State ex rel. Moore v. Houser

• Decision Date: 08 November 1976
• Docket Number: No. 4580--I,4580--I
• Citation: 556 P.2d 556,16 Wn.App. 363
• Parties: The STATE of Washington on the relation of Ralph A. MOORE, Appellant, v. The Honorable Paul HOUSER, Judge of the Renton Municipal Court, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 363

16 Wn.App. 363

556 P.2d 556

The STATE of Washington on the relation of Ralph A. MOORE, Appellant, v. The Honorable Paul HOUSER, Judge of the Renton Municipal

Court, Respondent.

No. 4580--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Nov. 8, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1977.

John H. Rayback, Seattle, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Warren, Deputy City Atty., City of Renton, Renton, for respondent.

CALLOW, Judge.

The defendant, Ralph Moore, appeals from the superior court's refusal to issue a writ of prohibition which would have reversed the result of a municipal court's denial of a motion to dismiss charges of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants and/or drugs for violation of the 60-day speedy trial rule, JCrR 3.08. The denial of the writ is affirmed.

The defendant was arrested in Renton, Washington, on September 28, 1975, and charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants and/or drugs. He was arraigned on November 25, 1975, and pleaded not guilty. The matter was set for trial in Renton Municipal Court on December 12, 1975.

The case was called for trial on the day set and the arresting officer testified. During the City's case in chief, the testimony revealed that Moore had been in a traffic accident involving an occupied motor vehicle. The municipal judge interrupted the cross-examination of the arresting officer and inquired whether the owner of the other vehicle allegedly involved in the accident was present. He was not. A defense motion for dismissal was denied, and the municipal judge continued the trial to have the owner of the vehicle subpoenaed, but stated that the City had established a prima facie case. The municipal judge suggested that the City prosecutor request a continuance to obtain the presence of other witnesses. The prosecutor requested such a continuance, which was granted over the objection of the defendant. The matter was first continued to a date within the 60-day period for a speedy trial required by JCrR 3.08, but the case was later set over for additional days due to the unavailability of defense counsel on the date originally set. The cause was reset for trial on February 13, 1976, more than 70 days after the date of the arraignment. A motion to dismiss the case for violation of JCrR 3.08 was filed in Renton Municipal Court and was denied. ¹

The defendant sought a writ of prohibition in superior court. A hearing on the petition for the writ was held in superior court on February 19, 1976, and the petition was denied. The order dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition recited that 'the continuance did not put the case in violation of the 60 day rule for speedy trial.'

The defendant filed notice of appeal, and the matter was set for hearing on this court's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the order appealed from was not a final appealable judgment pursuant to CAROA 14(1).

The first issue presented is whether the superior court order dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition constitutes an appealable final judgment.

CAROA 14(1) provides, in relevant part:

An aggrieved party may appeal a cause over which the court of appeals has jurisdiction from any and every of (the) following determinations, and no others, made by the superior court, or the judge thereof, in any action or proceeding:

(1) From the final judgment entered in any action or proceeding. . . .

Nestegard v. Investment Exch. Corp., 5 Wash.App. 618, 622--23, 489 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1971), states:

The question whether a judgment is final for appeal purposes is not always clear. . . . Some light is cast upon the meaning of the term judgment in CAROA 14(1) when considered in connection with RCW 4.56.010, which defines judgment as 'the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action.'

RCW 4.56.010 was superseded by CR 54(a) following the 1971 decision in Nestegard v. Investment Exch. Corp., supra. CR 54(a), however, also defines a judgment as 'the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action . . .'

Further, RCW 7.16.020, relating to the special writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, states that

A judgment in a special proceeding is the final determination of the rights of the parties therein.

RCW 7.16.350 mandates that

From a final judgment in the superior court, in any such proceeding, an appeal shall lie to the supreme court or the court of appeals.

Under these statutes, the superior court's denial of the petition for a writ of prohibition was the final judgment and determination of the rights of the parties in the special proceeding, and was appealable under RCW 7.16.350. See State ex rel. Spokane & E. Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Wash. 634, 187 P. 358, 9 A.L.R. 157 (1920); State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney v. Union Sav. Bank, 86 Wash. 48, 149 P. 327 (1915).

The second issue presented is whether the superior court erroneously denied the petition for a writ of prohibition. Before a writ of prohibition may be granted, two prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the judicial action to be restrained must be in excess of the court's jurisdiction, and (2) no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, either by appeal or writ of review from the challenged ruling, can be available to the moving party. RCW 7.16.290; RCW 7.16.300; Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Wash.2d 834, 355 P.2d 838 (1960); Johnson v. Pate, 54 Wash.2d 148, 338 P.2d 131 (1959); State ex rel. Rupert v. Lewis, 9 Wash.App. 839, 515 P.2d 548 (1973).

A writ of prohibition in superior court to review a judicial ruling in a municipal or district justice court criminal proceeding is inappropriate, for a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal is available. Clough v. Seattle, 47 Wash.2d 716, 289 P.2d 728 (1955); State ex rel. Heidal v. Bresemann, 42 Wash.2d 674, 257 P.2d 637 (1953); State ex rel. Morrow v. DeGrief, 40 Wash.2d 667, 246 P.2d 459 (1952); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court, 14 Wash.2d 340, 128 P.2d 332, 141 A.L.R. 1257 (1942); State ex rel. Sibbald v. Huntington, 1 Wash.2d 413, 96 P.2d 446 (1939); State ex rel. Lyon v. Police Court, 53 Wash. 361, 101 P. 1082 (1909).

Later cases recognize that a criminal appeal from a municipal or district justice court to the superior court invokes a trial de novo that is conducted without reference to irregularities that may have occurred in the lower court trial. In essence, all irregularities occurring in either district justice or municipal court are waived by taking an appeal that invokes a trial de novo in superior court. Seattle v. Schaffer, 71 Wash.2d 600, 430 P.2d 183 (1967); Seattle v. Buerkman, 67 Wash.2d 537, 408 P.2d 258 (1965); State v. Ladiges, 66 Wash.2d 273, 401 P.2d 977 (1965); State v. Miller, 59 Wash.2d 27, 365 P.2d 612 (1961); State v. Buckman, 51 Wash.2d 827, 322 P.2d 881 (1958). See also 1 V. Towne, Wash.Prac. § 1687 (2d ed. 1976); 4 L. Orland, Wash.Prac. 609--612 (2d ed. 1968). As recently stated in Seattle v. Crockett, 87 Wash.2d 253, 256, 551 P.2d 740 (1976), on a criminal appeal from municipal court, 'the superior court is vested with jurisdiction to proceed with the case as if it had been commenced originally in that court.'

Most errors allegedly occurring in a district justice court trial may be asserted anew in the superior court trial de novo. The objection in the instant case, however, is one which cannot be aserted anew in a trial de novo. It invokes the denial of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of JCrR 3.08 requiring a trial within 60 days absent good cause to the contrary. The objection is to an alleged legal irregularity occurring in the municipal court. The defendant may assert a motion to dismiss for violation of the speedy trial rule, CrR 3.3, but cannot reassert a violation of JCrR 3.08 as error. See Seattle v. Crockett, supra.

The question is, therefore, whether a defendant has 'other adequate remedy' than appeal by 'writ of review from the challenged decision.' Johnson v. Pate, supra at page 149, 338 P.2d at page 132.

The statutes concerning municipal courts reveal that criminal defendants have a procedure for challenging alleged errors occurring in the municipal court by writ of review taken after the entry of final judgment. RCW 3.50.370; RCW 35.20.030; Seattle v. Buerkman, supra; 4 L. Orland, Wash.Prac. 610 (2d ed. 1968). Although no similar statute exists for the district justice courts, it has been recognized that the same opportunity to challenge errors of law occurring in the district justice court is present through a writ of review filed in the superior court following judgment in district justice court. See State v. Ladiges, supra; State v. Miller, supra; State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wash.2d 457, 303 P.2d 290 (1956); 1 V. Towne, Wash.Prac. § 1688 (2d ed. 1976). As stated in State v. Miller, supra at page 29, 365 P.2d at page 613.

A defendant has an independent action in the superior court to require conformance to the law in procedural matters in the justice court.

1 V. Towne, Wash.Prac. § 1688, at 763 (2d ed. 1976) states:

In cases where it is contended that the justice exceeded his jurisdiction or that improper service was made on the defendant or that the justice erred in procedural matters, a writ of certiorari is a proper remedy. The choice between review on appeal or upon a writ of certiorari is often a difficult one to make. Where the case has been properly tried on its merits, an appeal should be taken. But where the lack of jurisdiction of the justice is challenged or where the justice has made jurisdictional errors in procedure, a writ of certiorari is used.

Accordingly, here the petition for a writ of prohibition was properly denied, for the defendant had an adequate opportunity to challenge the denial of the motion to dismiss for an alleged violation of...