State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner

• Decision Date: 06 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-991,93-991
• Citation: 74 Ohio St.3d 158,656 N.E.2d 1288
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. FOGLE et al., Appellants, v. STEINER, Judge, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 158

74 Ohio St.3d 158

656 N.E.2d 1288

The STATE ex rel. FOGLE et al., Appellants, v. STEINER, Judge, et al., Appellees.

No. 93-991.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 26, 1995.

Decided Dec. 6, 1995.

On June 11, 1987, appellant Mary Fogle and Adam Fogle were married. While married, they had two children, appellants Amanda Nicole Fogle and Matthew Adam Rodney Fogle. On June 23, 1992, Mary Fogle filed a complaint for divorce in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. On June 30, 1992, the court granted her ex parte motion for temporary custody of the two children. Adam Fogle subsequently filed an answer and a counterclaim for divorce.

After Adam Fogle and his mother, Judith Prince, refused to give Mary Fogle custody of the two children, Mary Fogle obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the Licking County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division. See, e.g., R.C. 2151.23(A)(3). The writ ordered that the children be brought before the court for a hearing.

On July 1, 1992, Adam Fogle filed a motion in the divorce proceeding for the court to vacate its prior ex parte temporary custody order and to grant temporary custody pendente lite to his mother, Judith Prince. The court granted the motion, awarding Prince custody of the two children pendente lite. The juvenile court then vacated its writ of habeas corpus and released the children to Prince.

On August 4, 1992, Adam Fogle filed a motion requesting a continuance in a temporary custody hearing in the divorce proceeding. One of the specified grounds for the motion was that Prince had "indicated that she will request leave to be joined as a party in the above-captioned matter." In an "agreed entry" signed on the same day by appellee Domestic Relations Division Judge Russell A. Steiner, the motion was granted. The entry noted that one of the reasons for the continuance was Prince's "request to be joined as a party." On August 7, 1992, Mary and Adam Fogle filed a notice of their joint dismissal of the divorce action in which they expressly dismissed their claims and counterclaims against each other. The notice of dismissal did not contain Prince's signature.

On October 9, 1992, appellee Domestic Relations Division Referee C. William Rickrich issued a report recommending that Judge Steiner designate Prince as the legal custodian of the parties' minor children. The referee stated the following about the effect of the parties' notice of dismissal on the proceedings:

" * * * [T]he plaintiff and defendant filed a notice of dismissal of the case on August 7, 1992. The dismissal does not contain the signature of Mrs. Prince or any representation that she consented to it. This point is significant since the Court's order of July 11, 1992, granted temporary custody of the Fogle children to Mrs. Prince. This order has not been modified or set aside."

Judge Steiner approved the referee's report, ordering that Prince be the legal custodian of the two minor children of the parties. On November 24, 1992, Judge Steiner overruled Mary Fogle's motion to vacate the judgment awarding custody of the children to Prince:

"The plaintiff claims that because she and the defendant entered a voluntary dismissal of their respective claims, the Court lost its jurisdiction to award custody of the parties['] minor children to the paternal grandmother.

"The problem with plaintiff's argument is that before plaintiff and defendant agreed to dismiss their claims against each other on August 7, 1992, the paternal grandparent was joined as a party and acquired the status of a third party to the suit pursuant to an entry filed August 4, 1992." (Emphasis sic.)

On March 9, 1993, appellants, Mary Fogle and her two children, filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition (misdesignated below as "prohibito"), mandamus, and procedendo, in the Court of Appeals for Licking County naming appellees, Judge Steiner, Referee Rickrich, and Juvenile Division Judge Mike Radabaugh as respondents. Appellants requested (1) a writ of prohibition preventing the Licking County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division from exercising further jurisdiction in the divorce proceeding; (2) a writ of mandamus ordering the Licking County Common Peas Court, Domestic Relations Division to vacate all orders made in the divorce proceeding since the August 7, 1992 notice of dismissal filed by Mary and Adam Fogle; (3) a writ of mandamus ordering the Licking County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division to vacate its July 1, 1992 order in the habeas corpus case, issue a new writ of habeas corpus for the production of the children, and return the children to Mary Fogle; and (4) a writ of procedendo ordering the Licking County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division to proceed with the habeas corpus case.

On March 19, 1993, prior to the expiration of the period for appellees to file an answer or motion to dismiss, the court of appeals sua sponte dismissed the case, holding:

"Writs denied. An adequate remedy at law existed, i.e., direct appeal of the October 9, 1992 judgment entry ordering that Judith Prince be designated legal custodian and/or the November 24, 1992 judgment entry denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the October 9, 1992 judgment entry."

Although relators filed a timely notice of appeal in 1993, the record was not transmitted and the case was not fully briefed until this year. While the appeal was pending, the referee issued a report on May 18, 1993 recommending that custody of the children continue with Prince. In the report, the referee noted that his "review of the file revealed that Mrs. Prince had not been formally added as a third party defendant." On the same date that the referee's report was filed, Judge Steiner issued an entry in which he sua sponte ordered that Prince be added as a third-party defendant in the divorce case. Subsequently, on February 22, 1994, Judge Steiner issued a nunc pro tunc entry in the divorce case, which provided:

"The Court, upon motion of Judith Prince, through counsel, hereby orders that Judith Prince be named as a third party defendant in the above captioned action effective August 4, 1992."

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right from the court of appeals' sua sponte dismissal of the extraordinary writ action.

Harry J. DePietro, Newark, for appellants.

Robert L. Becker, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Scott A. Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants contend in their first and second propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in sua sponte denying the writs, since the domestic relations court lacked jurisdiction in the divorce case when Mary and Adam Fogle filed their notice of dismissal on August 7, 1992. The court of appeals sua sponte denied the requested writs on the basis that appellants possessed an adequate legal remedy. This denial constituted a summary dismissal, which this court reviews to determine if the court of appeals abused its discretion. State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 102, 103, 637 N.E.2d 317, 318. The term "abuse of discretion" implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223, 631 N.E.2d 150, 155.

In general, a court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, only after the parties are given notice of the court's intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 647 N.E.2d 799, 801. However, sua sponte dismissal without notice is appropriate where the complaint is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. Id., citing Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm. (C.A.D.C.1990), 916 F.2d 725, and English v. Cowell (C.A.7, 1993), 10 F.3d 434. Here, the court of appeals did not give the parties prior notice of its intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. Consequently, we must determine if appellants' claims are frivolous or obviously without merit. Edwards, supra.

In initially considering the claims for writs of mandamus and prohibition against the domestic relations division, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Enyart v. O'Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. However, where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, mandamus and prohibition will lie to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions. State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155, 157; State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 330, 59 O.O.2d 387, 389, 285 N.E.2d 22, 24.

R.C. 3105.21(B) vests a domestic relations court with jurisdiction to determine custody issues even though a divorce action is dismissed due to a failure to prosecute. State ex rel. Easterday v. Zieba (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 251, 255, 569 N.E.2d 1028, 1032. However, the domestic relations court lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 3105.21(B) to exercise further jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding if the parties voluntarily dismiss their claims pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1). See Lilly v. Lilly (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 192, 193, 26 OBR 412, 413, 499 N.E.2d 21, 23. When a case has been properly dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1), the court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed and a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Hunt v. Thompson (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 182, 183, 586 N.E.2d 107, 108; ...