State ex rel. Ervin v. Cotney

• Decision Date: 27 June 1958
• Citation: 104 So.2d 346
• Parties: STATE of Florida, ex rel. Richard W. ERVIN, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Hoyt B. COTNEY, Chairman, Ben Zeliner, D. W. Wilkinson, Fro Strickland, KennethLaRue, Mrs. J. I. Triplett, III, Dr. Luke Glennan, John H. Pace, Jr., S. BryanJennings, G. E. Wiggins, M. H. Dyson, and Mrs. R. G. Jensen, individually andasconstituting the Clay County Development Authority, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 346

104 So.2d 346

STATE of Florida, ex rel. Richard W. ERVIN, as Attorney General of the State of Florida, Petitioner, v. Hoyt B. COTNEY, Chairman, Ben Zeliner, D. W. Wilkinson, Fro Strickland, KennethLaRue, Mrs. J. I. Triplett, III, Dr. Luke Glennan, John H. Pace, Jr., S. BryanJennings, G. E. Wiggins, M. H. Dyson, and Mrs. R. G. Jensen, individually andasconstituting the Clay County Development Authority, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 27, 1958.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Charles T. Henderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Scruby & Yonge, Orange Park, and Patterson, Freeman, Richards & Watson, Jacksonville, for Respondents.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This is an original proceeding in quo warranto initiated by the Attorney General, challenging the validity of Chapter 57-1226, Special Acts of Florida, 1957, and the actions of the Clay County Development Authority, created by such Special Act, already or proposed to be taken thereunder.

Under the terms of the Special Act in question, the Clay County Development Authority was created 'for the purpose of performing such acts as shall be necessary for the sound planning for, and development of Clay County' for the public good and welfare of the county, its incorporated municipalities, and its or their inhabitants. The Authority is granted power to lease or purchase real property, to construct improvements thereon, and to pay for same by the issuance of revenue certificates, or by using funds granted to it by the state or Clay County or its municipalities. Such improvement projects may include improvements 'for development, expansion and promotion of industry, commerce, agriculture, natural resources and vocational training and the construction of buildings and plants for the purpose of selling, leasing or renting such structures to private persons, firms, or corporations.' The Authority does not have the power of eminent domain nor any taxing power, and it is expressly provided in the Special Act that the Authority 'shall not be empowered or authorized in any manner to create a debt as against the state, the county of Clay or any of the incorporated cities therein.'

The Attorney General has attacked the Act in question as 'an invalid attempt by the Legislature to create and confer upon a public corporation the power to loan its credit to private interests and to acquire property which is to be developed for private interests' in contravention of § 10 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution F.S.A. which, among others, prohibits the enactment of legislation authorizing a county or city or other public body 'to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or individual.' He relies upon the decision of this court in Adams v. Housing Authority of City of Daytona Beach, Fla.1952, 60 So.2d 663, in support of this contention. But the Act stricken down in the Adams case authorized the Housing Authority not only to purchase but also to condemn property through the power of eminent domain with the avowed purpose of selling the entire property so acquired to other private individuals or corporations for private use. It was held that the public purpose incidentally served by the statutory plan, that is, the abatement of slum or 'blighted' areas, was not sufficient, standing alone, to convert into a public enterprise that which was essentially a plan for the establishment of private enterprises. The fact that the Housing Authority was authorized to condemn private property for such purpose was obviously given considerable weight by this court. It must, however, be taken as settled law under the Adams decision and the previous decision of this court in State v. Town of North Miami, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 779, that a public body cannot use its power and its funds to acquire property, either by purchase or by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, for the sole purpose of making such property available to private enterprises for private use.

It is equally clear from subsequent decisions of this court that, if a valid public purpose will be effectuated by a proposed plan of acquisition and/or improvement of property by a public body, the fact that a sale or lease of a portion of the improvement to private parties was contemplated will not invalidate the plan. In each of the following cases the proposed plan was approved as a valid public purpose, even though private enterprise was incidentally involved: Gate City Garage, Inc., v. City of Jacksonville, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d 653 (construction and lease of filling station on municipal parking lot); State v. City of Miami, Fla.1954, 76 So.2d 294 (an international trade market); State v. Inter-American Center Authority, Fla.1955, 84 So.2d 9 (an inter-American cultural and trade center); State v. Dade County, Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 404 (the erection and leasing of a warehouse and shop by the county to a private corporation); Panama City v. State, Fla.1957, 93 So.2d 608 (acquiring land and erecting two marinas, including stores to be leased to private interests); State v. Daytona...