State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash

• Decision Date: 15 September 1961
• Docket Number: No. 38327,38327
• Citation: 261 Minn. 106,110 N.W.2d 867
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota ex rel. James NORGAARD, Respondent, v. Ralph TAHASH, Acting Warden, Minnesota State Prison, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 867

110 N.W.2d 867

261 Minn. 106

STATE of Minnesota ex rel. James NORGAARD, Respondent, v. Ralph TAHASH, Acting Warden, Minnesota State Prison, Appellant.

No. 38327.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 15, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right of assistance of counsel in his defense. Section 7 of the same article provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Held, under the record here, petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process of law and was adequately represented by counsel in the proceeding in connection with his arraignment and sentence.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Henry H. Feikema, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., John Smith, County Atty., Owatonna, for appellant.

Joseph Robbie and Jerome Fitzgerald, Minneapolis, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

Appeal by the acting warden of the State Prison from orders discharging petitioner from imprisonment. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Washington County District Court upon a petition alleging that petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law as provided by Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7, M.S.A., and U.S.Const. Amend. XIV, when his plea of guilty was allowed to stand in the trial court although he made statements in court that he had no knowledge of the alleged crime.

In the proceedings leading to petitioner's commitment, an information was duly filed with the District Court of Steele County on April 22, 1958, charging the petitioner with the crime of assault in the second degree. It was filed by virtue of an order of the district court in response to the petitioner's written application that he be permitted to plead guilty to the crime of assault in the second degree.

On April 22, 1958, petitioner appeared in the district court and was duly arraigned on the crime charged in the information. He was represented by an attorney who was appointed by the court to represent him. The information was read to petitioner and a copy of the same supplied to him, whereupon in response to the court's request for his plea, he entered a plea of guilty. The county attorney then described to the district court the events and circumstances which formed the basis of the information pertaining to the alleged assault in the early hours of April 5, 1958, on a 17-year-old girl. After entering the plea, petitioner was sworn and, in response to questions by the court as to the time the offense occurred, the petitioner replied, 'I don't know for sure.' He said that he went to bed about 2:30 or 3:00 o'clock that night but that he had no recollection of anything that happened after he went to bed. When asked if the statements made by the county attorney in connection with the offense were true, petitioner replied, 'I guess they are. I can't remember them.' He further stated he had been told what happened by others.

His attorney stated to the court that he had spoken with the petitioner with reference to his recollection of events on the evening involved and that he had advised him that it was his right to plead not guilty and that the state had the burden of proving him guilty of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. His attorney further stated, 'He still felt that he preferred to plead guilty of this charge.'

The court then stayed further proceedings and ordered the matter referred to the state probation agent for a presentence investigation and a report to the court. The petitioner was remanded to the custody of the sheriff.

About 5 weeks later petitioner again appeared in court with his attorney, and he testified, in reply to an examination by the court, that he had had considerable time to consider the matter since his first appearance in court but still could not remember any events that occurred on the night of the alleged assault. He then stated that the last thing he could remember on that particular night was when he went to bed and the next thing he remembered was when a policeman and another woke him up.

Following is an extract of the proceedings:

'Q. You entered a plea of guilty to the charge of assault with intent to commit a felony. Do you realize--I understand you discussed it with your attorney--

'A. Yes, I have.

'Q. That phase of the matter, and also that you have the right if you desire to withdraw your plea of guilty. Have you discussed that with your attorney?

'A. Yes, I have.

'Q. In that connection do you have any desire to change your plea?

'A. No. Everything seems to indicate it wouldn't do me no good to change it so I might as well leave it the way it is.'

'Q. Would you step over here, please? You are satisfied, I take it, from the answers to the questions that your plea of guilty should stand?

'A. Yes, I am.'

The court then adjudged petitioner guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree and imposed sentence in the following language:

'THE COURT: Upon your plea of guilty, it is the judgment of this Court you are guilty of the offense charged in the information, that of assault in the second degree. It is now the sentence of this Court that you be committed to and confined in the State Prison at Stillwater, Minnesota for an indefinite period of time and until duly discharged as provided by law, not, however, exceeding a period of five years.'

More than 2 years after his commitment to the State Prison, the petitioner filed his petition in the Washington County District Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the general claim that he was committed to the state prison and retained therein by virtue of an invalid judgment of conviction. Thereafter on September 27, 1960, a writ of habeas corpus was issued.

After a hearing on the writ the district court made two orders, finding, among other things, that notwithstanding his plea of guilty at all times petitioner had persistently denied having any knowledge of the events connected with the commission of the offense with which he was charged. It further found that the district court of Steele County should not have accepted a plea of guilty when the statements of petitioner were so inconsistent with his plea and that in the interest of justice it should have entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner. The Washington County District Court declared the judgment of the Steele County District Court null and void and ordered that the petitioner be discharged from imprisonment. Appeal was taken from these orders.

The only issue appears to be whether the Steele County District Court should have refused to accept petitioner's plea of guilty in view of his statements to the court that he had no recollection of what took place on the night in question.

The petitioner relies on State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d 723. We do not regard that case as controlling here. In that case Dehning was arrested in Arizona prior to August 24, 1955, on a charge of willfully, unlawfully, wrongfully, and feloniously deserting and failing to support his wife while she was pregnant, with intent to wholly abandon her. He waived extradition and was returned to Marshall, Minnesota, where he was placed in jail. On September 14, 1955, he appeared before the district court on an application to plead guilty. At that time, according to his uncontradicted testimony, he was brought into the courtroom and the county attorney introduced him to an attorney and stated that said attorney was to represent him. His attorney talked with him for about 10 minutes and advised him to plead guilty. This was, according to Dehning's uncontradicted testimony, the first and only time he had an opportunity to consult with an attorney in regard to his case. Apparently in compliance with the attorney's advice, he entered a plea of guilty to the charge. In any event, the only inquiry made by the court of Dehning before sentencing with respect to elements of the crime with which he was charged was as follows (251 Minn. 121, 86 N.W.2d 725):

'Q. And when you left Thurley on February 26th of this year, while she was pregnant, you intended to abandon her?

'A. I don't know, Your Honor, whether I intended to abandon her or not. We had been in a big argument, been arguing for a week. When I left that morning I was going to Minneapolis to see if I could raise some money to keep the business going. It was a slack season and there just wasn't anything doing; and when I left she said that if I left and went to Minneapolis that day, I didn't have to come back. The more I thought about it the madder I got. I got drunk and kept going.'

Following that discussion, Dehning was immediately sentenced to be imprisoned in the State Prison where he was still confined at the time of his appeal to this court.

It was our opinion that After Dehning pleaded guilty and Before he was sentenced, when he answered, 'I don't know, Your Honor, whether I intended to abandon her or not,' he indicated that he did not know, or at least was in doubt, as...