State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-1776,94-1776
• Citation: 672 N.E.2d 1008,77 Ohio St.3d 201
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. PATTERSON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 201

77 Ohio St.3d 201

672 N.E.2d 1008

The STATE ex rel. PATTERSON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.

No. 94-1776.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 21, 1996.

Decided Dec. 24, 1996.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

R.C. 4127.04 unjustifiably discriminates against dependents of work-relief employees by preventing such dependents from receiving the same benefits as dependents of other employees whose death is caused by a work-related injury or disease. Therefore, R.C. 4127.04 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.

In 1984, Frank H. Patterson was exposed to pigeon droppings while in the course of his employment as a work-relief employee for appellee Guernsey County Welfare Department, and, as a result, he contracted histoplasmosis. Patterson filed a workers' compensation claim, and he was awarded temporary total disability compensation. Patterson died in 1985 as a result of the disease. ¹ Thereafter, Patterson's widow, appellant Viola Patterson, filed an application for death benefits. A district hearing officer for appellee Industrial Commission granted the claim, and appellant was awarded a weekly death benefit of $33.11, the same rate at which Patterson had received temporary total disability compensation prior to his death.

Appellant appealed the amount of the award to the regional board of review. The board affirmed the hearing officer's order. Appellant further contested the amount of the award, but it was ultimately administratively affirmed.

On March 9, 1993, appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, claiming that the commission abused its discretion in awarding her death benefits below the minimum set forth in R.C. 4123.59(B). Appellant further alleged that she was denied equal protection under the law because she was granted a lesser award than she would have received as a dependent of a non-work-relief employee.

The matter was initially heard by a referee, who recommended that the court of appeals deny the writ. The referee concluded that R.C. 4123.59(B) was not applicable in this case, that appellant's claim was governed by R.C. Chapter 4127, and that the commission properly awarded appellant weekly benefits of $33.11 pursuant to R.C. 4127.04. The referee also rejected appellant's equal protection argument, concluding that the General Assembly was justified in differentiating between awards to dependents of deceased employees who received public assistance and dependents of deceased employees who received other employer-paid wages. The court of appeals adopted the referee's report and denied the writ.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. Neither the commission nor the welfare department has responded to appellant's appeal.

Daniel D. Connor Co., L.P.A., and Daniel D. Connor, Columbus, for appellant.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

Appellant's weekly award of $33.11 was based upon R.C. 4127.04, which provides:

"The basis upon which compensation or benefits shall be computed, is the amount of work-relief which would have been afforded to the injured person for the calendar week in which the injury or death occurred. In no event shall such compensation exceed the maximum reimbursement relief award established by the state which the claimant would have been entitled to had he not been injured."

Appellant claims that her award should not have been based upon R.C. 4127.04, but, rather, former R.C. 4123.59(B), which provided:

"In case an injury to or an occupational disease contracted by an employee causes his death, benefits shall be in the amount and to the persons following:

" * * *

"(B) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the weekly payment shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wage, but not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount of weekly compensation which is equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the statewide average weekly wage as defined in division (C) of section 4123.62 of the Revised Code, and not in any event less than a minimum amount of weekly compensation which is equal to fifty per cent of the statewide average weekly wage as defined in division (C) of section 4123.62 of the Revised Code, regardless of the average weekly wage * * *." ² (Emphasis added.) 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1167.

In support of her position that her weekly death benefit award should have been based upon R.C. 4123.59(B), appellant relies, inter alia, on R.C. 4127.03 and 4127.13. Former R.C. 4127.03, 1953 H.B. No. 1, provided, in part, that "[e]very work-relief employee who sustains an injury and the dependents of such as are killed, in the course of and arising out of employment, * * * shall be entitled to receive out of the public work-relief employees' compensation fund, compensation [and] death benefits * * * for loss sustained on account of such injury or death, as is provided for by sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.) Relying on this italicized language, appellant points out that R.C. 4123.59(B) falls within R.C. Chapter 4123 and, therefore, she is entitled to at least fifty percent of the statewide average weekly wage.

Further, former R.C. 4127.13, 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3964, provided that "[s]ections 4123.01 to 4123.94, except sections 4123.519, 4123.62, and 4123.64, apply to sections 4127.01 to 4127.14, of the Revised Code." Appellant contends that because R.C. 4127.13 does not specifically exclude R.C. 4123.59 from applying to R.C. Chapter 4127, the General Assembly intended that R.C. 4123.59(B) govern the amount of benefits available to dependent persons of work-relief employees.

At first glance, appellant's statutory arguments regarding R.C. 4127.03 and 4127.13 appear to have some merit. Appellant's position is arguable given the general policy of workers' compensation legislation, which requires a liberal construction of such laws. See R.C. 4123.95. ³ However, it is apparent that the General Assembly, in enacting R.C. Chapter 4127 and, particularly, R.C. 4127.04, intended to establish a separate method for determining benefits for work-relief employees and their dependents. The last paragraph of R.C. 4127.03 provided that "[a]ll compensation payable under sections 4127.01 to 4127.14, inclusive, of the Revised Code, shall be paid on the basis of computation provided for in such sections." Further, R.C. 4127.13 specifically excludes from application to work-relief claims the foundational statute (R.C. 4123.62[C] ) for calculating benefits under R.C. 4123.59(B). Hence, it is evident that the General Assembly intended that R.C. 4127.04 be the applicable statute when determining awards to work-relief employees and their dependents.

Appellant also contends that even if we conclude that the commission's interpretation of R.C. 4127.04 was proper, its classification scheme, which treats dependents of work-relief employees differently from dependents of non-work-relief employees, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions. We agree. R.C. 4127.04 clearly violates appellant's right to equal protection of the laws. R.C. 4127.04 also contravenes the public policy which prompted Ohio's system of workers' compensation legislation and defeats the purpose of Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.

In considering appellant's constitutional claim, we are mindful of the fundamental principle that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 361, 653 N.E.2d 212, 214; State v. Gill (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 584 N.E.2d 1200, 1201; and Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 38, 616 N.E.2d 163, 166. We are also aware that "discrimination against individuals or groups is sometimes an inevitable result of the operation of a statute. The mere fact that a statute discriminates does not mean that the statute must be unconstitutional." Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen's Death Benefit Fund (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 443, 446-447, 613 N.E.2d 574, 577. See, also, Adamsky, supra, 73 Ohio St.3d at 362, 653 N.E.2d at 214. However, all laws, including legislation involving workers' compensation, are subject to the limitations imposed by the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. See Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 122, 70 O.O.2d 206, 207-208, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882, fn. 2.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; * * * nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Similarly, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution states that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have a right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly."

These constitutional guarantees require that all similarly situated individuals be treated in a similar manner. State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 119, 543 N.E.2d 1169, 1173. In other words, laws are to operate equally upon persons who are identified in the same class.

Ohio's system of compensating employees and their dependents is predicated upon Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. This provision establishes that one objective of such a system is to compensate "workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment." (Emphasis added.) Clearly, R.C. 4127.04 and 4123.59 were enacted to fulfill this objective of compensating employees and...