Walden v. State

• Decision Date: 29 November 1989
• Docket Number: 88-1440,88-1435 and 88-1439,Nos. 88-1434,s. 88-1434
• Citation: 47 Ohio St.3d 47,547 N.E.2d 962
• Parties: WALDEN, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. ELLIS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 47

47 Ohio St.3d 47

547 N.E.2d 962

WALDEN, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

ELLIS, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 88-1434, 88-1440, 88-1435 and 88-1439.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 27, 1989.

Decided Nov. 29, 1989.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A person who is acquitted by reason of self-defense may seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment under R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48.

2. Where a person claiming compensation for wrongful imprisonment has presented an affirmative defense of self-defense at his criminal trial, and has obtained a judgment of acquittal, that judgment is not to be given preclusive effect in a proceeding under R.C. 2305.02.

3. In a proceeding under R.C. 2305.02, the claimant bears the burden of proving his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

These appeals arise from two actions brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County. Linda Lee Walden and Nathaniel E. Ellis each seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment under R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48. The cases have been consolidated for purposes of decision because the legal issues in both are identical.

Walden v. State,

Nos. 88-1434 and 88-1440

Linda Lee Walden was indicted for aggravated murder in 1980 for the death of William F. Whitfield III. At trial, Walden claimed that she had killed Whitfield in self-defense. On March 16, 1981, she was found guilty of the lesser included offense of murder and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. The court of appeals affirmed her conviction. State v. Walden (Apr. 8, 1982), Franklin App. No. 81AP-335, unreported, 1982 WL 4094.

Walden pursued post-conviction relief, and was ultimately granted a new trial in 1984 based on evidence that the prosecution had unlawfully suppressed. Her second trial resulted in a hung jury. At her third trial, which was to the court, she was acquitted. Judge Gillie noted in his opinion:

"The direct evidence adduced established all of the elements of the crime and charge herein of murder.

"It is incumbent upon us therefore to move to the issue of self-defense as presented by the defendant. * * *

" * * * "The circumstantial evidence in this case is not for the most part necessarily inconsistent with either the version of the State nor with that of the defendant.

"This leads us to the law which reads that circumstantial evidence, by itself, will justify a finding of guilty only if the circumstances are entirely consistent [sic ] with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence and are so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

"There is presented a reasonable theory of defendant's innocence which must prevail against the State's significant circumstantial evidence on the issue of self-defense."

Walden filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, pursuant to R.C. 2305.02, seeking a determination that she was a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation under R.C. 23743.48. The statute requires a person seeking compensation to secure a determination from the common pleas court that "the offense of which he was found guilty * * * was not committed by him or was not committed by any person." Former R.C. 2743.48(A)(4).

On motions for summary judgment by both parties, the trial court held that Walden was entitled to compensation. Walden v. State (Oct. 1, 1987), Franklin C.P. No. 86-CV-12-7644, unreported. The court reasoned that the judgment of acquittal precluded the state from contesting Walden's innocence. The state appealed to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, where the case was consolidated with that of Nathaniel Ellis for purposes of argument.

Ellis v. State,

Nos. 88-1435 and 88-1439

Nathaniel E. Ellis was indicted for felonious assault which stemmed from a fight in June 1981. State v. Ellis (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 27, 8 OBR 29, 455 N.E.2d 1025. At trial, he claimed self-defense. Id. at 28, 8 OBR at 30, 455 N.E.2d at 1026. He was convicted of felonious assault on March 11, 1982, and sentenced to five to fifteen years in prison.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. State v. Ellis, supra. At his second trial, Ellis was acquitted by a general verdict.

Ellis filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, pursuant to R.C. 2305.02, seeking a determination that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation under R.C. 2743.02, seeking a determination that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation under R.C. 2743.48. In a decision on stipulated facts, the trial court held that Ellis was entitled to compensation. Ellis v. State (Oct. 22, 1987), Franklin C.P. No. 87CV-04-2474, unreported. The court reasoned that the verdict of acquittal following a claim of self-defense meant that Ellis was a wrongfully imprisoned individual as a matter of law. Id. at 3-4, citing Walden v. State, Franklin C.P. No. 86-CV-12-7644, unreported. The state appealed to the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, where the case was consolidated with that of Walden for purposes of argument.

Court of Appeals

In nearly identical opinions released on the same day, the court of appeals held that persons acquitted by reason of self-defense were entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment. However, the court of appeals held that the state was not barred by collateral estoppel from contesting factual determinations a claimant must prove in order to recover compensation.

In case Nos. 88-1434 and 88-1435, the state appeals the lower court's holding on the question of whether a person acquitted by reason of self- may recover for wrongful imprisonment. The state also raises the issue of what standard of proof is required in proceedings under R.C. 2305.02. In case Nos. 88-1439 and 88-1440, Ellis and Walden, respectively, appeal the holding that collateral estoppel does not apply in an action under R.C. 2305.02 where the defendant has been acquitted by proving self-defense.

These causes are before the court pursuant to the allowance of motions and cross-motions to certify the record.

Wristen & Ucker Co., L.P.A., David A. Ucker and Ellen L. Wristen, Columbus, for appellees and cross-appellants.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Simon B. Karas and Mark T. D'Alessandro, Columbus, Michael J. Miller, Pros. Atty., and William J. Owen, Supplementary Counsel, Dayton, for appellant and cross-appellee.

David L. Landefeld, Pros. Atty., urging reversal in case Nos. 88-1434 and 88-1435, and affirmance in case Nos. 88-1439 and 88-1440, for amicus curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Assn.

HERBERT R. BROWN, Judge.

These cases present our first opportunity to construe Ohio's wrongful imprisonment statutes, R.C. 2305.02 and 2743.48. These statutes were added to the Revised Code in 1986 by Sub. H.B. No. 609 "to authorize civil actions against the state, for specified monetary amounts, in the Court of Claims by certain wrongfully imprisoned individuals" (141 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5351), replacing the former practice of compensating wrongfully imprisoned persons by ad hoc moral claims legislation. See, generally, Comment, Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio: Should There Be More Than A Moral Obligation to Compensate? (1982), 12 Cap.U.L.Rev. 255. Under the statutory scheme, a claimant must follow a two-step process.

In the first step, the claimant must bring an action in the court of common pleas to secure a determination that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual entitled to compensation. As relevant here, a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" was defined in former R.C. 2743.48(A) as one who satisfied four criteria:

"(1) He was charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an indictment or information prior to, or on or after, the effective date of this section, and the violation charged was an aggravated felony or felony.

"(2) He was found guilty of the particular charge or a lesser-included offense * * * and the offense of which he was found guilty was an aggravated felony or felony.

"(3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a state penal or reformatory institution for the offense of which he was found guilty.

"(4) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or subsequent to his imprisonment, it was determined by a court of common pleas that the offense of which he was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by him or was not committed by any person." ¹

R.C. 2305.02 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the court of common please "to hear and determine an action or proceeding that is commenced by an individual * * * that seeks a determination by the court that the offense of which he was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by him or was not committed by any person." Once the claimant secures this determination, R.C. 2743.48(D) provides that he "has and may file a civil action against the state, in the court of claims, to recover a sum of money * * *" in an amount fixed by R.C. 2743.48(E).

The issues now before this court all relate to the first stage of this process, the determination that "the offense of which * * * [the claimant] was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by him or was not committed by any person."

I

In its first and second propositions of law, the state argues that a person acquitted by reason of self-defense is not within the definition of a "wrongfully imprisoned individual." It bases this argument on the manner in which self-defense is treated under Ohio criminal law.

Ohio is one of only two states which retains the common-law rule on self-defense. See Martin v. Ohio (1987), 480 U.S. 228, 236, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1103, 94 L.Ed.2d 267. In Ohio, self-defense is an affirmative defense which the defendant is required to prove...