E.2d 400.

Ohio courts have the inherent power to order the funding necessary to fulfill their purposes. State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 20 O.O.3d 361, 423 N.E.2d 80; State ex rel. Foster v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 89, 45 O.O.2d 442, 242 N.E.2d 884. A coordinate branch of government may not impede a court's business by refusing reasonable funding requests. Johnston, supra; Foster, supra. The determination of necessary administrative expenses rests solely with the court, and another branch of government may not substitute its judgment for that of the court. See Foster, supra, paragraph three of the syllabus. Funding orders enjoy a presumption of reasonableness. A funding authority refusing to obey a funding order bears the burden to demonstrate that the order constitutes an abuse of discretion and is unreasonable. State ex rel. Durkin v. Youngstown City Council (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 132, 9 OBR 382, 459 N.E.2d 213. This court has declared unconstitutional a legislative attempt to shift the burden of proof on the reasonableness issue onto the court requesting funding. Johnston, supra. The doctrine of separation of powers underpins these principles. Courts must be free from excessive control of the legislative and executive branches in order to ensure their independence and integrity. Id., 66 Ohio St.2d at 420-421, 20 O.O.3d at 363-364, 423 N.E.2d at 82-83; Zangerle v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1943), 141 Ohio St. 70, 25 O.O. 199, 46 N.E.2d 865.

A court's ability to compel funding from a coordinate branch is not, however, unfettered. The financial condition of the funding authority, for example, is one factor in determining reasonableness. Durkin, supra, 9 Ohio St.3d at 134, 9 OBR at 384, 459 N.E.2d at 216; State ex rel. Britt v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 18 OBR 1, 480 N.E.2d 77. In Britt, the Franklin County Common Pleas Court attempted in a single year's budget to bring the salaries of its employees into alignment with those of other counties. The salaries of court personnel had not been raised significantly in several years. This court denied the writ of mandamus, holding that the salary increase was too precipitous and caused an undue strain on the county purse. Britt, supra, 18 Ohio St.3d at 5, 18 OBR at 4, 480 N.E.2d at 80.

Another limitation, peculiar to municipal courts, is that a municipality may refuse to fund even reasonable requests if the General Assembly has placed discretion over a particular budget item with the municipal legislative authority. State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 63 O.O.2d 199, 296 N.E.2d 544 (city has discretion whether to fund certain support staff positions and equipment); Musser, supra. Any determination of the reasonableness of a funding order must also take into account the need to preserve the proper balance of power among the three branches of government. Britt, supra, 18 Ohio St.3d at 3, 18 OBR at 2, 480 N.E.2d at 79.

The propriety of a funding order, specifically for outside legal representation to respond to requests for court documents, is a novel issue to this court. This situation rarely arises because normally a city's law director would counsel the court. See R.C. 705.11. The acrimony between relator and respondents in this case, however, threatened to divide the loyalties of the Director of Law of the city of Shaker Heights. The city does not seriously contend at this stage that the director of law, who serves at the pleasure of respondent, the mayor of Shaker Heights, could have represented relator zealously and without at least the appearance of a conflict.

As stated in the funding order, the explicit purpose of the money was to pay legal expenses "incurred by the Court in the course of responding to subpoenas, document and information requests, and other inquiries served on or made to the Court or its personnel in their official capacities, arising out of, or related to, any investigation of the Court by the grand jury, county prosecutor, any representative of the City of Shaker Heights, any other law enforcement agency, or any representative of the news media." The city contends that funding was improper because relator would personally benefit from the representation and was unable to make impartial decisions regarding the distinction between official and personal representation.

There is, to be sure, a gray area between official and personal representation in a situation where a grand jury is investigating a judge and his or her staff, and Ohio case law provides little clarity. We find some guidance, however, from cases dealing with the right of the legislative and executive branches to employ special counsel. While a city's governing body may not employ counsel to shield itself from its own wrongdoing, "the power and duty of the city to defend the members of its governing body against unfounded and unsupported charges of corruption and fraud is quite another matter." Birmingham v. Wilkinson (1940), 239 Ala. 199, 204, 194 So. 548, 552. See, also, Osborne v. Murphy (1937), 119 N.J.L. 65, 194 A. 551 (government body entitled to employ counsel during summary investigation of its affairs); N. Miami Beach v. Estes (Fla.App.1968), 214 So.2d 644 (city council entitled to appropriate funds for special counsel to represent councilmen in lawsuits alleging election law violations). A city may have an interest in a...