State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd., 2004 Ohio 5268 (OH 9/30/2004)

• Decision Date: 30 September 2004
• Docket Number: Case No. 99AP-1474.
• Citation: 2004 Ohio 5268
• Parties: State of Ohio ex rel. Jacalyn A. Rock, Relator, v. School Employees Retirement Board, Respondent.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

2004 Ohio 5268

State of Ohio ex rel. Jacalyn A. Rock, Relator, v. School Employees Retirement Board, Respondent.

Case No. 99AP-1474.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on September 30, 2004.

ON REMAND From the Supreme Court of Ohio.

Janice L. Mazurkiewcz, for relator.

Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Emily A. Smith, for respondent.

DECISION

PETREE, J.

{¶1} This case is before this court after this court's decision in State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd. (Dec. 27, 2001), Franklin App. No. 99AP-1474 (Memorandum Decision) was reversed by State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd., 96 Ohio St.3d 206, 2002-Ohio-3957, and the cause remanded "for a consideration of the merits of Rock's mandamus action." Id. at ¶11.

{¶2} On January 24, 1997, relator, Jacalyn A. Rock, who was a school bus driver for the Parma City School District, injured her right knee when she slipped on ice. In March 1998, Rock applied for disability retirement benefits from respondent School Employees Retirement System ("SERS"). On July 31, 1998, the SERS board ("board") denied Rock's application for disability retirement. Thereafter, Rock unsuccessfully requested the board to reconsider its decision.

{¶3} On December 22, 1999, Rock filed a complaint in mandamus in this court to compel the board to vacate its decision and to grant disability retirement benefits to Rock. Alternatively, Rock sought an order to compel the board to vacate its decision and to grant Rock a personal appearance before the board.

{¶4} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C)¹ and Loc.R. 12(M)² of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this court referred the matter to a magistrate of this court. On May 31, 2000, after having examined the evidence, the magistrate issued a decision, wherein she made findings of fact and conclusions of law. In her decision, the magistrate recommended that a writ of mandamus should lie: (1) ordering respondent to vacate its decision that denied relator's request for disability retirement benefits; and (2) ordering respondent to issue a new decision within which the board identifies what medical evidence it relied upon in reaching its new decision.

{¶5} Thereafter, the board objected to the magistrate's decision. On December 26, 2000, this court sustained the board's objections to the magistrate's decision and ordered the cause to be returned to the magistrate for a determination on the merits. State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd. (Dec. 26, 2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-1474 (Memorandum Decision). On February 9, 2001, Rock appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.

{¶6} Subsequently, on February 14, 2001, during the pendency of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the magistrate issued another decision, wherein she recommended that this court deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.³ In March 2001, Rock objected to the magistrate's decision of February 2001, and the board filed a memorandum in opposition to Rock's objections. On April 10, 2001, Rock moved for an extension of time to file a reply to the board's memorandum in opposition. By journal entry filed April 12, 2001, this court found it was unable to rule upon Rock's motion for an extension of time to file a reply due to an "ostensible lack of jurisdiction." On April 16, 2001, Rock again moved for an extension of time to file a reply to the board's memorandum in opposition. By journal entry filed April 20, 2001, this court again denied Rock's motion of April 16, 2001.

{¶7} On April 17, 2001, the Supreme Court of Ohio sua sponte dismissed Rock's appeal of February 9, 2001, for want of prosecution. State ex rel. Rock v. School Emp. Retirement Bd. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1498.

{¶8} On December 27, 2001, this court dismissed Rock's mandamus action for lack of jurisdiction. From this judgment, Rock appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court reversed this court's judgment and remanded the cause for a consideration of the merits of Rock's mandamus action. Rock, 2002-Ohio-3937, at ¶11.

{¶9} A determination of whether a member of SERS is entitled to disability retirement is solely within its province, pursuant to R.C. 3309.39. State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, citing Fair v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 118, syllabus. "[T]o be entitled to disability retirement benefits, a member must be mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of such member's last assigned primary duty by a disabling condition either permanent or presumed to be permanent for twelve continuous months following the filing of an application." McMaster, at 133. See, generally, R.C. 3309.39(C). SERS' determination of a member's entitlement to disability retirement benefits "is subject to review by mandamus, and mandamus may also be utilized to correct any other abuse of discretion in the proceedings." McMaster, at 133, citing Carney v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. Bd. (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 71, 72. "In the mandamus context, an abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is 'to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.' " State ex rel. Bryant v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 748, 752, quoting State ex rel. Democratic Executive Commt. v. Brown (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 157, 161. See, also, McMaster, at 133, citing Rock v. Cabral (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 112 (stating that "[t]he term 'abuse of discretion' connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable").

{¶10} "[T]o be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish that: (1) relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act, and (3) relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." McMaster, at 133, citing State ex rel. Manson v. Morris (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 440, 441.

{¶11} At the outset, relator suggests the board had insufficient information concerning relator's job duties when it denied relator's application for disability retirement. We observe, however, that it was relator herself who provided the board with a description of her job duties. (Stipulated Evidence, Exhibit 127.) Accordingly, for relator to now claim that this information is insufficient is unpersuasive.

{¶12} In her objections, relator contends that the magistrate was incorrect when she concluded that "[s]ince SERB does not have to provide an explanation for its determinations, one must assume that SERB has properly discharged its duties and responsibilities under the law. As such, relator has not established that SERB abused its discretion in this regard." (Magistrate's Decision, filed September 2, 2004, at ¶59, attached as Appendix A.)

{¶13} "The rule is generally accepted that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers, administrative officers and public authorities, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law, will be presumed to have properly performed their duties in a regular and lawful manner and not to have acted illegally or unlawfully. All legal intendments are in favor of the regularity of administrative action." State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney (1955), 163 Ohio St. 159, 186. See, also, State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 590; Bloch v. Glander (1949), 151 Ohio St. 381, 385-386. See, also, Withrow v. Larkin (1975), 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.

{¶14} Here, notwithstanding relator's contention to the contrary, we find the evidence does not support a finding that the board failed to properly discharge its duties and responsibilities under the law. We therefore conclude relator has failed to carry her burden of persuasion to rebut a presumption in favor of the regularity of SERS' administrative action. Accordingly, relator's contention that the magistrate erred when she assumed the board properly discharged its duties is not well-taken.

{¶15} In her objections, relator also contends that she was deprived procedural due process because: (1) she was not provided with an evidentiary hearing before the board, and (2) the board denied her request for a personal appearance. Although relator failed to raise this issue before the magistrate, we consider it here.

{¶16} "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite." Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564, 569-570, 92 S.Ct. 2701. (Footnote omitted.) See, also, Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan (1999), 526 U.S. 40, 59, 119 S.Ct. 977 (stating that "[t]he first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in 'property' or 'liberty.' * * * Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State's procedures comport with due process").

{¶17} "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims." Roth, supra, at 577.

{¶18} The Roth Court further explained that "[p]roperty interests * * * are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or...