State ex rel. Hilbert v. Glaves

• Decision Date: 15 May 1916
• Citation: 186 S.W. 685,268 Mo. 100
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. EMERT C. HILBERT, Prosecuting Attorney of Lewis County, Appellant, v. E. C. GLAVES et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

186 S.W. 685

268 Mo. 100

THE STATE ex rel. EMERT C. HILBERT, Prosecuting Attorney of Lewis County, Appellant, v. E. C. GLAVES et al

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 15, 1916

Appeal from Lewis Circuit Court. -- Hon. Charles D. Stewart, Judge.

Affirmed.

H. S Rouse, R. J. McNally, Hilbert & Henderson, B. F. Thompson, J G. Trimble and E. R. McKee for appellant.

(1) Notice does not describe land sought to be included. Should describe it sufficiently to enable voters to understand the exact land intended to comprise the district. State ex rel. v. Eden, 54 Mo.App. 31; School District v Neal, 74 Mo.App. 553; State ex rel. v. Gibson, 78 Mo.App. 170; School District No. 4 v. Smith, 90 Mo.App. 215; State ex rel. v. Young, 84 Mo. 90; Mason v. Kenedy, 89 Mo. 23; School District v. School District, 94 Mo. 612; State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 1. True, the notice refers to the plat for a description, but the plats were not posted at same places the notices were. They were posted in other and different parts of the district sought to be affected. (2) The notice posted notified the voters that meeting would be held at "Gem Theater, at Lewistown." The record of the meeting simply shows it was held "At Lewistown." The place of meeting is jurisdictional; the meeting must be held where notice calls for. Kane & Co. v. The School District of Calhoun, 48 Mo.App. 414; State v. Lawrence, 178 Mo.App. 374; Surveying Co. v. St. Louis, 68 Mo.App. 187; State ex rel. v. Lockett, 54 Mo.App. 208. (3) The decree of the court should be set aside for the reason that there is no record of the proposed organization of the district kept by the county superintendent of schools as is contemplated by the statute. The county superintendent is a county official (R. S. 1909, sec. 10929). He must turn over his "records" (Sec. 10929). He must give bond for "records." He must have a place to keep his "records." The county must furnish a book for his "records." He must turn over to his successor his "records" (Sec. 10931). An officer can speak only by his "records." His "record" is conclusive. Newcomb v. Railroad, 182 Mo. 687. The law contemplates that the county superintendent shall keep records of his official acts, and in such a matter as this it is very important that records should be kept. An examination of the testimony in this case shows that the only evidence of his official acts is oral.

F. H. McCullough and J. L. Brightwell for respondents.

(1) The record in this case shows a substantial compliance with the provisions of the laws of Missouri, applying to consolidated schools. Laws 1913, p. 720. (2) The Consolidated School Law is constitutional. State ex rel. v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631. (3) For a half century it has been recognized in this State that the business affairs of all public schools must be transacted by plain, honest citizens, not accustomed to legal technicalities, and if their proceedings, which were had in good faith, can be treated as void for irregularities which do not affect the substantial rights of the people interested, then the beneficial object of our school system wold entirely fail in many of the school districts of this State. Eads v. Woolridge, 27 Mo. 251; Rice v. McClelland, 58 Mo. 116; State ex rel. v. Job, 205 Mo. 1; School Dist. v. School Dist., 181 Mo.App. 583; School Dist. v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 498; State ex rel. v. Sexton, 151 Mo.App. 517; State ex rel. v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617. (4) Mere omissions to perform certain requirements of the Consolidated School Law, not going to the merits, are not mandatory and will not invalidate such proceedings. (5) The statute provides that certain acts or things shall be done within a particular time and in a particular manner, and does not declare that their performance is essential to the validity of the election. Such acts are therefore directory, and, if they do not affect the actual merits of the election will not invalidate the proceedings. Technicalities have no place in construing the school laws. Sanders v. Lacks, 142 Mo. 255; State v. Swearingen, 128 Mo.App. 605; State ex rel. v. Cloud, 180 S.W. 26.

BLAIR, J. Bond, J., concurs in the result.

OPINION

In Banc.

BLAIR J.

-- Relator appeals from a judgment for respondents rendered in the Lewis Circuit Court in a proceeding by quo warranto, begun for the purpose of testing the validity of the organization of a consolidated school district in that county. The facts necessary to an understanding of the questions presented are stated in the course of the opinion.

I. It is contended the petition and the certificate of the proceedings at the election (Sec. 3, Laws 1913, pp. 722, 723) were incompetent because not shown to have been spread of record by the county superintendent. Sections 10929 and 10931, Revised Statutes 1909, are relied upon. These sections provide for no records. They require the superintendent to deliver "all books, papers, certificates, stub books and records" to his successor, and thereby imply records are required by other statutes. The documents objected to are governed by the act referred to, and it makes no provision for their recording. That act is satisfied when the petition and certificate are deposited with the superintendent. [State ex inf. v. Clardy, 267 Mo. 371, 185 S.W. 184.] The documents offered were marked filed and were produced by the superintendent. It may be, as suggested, that recording the petition and certificate would better preserve the evidence of the organization of the district. That is matter for the Legislature.

II. In forming the new district common school districts were divided. It is insisted the welfare of the excluded parts of such districts was not given due consideration. The statute does not make this a judicial question, but invokes for its settlement the discretion of the superintendent, in the first place, and then submits it, with the rest, to the voters at the election required to be held. This infringes no constitutional right. [State ex inf. v. Jones, 266 Mo. l. c. 191, 181 S.W. 50.] The statute (Sec. 5, Laws 1913, p. 723) provides procedure for annexation of fractional districts to the consolidated district, and also provides a summary method of annexation to adjacent common school districts. What method might apply to annexation to an adjoining city, town and village district is not presented for decision.

III. It is urged the organization is void because the notices posted failed to set out the description and boundaries of the proposed district. The statute (Laws 1913, sec. 3, p. 722) requires that the superintendent shall call the election "by posting within the proposed district ten notices in public places, stating the place, time and purpose of such meeting. At least fifteen days' notice shall be given and the meeting shall commence at two o'clock p. m. on the date set. The county superintendent shall also post within said proposed district five plats of the proposed consolidated district at least fifteen days prior to the date of the special meeting." It further provides that a copy of the petition and plat shall be filed with the county clerk and that one plat shall be taken to the special meeting. In case the district as established includes territory in more than one county a copy of the petition and plat is required to be filed with the county clerk of each county affected.

The decisions principally relied on in this connection are School Dist. No. 1. v. School Dist. No. 4, 94 Mo. l. c. 612 at 618, 619, 7 S.W. 285; State ex rel. v. Eden, 54 Mo.App. l. c. 31 et seq.; and School Dist. No. 4 v. Smith, 90 Mo.App. 215. In these cases the courts were dealing with changes in school districts and interpreting statutes which respectively provided for "notice of required change," "notice of desired change," and notice of "proposed change." These expressions are practically equivalent. That language was held to mean that the notice itself must describe the change it was proposed to make in district boundaries. The statute applicable in this case requires the notice to state the "time, place and purpose" of the meeting. It is argued the use of the word "purpose" imposed the duty of setting out the exact boundaries. It is true the word might be given such a construction. It is to be observed, however, that there was already (cases last cited) employed in statutes in pari materia language having a judicially determined meaning adequate to express the idea now asserted to be contained in the word "purpose" as used in the act before us. The use of this language was avoided by the Legislature.

Again in the very act itself, the Legislature used the words "exact boundaries" in one connection in which it desired to require the setting out of the exact limits of the district. In addition, the act provides for the posting of plats in five public places, which plats are designed to...