The State ex rel. Pearson v. Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 30 May 1906
• Citation: 94 S.W. 279,196 Mo. 523
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. PEARSON, Collector, Appellant, v. LOUISIANA & MISSOURI RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY and CHICAGO & ALTON RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

94 S.W. 279

196 Mo. 523

THE STATE ex rel. PEARSON, Collector, Appellant, v. LOUISIANA & MISSOURI RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY and CHICAGO & ALTON RAILWAY COMPANY

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division One

May 30, 1906

Appeal from Pike Circuit Court. -- Hon. D. H. Eby, Judge.

Affirmed.

J. W Jump, J. D. Hostetter, J. W. Reynolds, Ball & Sparrow, and Pearson & Pearson for appellant.

(1) The bridge in question comes under both classes of structure made taxable by section 7755 Revised Statutes 1889, to-wit: (a) A bridge owned by joint stock company; and (b) a bridge where a charge is made for crossing the same, namely a toll bridge. That this particular bridge is owned and controlled by a joint stock company, within the meaning of the statute, was determined and adjudicated by this court in State ex rel v. Bridge Co., 109 Mo. 257. This doctrine is reiterated and reaffirmed, by this court, in the same case, upon a second appeal. State ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 329. At the time this bridge was under consideration, in this court, in the 109th and 134th reports, the paramount title to the bridge property was in the Mississippi River Bridge Company; and the road and roadbed in connection with which the bridge was used was operated, managed and controlled by the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. On the 29th day of April, 1895, the Mississippi River Bridge Company conveyed, by quitclaim deed, the paramount title in the bridge property to the Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company. At the time of the trial of the case at bar, the paramount title to the bridge property was and is in the Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company; and the road and roadbed is operated, managed and controlled by the Chicago & Alton Railway Company. That this bridge is and has always been used, and retained, as a toll bridge, we do not think there is any question under the evidence. Every passenger pays more for riding over this bridge, than he pays for riding the same distance over any other portion of the roadbed, used in connection with said bridge, on either side of the bridge; and this extra pay is the toll exacted and charged the passenger for the privilege of riding over or across said bridge. This bridge is also used by the C. B. & Q. Railroad Company, and it pays for the use of the same, a certain sum for every passenger it carries over this bridge. And this is practically the same arrangement had with the bridge company when it was operated by the Mississippi River Bridge Company. State ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 109 Mo. 258. If it was taxable then as a toll bridge, it is taxable now. (2) The status of this particular bridge, as to whether it is taxable as a bridge or as a part of the roadbed, was fixed by this court years ago, in a case that was before this court twice upon appeal: State ex rel. v. Bridge Co., 109 Mo. 253, 134 Mo. 321.

Scarritt, Griffith & Jones for respondents.

(1) If the court's peremptory instruction given for defendants at the end of all the evidence is correct, then errors, if any, in the giving and refusal of other instructions are immaterial. The taxes in question being for the year 1900 were assessed in July, 1899, as of June 1, 1899, under authority of section 7755, Revised Statutes 1889. It appears both from the petition and from the proof that the bridge in question belongs to the railroad company and not to a joint stock company and is therefore clearly not taxable under this statute, unless it is a toll bridge. And if certain charges were incidently made and collected for crossing this bridge, it still would not be a toll bridge within the meaning of section 7755 and taxable as a separate structure, if the bridge was an integral part of the railroad, for it was then taxable as a part of the railroad line under sections 7717 to 7754, Revised Statutes 1889. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 348. (2) The bridge in question is not a toll bridge within the meaning of section 7755, Revised Statutes 1889. (a) It is not chartered as a toll bridge. (b) There is no proof that tolls are exacted for crossing the bridge in question. The evidence is that the bridge is an ordinary railway structure. It does not appear that any other vehicle than a train can cross the same nor that even a footpath for pedestrians is provided. It does not appear that there are toll gates on the bridge, or a tollkeeper; or that there are signs such as are usually found at toll bridges announcing the tolls for various vehicles; nor that trains are stopped thereon or at either end thereof, nor that the passengers on trains are counted, nor tickets taken up from them on approaching the bridge. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 348. (c) The claim of plaintiff that this is a toll bridge is based solely upon some testimony to the effect that the railroad fare charged by defendant company from Louisiana, Missouri, to Pleasant Hill, Illinois, and certain other Illinois points, was greater than that charged between Louisiana and local points in Missouri. There is no proof that such excess tariff was toll for crossing the bridge in question. (d) Plaintiff does not state a cause of action for taxes against this structure as a toll bridge. It is not alleged in the petition that this is a toll bridge. Barker v. Railroad, 91 Mo. 94; People v. Railroad, 63 Cal. 392; Railroad v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 64; Sickle v. Belknap, 129 Ind. 558; Gas. Co. v. People, 138 Ill. 344. (3) The bridge in question being an integral part of the railroad line, is not taxable under section 7755, Revised Statutes 1899. (a) Article 8, chapter 138, Revised Statutes 1889 (being sections 7717 to 7754), provides for the taxation of all railroad property in this State, including the roadbed itself, according to its mileage in each county, municipal township and incorporated city. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 354. Sec. 7755, Revised Statutes 1889, should not be read so as to conflict with or repeal any part of the law just referred to. To prevent such a result the proper and consistent construction of said section 7755 is that it does not apply to a bridge that belongs to and forms an integral part of a particular railroad, but only to a bridge that is in fact a separate structure, an entity to itself. This is expressly and clearly decided by the Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. v. Railroad, supra. (b) The bridge in question is an integral part of defendant's railway line. The evidence is clear, convincing and uncontradicted upon this point. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 97 Mo. 348; Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116; Railroad v. Supervisors, 48 Wis. 666; Anderson v. Railroad, 117 Ill. 26. (c) Indeed, the people and the officials of the State and of Pike county are estopped from asserting or claiming that this bridge is not a part of defendant's railway line. The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that in the same year, the 1899 assessment for the 1900 taxes, that part of this bridge which is within Pike county, and is described in the petition, was included in the mileage of defendant's railroad, certified by the county court of Pike county, to the State Auditor; that the state authorities assessed the same as a part of the railroad and that the county and city officials collected and receipted for taxes upon this bridge and the half mile of right of way alleged in the petition to be a part of this bridge as a part of defendant's railway property. It will not be contended that by section 7755 the Legislature intended to provide for double taxation of any property. Even when constitutional it is held that double taxation must be provided for by the Legislature in clear and unmistakable terms. Double taxation is never presumed. Sec. 4, art. 10, Const.; Rice Co. Comrs. v. Bank, 23 Minn. 280; City v. Railroad, 27 Mo. 265; Valle v. Zeigler, 84 Mo. 214. (4) Section 7755 does not in any event authorize the tax in question upon the property described in the petition. The description in the records of the Board of Equalization, "Portion of the Bridge of the Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company at Louisiana," is too vague to support a tax. State ex rel. v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 1; City of Jefferson v. Whipple, 71 Mo. 519.

LAMM, J. Brace, P. J., and Valliant, J., concur; Graves, J., not sitting.

OPINION

LAMM, J.

The statement of facts furnished by the learned aggregation of counsel representing plaintiff, appellant here, seems colorless and fair as far as it goes, and is adopted pro tanto. Thus:

"This is the suit for delinquent taxes for 1900, on a railroad bridge across the Mississippi river at Louisiana, Pike county, Missouri. The defendant, the Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company, is a Missouri railroad corporation and owns a line of railroad, including so much of the bridge in controversy as is in the State of Missouri from the middle of the Mississippi river, at the City of Louisiana, Missouri, to Mexico, Missouri; thence to Cedar City. It acquired title to so much of said bridge in controversy as is in the State of Missouri from the Mississippi River Bridge Company by quitclaim deed dated April 29, 1895. The remainder of its line of railroad, it has owned since the date of its construction in 1870. On August 1, 1870, said defendant, Louisiana & Missouri River Railroad Company, leased its railroad aforesaid to the Chicago and Alton Railway Company for a term of one thousand years. On April 3, 1900, said Chicago & Alton Railroad Company subleased said railroad, including so much of the bridge in controversy as is in the State of Missouri, to the defendant, Chicago & Alton Railway Company for ninety-nine years. Defendant, Chicago & Alton Railway Company, is an Illinois railroad corporation, and, as such, operates, manages and controls a line of railroad...