State ex rel. Missouri Southern Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri
| Decision Date | 02 July 1914 |
| Citation | 168 S.W. 1156,259 Mo. 704 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. MISSOURI SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MISSOURI |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Writ Allowed.
J. B Daniels for relator; E. A. Rozier, O. L. Cravens, R. A. Hope Thomas R. Morrow, S. H. West, S.W. Moore, O. M. Spencer, J M. Bryson, J. W. Jamison, W. F. Evans, J. L. Minnis, R. A Brown, Lon O. Hocker, Martin L. Clardy, T. L. Philips, of counsel.
(1) All of that part of section 47 of the Public Service Commission Act of the State of Missouri under consideration in this case was copied verbatim from the Public Service Commissions Law of the State of New York, and in adopting the language of the New York statute the Legislature is presumed to have adopted the interpretation theretofore placed upon it by the commissions and courts of New York. Laws New York, 1907, chap. 429; Laws New York, 1910, chap. 480; Laws New York, 1911, chap. 546; Knight v. Rawlings, 205 Mo. 412; State ex rel. v. Miles, 210 Mo. 146; Skouten v. Wood, 57 Mo. 380; Skrainka v. Allen, 76 Mo. 389; Snyder v. Railroad, 86 Mo. 613. (2) Both the Public Service Commission of the State of New York and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of that State had construed the law now before this court for construction prior to its enactment in this State, and had construed it to confer upon the Commission power to change statutory rates, and this construction was placed upon it when the law of New York was, as originally enacted in 1907, and when it did not contain the clause "notwithstanding that a higher rate, fare or charge has heretofore been authorized by statute." 2 Public Service Commission Rep. N.Y., 2 District, 78; 140 App.Div. (N.Y.) 839. (3) All statutes of Missouri fixing maximum charges for carriage of freight and passengers are repealed by the Law of 1913, creating the Public Service Commission, because they are in conflict with the last-mentioned law, at least in so far as they undertake to prescribe charges that may not be increased. The purpose of the Act of 1913, creating the Public Service Commission was to create an administrative board that should have the power from time to time to fix all charges for carrying freight and passengers regardless of any previous laws. Henderson's Tobacco Company, 11 Wall. 657; Mining, etc. Co. v. Gardner, 173 U.S. 123; Constitution of Mo., art. 13, sec. 14; Laws 1875, 112; R. S. 1899, secs. 1192, 1194; Laws 1887, p. 17; R. S. 1899, sec. 1136; Laws 1903, p. 132; R. S. 1909, secs. 3187, 3251, 3252, 3253; Laws 1911, p. 162; Coal Co. v. Railroad, 52 F.716; Railroad v. Jones, 37 N.E. 247; Railroad Com. v. Railroad, 170 F.225; Gregg v. Laird, 87 Atl. 1111. (4) If the legislative intent was to authorize the commission to reduce rates below the maximum rates prescribed by statute without conferring upon it the power to increase rates above such statutory rates, the enactment is void because it deprives the petitioner of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and deprives it of its property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of section 30 of article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 331; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 689; Railroad v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 458; Reagan v. Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 399; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466; Railroad v. Railroad Commission, 196 F.800; Trustees v. Gas E. L. & P. Co., 191 N.Y. 123. (5) If the maximum freight or passenger rates, or the maximum freight and passenger rates prescribed by the statutory laws of the State of Missouri in effect on and prior to March 16, 1913, are in fact confiscatory of the property of petitioner (and for the purpose of this case they must be presumed to be), such laws as to this petitioner were and are void, and do not constitute a bar to the right of the commission to fix rates. Authorities under point 4. (6) If section 47 of the Public Service Commission Act is susceptible of two constructions, one of which renders said section violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights, and is therefore void, the court will adopt that construction which will sustain and uphold the statute rather than the construction which would render it void. Gregg v. Laird, 87 Atl. 1111; State ex rel. v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 1; People v. Bradley, 207 N.Y. 592; U.S.v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366; Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 511.
E. J. Bean for respondent.
(1) The Public Service Commission law did not repeal sections 3232, 3241, 3244, 3246, Revised Statutes 1909; therefore, the Public Service Commission had no authority to permit relator to increase its rates and charges above the amounts fixed by the statutes of this State, and the demurrer of respondent should be sustained. Sections 3232, 3240, 3241, 3244, 3246, 3258, R. S. 1909; Laws 1911, p. 162; 1 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), 465; McGrew v. Railroad, 177 Mo. 542; State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 389; Manker v. Faulhaber, 94 Mo. 439. (2) Authority cannot lawfully be delegated to the Public Service Commission to repeal a statute which establishes and fixes a maximum rate for railroad rates or charges. Railway v. Railroad Commission, 161 F.985; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 694. The Legislature may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Legislature. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194; Railroad v. Gill, 156 U.S. 663; Reagan v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362. (3) The Public Service Commission is an administrative body and has no judicial power, hence it cannot adjudge the maximum rate laws unconstitutional because confiscatory to the relator.
OPINIONIn Banc
Mandamus.
Original proceeding.
Relator is a domestic corporation owning and operating, as a common carrier of freight and passengers, a railroad of fifty-four miles in this State, beginning at the town of Leeper in Wayne county and running thence northwestwardly through parts of Wayne and Reynolds, ending at the town of Bunker in the latter.
In July, 1913, relator as petitioner made to, and filed a complaint with, the Public Service Commission. That complaint was under the Public Utilities Act. [Laws 1913, pp. 557-651.] In substance it set forth relator's domestic incorporation as a railroad company, its ownership and operation of a railroad wholly within the State and more than forty-five miles in length; that it was engaged in the business of transporting freight and passengers as a common carrier for hire; that under authorized rates prior to 1905 its earnings for such service produced a sum barely sufficient to meet the cost and expenses of the service, thereby resulting in an inability to create any reserve therefrom for surplus or contingencies, and an impossibility of making a reasonable return on the value of the property actually used in the service; that the rates designated by the Act of 1907 for freight and the maximum of two cents per mile for passengers would be insufficient to yield any compensation therefor and would be unreasonable, unjust and confiscatory; that it was entitled by law to a reasonable average return on the value of the property actually used in its public service, and further entitled to a reservation from its income of a sum sufficient to keep its property in a fair state of repair, and also sufficient for surplus and contingencies; that its road lies in a rough country, has sharp curves and heavy grades, and that the population served by it is limited and scattered; that the rates prescribed by statute are insufficient to meet the actual cost of operation; and that the complaint is under section 47 of the Public Utilities Act of 1913.
It then went on to ask the commission to increase relator's service rates above those prescribed by statute and to determine the just and reasonable compensation which petitioner thereafter would be entitled to receive for that service, and, to that end, that a hearing be granted, etc.
The complaint filed before the commission was verified by affidavit and no question was made on its form or sufficiency in allegation of fact.
It seems, under protest and after filing that complaint, relator put into effect (under the orders of the commission) rates not in excess of the maximum ones prescribed by the Laws of 1907; that under protest it has continued such rates, although alleged to be unreasonable, unjust and confiscatory of relator's property. It appears (the commission doubting its own authority) that although relator pressed its complaint, it could get no hearing on the merits and that finally in April, 1914, the commission, having taken time to consider, reached a conclusion and entered its order refusing to hear evidence. Accordingly it dismissed the complaint, giving as reason (whereby weighty matter hangs, to-wit) that it had no power to allow or order an increase in rates in excess of the maximum rates prescribed by statute. The order recites, inter alia, that in its (the commission's) judgment it is without authority to grant the relief prayed, and this (quoting) "regardless of any evidence that may be submitted and" (regardless of) "the fact that complainant may show such rates, fares and charges to be unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory of its property."
Making averments and narrations to...
To continue reading
Request your trial