State ex rel. Pearson v. Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 23 December 1908 |
| Citation | 114 S.W. 956,215 Mo. 479 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. JOHN A. PEARSON v. LOUISIANA & MISSOURI RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY and CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pike Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. H. Eby, Judge.
Reversed.
Scarritt Scarritt & Jones for appellants.
(1) The second count for the taxes for 1897 is disposed of by the decision of this court in State ex rel. v. Railroad, 196 Mo. 523. (2) In 1899 the statute in question was amended and as amended was carried forward into the revision of 1899 and designated as section 9387. The decision in the above-entitled cause is decisive of this case, and this bridge under the amended statute is not taxable as a separate structure because (1) it is an integral part of defendants' railroad and has already been taxed as such and the amended statute, like the old statute, does not attempt to provide for double taxation, and (2) the amended statute does not attempt to tax as a separate structure any but toll bridges, and this bridge is not a toll bridge in the meaning of that statute. The clause "where the charge is made for crossing the same" applies to "bridges over streams dividing this State from another State," as well as to "bridges across or over navigable streams within this State." Endlich on Interp. of Stat., secs. 81, 414; Fisher v. Connard, 100 Pa. St. 63; Gyger's Estate, 65 Pa. St. 311; Eby's Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 311; In re Ah Tie, 13 F. 291; Plum v. Kansas City, 101 Mo. 533; St. Louis v. Lane, 110 Mo. 259; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 554. (3) A bridge across a stream between two States is an instrument of interstate commerce. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U.S. 640; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 351; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 457; State v. Furbush, 72 Me. 495; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275. Respondent's construction of section 9387 and the classification of bridges contended for by him would be a discrimination against an interstate bridge in favor of an intrastate bridge, and would be putting a burden upon an instrument of commerce such as "amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress." (4) The bridge in question is not a toll bridge within the meaning of section 9387, R. S. 1899. (a) It will be conceded that the owner of this bridge over the Mississippi river may not lawfully conduct the same as a toll bridge unless it is expressly authorized thereto by an act of Congress. Such rentals as are authorized and provided for in the act of Congress, 16 U. S. Statutes at Large, p. 473, are not tolls in the sense that the word is used in section 9387. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 352. (b) There is no proof that tolls are exacted for crossing the bridge in question. (c) The claim of plaintiff that this is a toll bridge is based solely upon some testimony to the effect that the railroad fare charged by defendant company from Louisiana, Missouri, to Roodhouse, Illinois, and certain intermediate points, was greater than that charged between Louisiana and local points in Missouri, equally distant respectively from Louisiana. There is no proof that such excess tariff was toll for crossing the bridge in question. All the testimony upon this point was that it was not bridge toll. Plaintiff contends, however, that it was unlawful during the years in question for defendant company to charge more than three cents a mile between Louisiana and the Illinois points aforesaid; that the court must presume that the defendant was not breaking the law and therefore that the excess charge was toll across the bridge. There are several flaws in the plaintiff's logic. In the first place, it is not shown that it is lawful for the defendant company to charge a toll of twenty-five cents per person for crossing the bridge. It is not authorized by the bridge charter. In the second place it is not shown that a bridge toll was the only possible explanation compatible with law, of the excess railroad fare. The excess charges may be accounted for by mistake. Payne v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 420; Bigelow v. Railroad, 48 Mo.App. 367; U. S. v. Ross, 92 U.S. 283. (5) (a) The bridge in question being an integral part of the railroad line is not taxable under section 9387, R. S. 99. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 354; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 196 Mo. 523; State ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 109 Mo. 253. (b) The bridge in question is an integral part of defendants' railway line. The evidence is clear, convincing and uncontradicted upon this point. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 348; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116; Railroad v. Supervisors, 48 Wis. 666; Anderson v. Railroad, 117 Ill. 26; Railroad v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 451. Double taxation is unlawful, and is never presumed. State ex rel. v. Pearson, 196 Mo. 523; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 137. (6) Section 9387 does not authorize the tax in question upon the property described in the petition. It is alleged in each count of plaintiff's petition that the taxes in question were assessed and levied and are a lien upon the "real estate, roadbed, bridge and bridge property aforesaid" (said property being specifically described upon the second and third pages of each count of the petition). That the whole property so described was assessed at a valuation of $ 150,000 and the petition prays that the whole of said property be impressed with the lien of said property and be sold to pay the same. It was conclusively shown at the trial that the property described in the petition included the roadbed and right of way and defendants' real estate within the limits of the right of way for more than one-half mile west of the bridge itself. Railroad v. Apperson, 97 Mo. 308; Milner v. Shipley, 94 Mo. 106; Vaughan v. Daniels, 98 Mo. 234; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 1.
Ball & Sparrow, Pearson & Pearson, J. D. Hostetter and James W. Reynolds for respondent.
(1) Appellants contend that both classes of bridges mentioned in section 9387, R. S. 1899, must be toll bridges in order to be taxable as bridges. In other words, that the clause "where a charge is made for crossing the same" refers to both classes of bridges preceding it instead of only the last class mentioned, and bases its contention on the fact that the clause is separated from the clause preceding it by a comma. (a) Punctuation is not to be considered in the construction of statutes. State ex rel v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 144. The qualifying clause refers only to the last preceding class for the following reasons: (b) A limiting or qualifying clause, where no contrary intention appears, or where there is nothing in the subject-matter indicating the contrary, refers solely to the last preceding antecedent. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 267; Sedgwick on Construction of Statutes (2 Ed.), p. 226; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 142. (c) The phraseology is different from the old statute, sec. 7755, R. S. 1889. (d) The old statute requiring both classes of bridges to be toll bridges before they could be taxed, it was certainly the intention of the Legislature in this amendment to make such a change as would yield more revenue, and inasmuch as the elimination of the toll feature would increase the number of taxable bridges in the State, this must have been the object of its passage. Pembroke v. Huston, 180 Mo. 636; Springfield Grocery Co. v. Walton, 95 Mo.App. 533; Westerman v. K. of P., 196 Mo. 728; State ex rel. v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 576. (e) Appellant has difficulty in finding a reason for taxing bridges over streams dividing this State from another State and not taxing bridges in this State unless they make a charge for crossing. To the respondent it appears that this discrimination is just, wise and reasonable, for the reason that as a class the interstate bridges are larger and more valuable than the bridges in this State. (f) Reason and natural justice support respondent's contention. The authorities cited by appellant in this connection, to the effect that ambiguities in law should be resolved in favor of reason and natural justice, might be cited by the respondent, for as we contend there would be certainly no reason or natural justice in $ 150,000 worth of property invested in the bridge in question escaping its just proportion of the tax burdens by the paying of taxes based on $ 8,000 valuation as contended in this case by the appellant. (g) If the foregoing propositions are true, it is not true, as contended by appellant, that the act in question is any discrimination against an instrument of interstate commerce. (2) Charges were made for crossing this bridge. If it be held, as contended by the appellant, that the clause "where a charge is made for crossing the same" refers also to bridges of this character, then the evidence in the record brings the bridge in this case within that definition. It stands not only undisputed but admitted in the record that a charge of practically twenty-five cents was made for each ticket sold to persons traveling over this bridge in addition to the three cent maximum passenger rate per mile, authorized by the statute of Illinois and Missouri. The record also shows it to be a misdemeanor to charge for railroad transportation a rate in excess of the maximum rate. It appearing of record that the defendant cannot account for the excess, otherwise than the passage over the bridge in question, we are justified in presuming that the extra charge of twenty-five cents, instead of being an excess in transportation rate in violation of the penal laws of the State of Illinois, is a charge for crossing that bridge. Payne v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 420. Tillery v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 348, is not in point. (3) This tax would not result in a double taxation, as a...
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