State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1973,93-1973
• Citation: 630 N.E.2d 701,69 Ohio St.3d 130
• Parties: , 90 Ed. Law Rep. 374 The STATE ex rel. McMASTER, Appellant, v. SCHOOL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 130

69 Ohio St.3d 130

630 N.E.2d 701, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 374

The STATE ex rel. McMASTER, Appellant, v. SCHOOL EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Appellee.

No. 93-1973.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 1, 1994.

Decided April 27, 1994.

Frank D. McMaster, relator-appellant, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Appeals which denied his complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the School Employees Retirement System, respondent-appellee, to: (1) vacate its decision denying his application for disability retirement benefits, (2) order appellee to pay appellant disability retirement benefits, and (3) order appellee to comply with due process and its administrative rules. The parties stipulated the evidence to be considered in the court of appeals.

Appellant was employed as a school bus driver for the Chesapeake Union School District in Lawrence County, Ohio, for over fifteen years. The last day that he drove a school bus was March 7, 1990. In June 1990, appellant applied for disability retirement benefits with appellee. Appellant claimed that he was unable to drive a school bus because of depression, anxiety, and high blood pressure. He noted that the least amount of pressure or noise, e.g., a child acting up on the bus, would cause great anxiety and result in an unsafe situation.

Robert J. Thomas, M.D., appellant's attending physician, filed a report on behalf of appellant which diagnosed him as suffering from severe anxiety neurosis and hypertension. Dr. Thomas opined that appellant's anxiety disorder significantly affected his ability to do any job and that driving a school bus was not an option "at this time." Dr. Thomas concluded that appellant was "mentally incapacitated" from performing his duties as a school bus driver. Nevertheless, Dr. Thomas questioned whether appellant's conditions were permanent, stating that he might improve with "psychiatric input."

Jerold H. Altman, M.D., conducted a psychiatric examination of appellant on behalf of appellee. Dr. Altman reviewed Dr. Thomas' report and took a medical history from appellant. Dr. Altman was unable to ascertain any evidence of either a severe disruptive psychiatric disorder or an organic brain dysfunction. He concluded that appellant was not disabled on a psychiatric basis. Dr. Altman further noted:

"I am somewhat puzzled at Dr. Thomas' brief report about prognosis for recovery as poor and patient may need, 'Significant psychiatric counseling.' Perhaps Dr. Thomas can give a much better and clearer explanation of this so that it can be considered. However, after my examination of Mr. McMaster I fail to see any disruptive psychiatric disorder."

N. Stanley Nahman, Jr., M.D., conducted a physical examination of appellant on behalf of appellee. Dr. Nahman concluded:

" * * * Mr. McMaster may be considered to have systemic hypertension without evidence of cardiovascular, central nervous or renal complications. Because he has no end organ dysfunction secondary to his hypertension he cannot be considered disabled."

The four-member medical advisory committee for appellee reviewed the medical reports and recommended that appellant's application for disability retirement benefits be denied because he was not disabled from performing his duties as a bus driver. On December 7, 1990, appellee denied the application. By certified letter dated December 7, 1990, appellee notified appellant of its denial of his application and further stated: "If you intend to appeal the Board's decision it must be in writing, signed by you, and sent within 15 days of the date on this letter. Please follow the instructions in the enclosed leaflet regarding School Employees Retirement System's disability appeals procedures."

On December 13, 1990, appellant appealed appellee's decision and indicated his intent to provide additional medical evidence. By letter dated January 30, 1991, Alice Fletcher, R.N., a psychiatric nurse at Pathways, Inc., indicated that appellant had been recently treated by Khan M. Matin, M.D., the medical director of the facility, with medication as well as psychotherapy. In another letter dated February 27, 1991, Fletcher and Dr. Matin stated that appellant had "reported his inability to cope with stress and a fear that he may have an accident while driving the school bus with the children." Dr. Matin recommended and also scheduled a psychological evaluation of appellant for March 1991, and further requested an extension of time for appellee's determination of the appeal.

On March 6, 1991, Steven Parks, M.A., a certified psychologist with Pathways, Inc., conducted a psychological examination of appellant. In an evaluation received by appellee on March 29, 1991, and listing the typewritten names of both Parks and Walter F. Powers, M.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, it was opined that appellant suffered from dysthymia and chronic depression. Parks concluded that the "[p]rognosis regarding his emotional problems is fair," that "[s]ymptomatic relief for his depression may be provided by antidepressant medication," and that psychotherapy may also prove beneficial. In an April 1, 1991 letter, Robert J. Atwell, M.D., the Chairman of the Medical Advisory Committee, advised appellee:

"I have reviewed the material submitted as a basis for appeal. In reviewing, only the conditions for which he has been examined were raised and I see no reason to change the recommendation to deny."

On April 12, 1991, appellee denied the appeal and upheld its decision to deny appellant disability retirement benefits. By letter dated April 16, 1991, appellee informed appellant of its decision:

"On April 12, 1991 the Retirement Board, in consultation with its Medical Advisory Committee, reviewed all the evidence and concurred in the decision to uphold the original recommendation to deny disability retirement because of the lack of acceptable medical evidence establishing your inability to perform your job duties."

In a September 24, 1992 letter, appellant's counsel advised appellee that appellant requested that his application be "fully and fairly adjudicated" and that he receive a personal appearance before appellee. Appellant's counsel also attached a June 25, 1992 psychiatric evaluation of appellant by Allan R. Korb, M.D. Dr. Korb diagnosed appellant as suffering from dysthymia and concluded that his "severe psychiatric disorder * * * totally incapacitated [him] from performing his duties as a school bus driver * * *." Dr. Korb concluded that appellant's disability was permanent and had been permanent since March 7, 1990. Appellee subsequently notified appellant that his appeal rights had ceased.

On January 19, 1993, appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. On August 13, 1993, the court of appeals entered judgment denying the requested mandamus relief.

The cause is before the court upon an appeal as of right.

Stewart Jaffy & Assoc. Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, Marc J. Jaffy and Sue Fauber, Columbus, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Christopher S. Cook, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The Public School Employees Retirement System was established for the purpose of providing retirement allowances and other benefits to public school employees other than teachers. 1 Baker & Carey, Ohio School Law (1993) 399, Section 8.25. The determination of whether a member of the School Employees Retirement System is entitled to disability retirement is solely within the province of appellee pursuant to R.C. 3309.39. Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 118, 7 O.O.3d 192, 372 N.E.2d 814, syllabus. In order to be entitled to disability retirement benefits, a member must be mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of such member's last assigned primary duty by a disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application. R.C. 3309.39(C). The determination by appellee of whether a person is entitled to disability retirement benefits is subject to review by mandamus, and mandamus may also be utilized to correct any other abuse of discretion in the proceedings. Carney v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. Bd. (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 71, 72, 528 N.E.2d 1322, 1324.

In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish that: (1) relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Manson v. Morris (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 440, 441, 613 N.E.2d 232, 233-234. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 112, 616 N.E.2d 218, 222. Appellant essentially contends that appellee abused its discretion in several particulars in denying appellant's application for disability retirement benefits.

In his first proposition of law, appellant asserts that appellee breached its fiduciary duty to him by failing to properly evaluate and follow up on the evidence submitted in conjunction with his application for disability retirement benefits. Appellant claims, as he did below, that appellee owed him a fiduciary duty to protect his interest and his right to disability retirement benefits in its handling of his application. Appellant contends that this fiduciary duty arose as a result of R.C. 3309.15, which provides in pertinent part:

"The members of the school employees retirement board shall be the trustees of the several funds created by section 3309.60 of the Revised Code. The board and other fiduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to such funds solely in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries; for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to...