State ex rel. Niedemeyer v. Hackmann

• Decision Date: 16 February 1922
• Citation: 237 S.W. 742,292 Mo. 27
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. F. W. NIEDEMEYER et al., Directors of School District of Columbia, v. GEORGE E. HACKMANN, State Auditor
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

237 S.W. 742

292 Mo. 27

THE STATE ex rel. F. W. NIEDEMEYER et al., Directors of School District of Columbia, v. GEORGE E. HACKMANN, State Auditor

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 16, 1922

Writ granted.

Wm. H Sapp for relators; Harry Carstarphen of counsel.

(1) The notice given of said election was sufficient under the law relating to such elections. Sec. 11127, R. S. 1919. (2) The proviso clause contained in Section 1 of the Act of March 31 1921, Laws 1921, pp. 169, 170, relative to statement in notice of election of maximum amount of interest bonds should bear, is unconstitutional and void in that the proviso is not comprehended in the title of said act. Sec. 28, Art. 4, Mo Constitution; Hardware Co. v. Fisher, 269 Mo. 276; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 730; State v Sloan, 258 Mo. 313; State ex rel. v. Revelle, 257 Mo. 538; State ex rel. v. Assurance Co., 251 Mo. 294; Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 676; State v. Rawlings, 232 Mo. 557; State v. Fulks, 207 Mo. 33; State v. Coffee & Tea Co., 171 Mo. 634; State v. Wortman, 213 Mo. 136. (3) The title to the act in question descended to particulars and set forth in detail what was included within its provisions to the exclusion of the contents of the proviso; therefore, the proviso, not having been mentioned in the title, is unconstitutional. The doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applied to this class of titles. State v. Sloan, 258 Mo. 313; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 22; State v. Rawlings, 232 Mo. 557; Cooley on Const. Lim. (7 Ed.) p. 205. (4) Part of an act may be declared unconstitutional and the remainder be held constitutional and valid. Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 467; State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, 251 Mo. 336.

Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, Henry Davis, Assistant Attorney-General, for defendant.

(1) The term "issued" should be construed to cover every act necessary to give validity to a bond. Folks v. Yost, 54 Mo.App. 55; Heman v. Larkin, 99 Mo.App. 294; Douglass v. Lincoln County, 5 F. 775; Brown v. Robinson, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 157; Dargin v. Life Assur. Society, 71 S.C. 356; Pease v. Ritchie, 132 Ill. 645; Moller v. Galveston, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 699. (2) The act of the Legislature providing the rates of interest that bonds of public corporations may bear is constitutional. Sec. 28, Art. IV, Mo. Constitution; Laws 1921, p. 169; State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 54; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1; Scott v. Booth, 253 U.S. 475; O'Connor v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622; Coffee v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616; State ex inf. Hadley ex rel. Wayland v. Herring, 208 Mo. 708; State ex rel. Life Assur. Society v. Vandiver, 222 Mo. 206; State ex rel. United Rys. Co. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449; 25 R. C. L. p. 849, sec. 95.

JAMES T. BLAIR, C. J. Graves, Higbee, David E. Blair, and Elder, JJ., concur; Walker, J., dubitante; Woodson, J., not sitting.

OPINION

In Banc.

Mandamus.

JAMES T. BLAIR, C. J.

-- Mandamus. Relators constitute the Board of Education of the School District of Columbia, Missouri. The purpose of this proceeding is to compel the State Auditor to register certain bonds of the district. Respondent's admissions are such that no question arises concerning the calling or holding (except in one particular) of the bond election, or any of the subsequent proceedings, or the form of the bonds proffered for registration. There is no claim the district was not empowered to issue bonds in the amount here involved. The single objection respondent makes to registering the bonds is that the notice of election did not state the particular rate of interest the bonds were to bear. His sole contention is that the Act of March 31, 1921, Laws 1921, pp 169, 170, required the statement of that rate in the notice of election and that the absence from the notice of that statement renders it his duty to refuse registration.

The contention of relators is that the provision of the act referred to respecting the statement of the rate of interest in the election notice is invalid because (1) it is vague and indefinite; (2) the title of the act is defective; and (3) the title of the act does not include the provision mentioned, and that provision was not, therefore, validly enacted when Section 28 of Article 4 of the Constitution is considered.

The title to the act in question reads as follows:

"An Act providing that bonds hereafter issued under any law of the State of Missouri by county, city, town, village, school district, or other municipality, political division or district may bear interest at any rate not exceeding six per cent per annum, and that such bonds may be sold at not less than ninety-five per cent of the par value thereof, with an emergency clause."

The act itself, omitting the emergency clause, reads thus:

"Section 1. Rate of interest of bonds -- Minimum par value. That any and all bonds hereafter authorized to be issued under any law of this State by any county, city, town, village, school district, or other municipality, political subdivision or district of this State, may bear interest at a rate not exceeding six per cent, per annum, and may be sold, at any sale pursuant to any law applicable thereto, at the best price obtainable, not less than ninety-five per cent of the par value thereof, anything in any proceedings heretofore had authorizing such bonds or in any law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding: 'provided, that, in every election hereafter held for the purpose of authorizing an issue of bonds the maximum rate of interest such bonds are to bear shall be stated in the notice of the election.'"

The proviso in section 1 is the part of the act said to fall outside the title.

I. Section 28 of Article IV of the Constitution provides that "No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." It is uniformly held that this provision is to be liberally construed; that its purpose is to have the title indicate the general contents of the act; that if the contents of the act fairly relate to and have a natural connection with the subject expressed in the title they fall within the title. On the other hand, provisions incongruous in their subject-matter may not be enacted in the same act. The subject must be single. In addition to being single, the subject must be clearly expressed in the title; the title must not mislead as to the contents of the act.

II. There is no contention that the Legislature might not constitutionally legislate in one act respecting the maximum interest rate and the minimum price which might be accepted for bonds. It is apparent these things pertain to one general subject and are particulars which are congruous and may be included in one act. [State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 433 et seq.]

III. The question is whether the subject, as clearly expressed in the title, is not thereby confined and restricted by its statement of particulars so as to exclude the substance of the proviso. The title must not mislead. [State ex inf. v. Borden, 164 Mo. 236, 237, 64 S.W. 172; State v. Great Western Coffee & Tea Co., 171 Mo 643, 71 S.W. 1011.] Though subject-matter in an act be such as might constitutionally be enacted under one title, it cannot be so enacted in a particular act unless it be within the subject "clearly expressed in the title" of such act. [St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, 31 S.W. 1045.] It follows that if the title of an act "descends to particulars" and states such particulars as the subject of the act, then not the general subject within which such particulars fall but the particulars stated become the subject stated in the title. In such a case the provisions of the act enactable under such a title must be such as fairly relate to and have a natural connection with, not the general subject which might have been stated but the subject which is stated, i. e. the particulars set out in the title. [State v....