State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich

• Decision Date: 08 April 1994
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,Nos. 93-2057,93-2059 and 93-2060,s. 93-2057
• Citation: 69 Ohio St.3d 225,631 N.E.2d 582
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. OHIOet al. v. VOINOVICH, Governor, et al. The STATE ex rel. GELTZER v. VOINOVICH, Governor, et al. The STATE ex rel. UNITED AUTO AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 225

69 Ohio St.3d 225

631 N.E.2d 582

The STATE EX REL. OHIO AFL-CIO et al. v. VOINOVICH, Governor, et al.

The STATE ex rel. GELTZER v. VOINOVICH, Governor, et al.

The STATE ex rel. UNITED AUTO AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL WORKERS OF AMERICA et al. v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al.

Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 15, 1993.

Decided April 8, 1994.

Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Marc J. Jaffy and Stewart R. Jaffy, Columbus, for relators in case No. 93-2057.

Rishel, Myers & Kopech and James R. Rishel, Columbus, for relator in case No. 93-2059.

Esther S. Weissman Co., L.P.A., and Esther S. Weissman, Cleveland, for relator in case No. 93-2060.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Cordray, State Sol., Andrew S. Bergman and James M. Harrison, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondents in case Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Columbus, and Kathleen M. Trafford, Sp. Counsel, for intervening respondent Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation in case No. 93-2060.

Gallon & Takacs Co., L.P.A., and Theodore A. Bowman, Toledo, urging granting of writ for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers in case No. 93-2057.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, John C. Elam and Robert N. Webner, Columbus, urging denial of writ for amici curiae, Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n, Ohio Self-Insurers Ass'n, Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, Ohio Chamber of Commerce, National Federation of Independent Business, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, Ohio Business Roundtable and Council of Smaller Enterprises in case Nos. 93-2057, 93-2059 and 93-2060.

WRIGHT, Justice.

These three cases challenge the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 of the 120th Ohio General Assembly. The cases present the following constitutional issues: (1) whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution; (2) whether the bill violates the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio Constitution; (3) whether the bill denies the citizens of this state their right to a referendum under Section 1, Article II of the Ohio Constitution; and (4) whether abolishing the old Industrial Commission and creating a new one deprives the former commission members of their positions without due process of law and violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Case No. 93-2059 presents the further question of whether the Governor violated former R.C. 4121.02(E) by failing to grant relator Geltzer an annual salary increase of five percent.

I

In their first proposition of law relators in case No. 93-2057 argue that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 contains more than one subject and therefore violates the one-subject rule of Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Relators argue that the bill contains seven different subjects: appropriations for the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, appropriations for the Industrial Commission, structural changes to the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, structural changes to the Industrial Commission, changes to the substantive provisions of the workers' compensation law, the creation of a new employment intentional tort, and the creation of a child labor exemption for the entertainment industry.

We agree that the provisions creating a new employment intentional tort and the provisions related to the child labor exemption violate the one-subject rule. The provisions related to the remaining five topics, however, are all directed at the same subject, workers' compensation, and therefore do not violate the one-subject rule.

Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution provides:

"No bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. * * * "

This court has held that Section 15(D), Article II is directory rather than mandatory. State ex rel. Dix v. Celeste (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 141, 11 OBR 436, 464 N.E.2d 153. "There is no question that by holding that the one-subject rule is directory and not mandatory, judicial interference with legislative action is reduced." Id. at 144, 11 OBR at 439, 464 N.E.2d at 156. However, although we are most reluctant to interfere in the legislative process, we will not "abdicate [our] duty to enforce the Ohio Constitution." Id. at 144, 11 OBR at 439, 464 N.E.2d at 157. Accordingly, we will hold enactments invalid under Section 15(D), Article II whenever there is a "manifestly gross and fraudulent violation" of this provision of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at syllabus. But "[t]he mere fact that a bill embraces more than one topic is not fatal, as long as a common purpose or relationship exists between the topics." (Emphasis added.) Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 19 OBR 1, 5, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580.

The bill at issue in this case funds the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission, contains provisions that structurally change those administrative bodies, and amends the procedural and substantive law underlying the compensation of injured workers. We cannot conclude these provisions are so unrelated that they constitute a "manifestly gross and fraudulent violation" of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution. Although the provisions embrace more than a singular topic, they do have a common purpose: to amend and reform the laws governing the compensation of injured workers and to fund the two agencies that are charged with administering those laws. And they all have a clear common relationship, namely workers' compensation.

Relators nevertheless assert that the appropriation aspects of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 bear no relation to the rest of the bill. We disagree. In Dix, supra, the relator contended that the addition of an appropriation provision to a bill which abolished the Ohio Development Financing Commission and which transferred the duties to the Director of Development violated the one-subject rule. We held otherwise, stating that "the one-subject provision is not directed at plurality but at disunity in subject matter * * *." (Emphasis added.) Id., 11 Ohio St.3d at 146, 11 OBR at 440-441, 464 N.E.2d at 158. The appropriation is "simply the means by which the act is carried out, and the inclusion of such an appropriation does not destroy the singleness of the subject * * *." Id. at 146, 11 OBR at 441, 464 N.E.2d at 158. As stated by Professor Ruud, "[t]here seems to be no serious contention that an appropriation is in itself a second subject; therefore, an act may, for example, establish an agency, set out the regulatory program, and make an appropriation for the agency without violating the one-subject rule." Ruud "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject" (1958), 42 Minn.L.Rev. 389, 441.

We see no reason to depart from our holding in Dix and declare that the appropriation provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 destroy the unity of the bill. The inclusion in the bill of such provisions simply allows the other provisions of the bill to be implemented.

We have previously stated, however, that intentional torts are completely unrelated to workers' compensation and the employment relationship. In Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 576 N.E.2d 722, we held that "[w]hile [a] cause of action [alleging a workplace intentional tort] contemplates redress of tortious conduct that occurs during the course of employment, an intentional tort alleged in this context necessarily occurs outside the employment relationship." Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Under our decision in Brady, the intentional tort provision under newly enacted R.C. 2745.01 is not and cannot be related to the common purpose of the bill, and we therefore hold that such provision violates Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

Likewise, we determine that the provisions creating an exemption for the employment of minors violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The provisions amend R.C. 4109.06 by adding the language that R.C. Chapter 4109 does not apply to a minor participating as an actor in a movie or in radio or television productions. In a broad sense this exemption addresses the area of employment, an area also addressed by the workers' compensation laws. However, the purpose, in part, behind Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was not to generally amend laws that relate to employment but to specifically amend the workers' compensation laws. The child labor exemption does not in any way touch upon the laws related to workers' compensation. We therefore find that the inclusion of the child labor exemption in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was an actionable violation of the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution.

Having found that the intentional tort and child labor exemption provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violate Section 15(D), Article II of the Ohio Constitution, we sever those portions from the bill. State ex rel. Hinkle v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 145, 149, 580 N.E.2d 767, 770. The remaining provisions of the bill do not violate Section 15(D), Article II and pursuant to our decision in Hinkle we save those provisions. We therefore grant relators' request for a writ of mandamus on the issue of whether Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 violates the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution only as the request relates to the intentional tort and child labor exemption provisions of the bill. We deny all other requests for a writ of mandamus and prohibition on this issue.

II

Relators in all three cases argue that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107 was enacted in violation of the three-consideration provision of Section 15(C), Article II of the Ohio Constitution. That section states in relevant part:

"Every bill shall be considered by each house on three different days, unless two-thirds of the members elected to the house in which it is pending suspend this requirement, and every individual consideration of a bill or action suspending the requirement shall...