State ex rel. Police Retirement System of City of St. Louis v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 14 November 1949
• Docket Number: 41555
• Citation: 224 S.W.2d 68,359 Mo. 854
• Parties: State of Missouri, at the Relation of the Police Retirement System of the City of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. David J. Murphy, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Presiding in Division No. 1 Thereof, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

224 S.W.2d 68

359 Mo. 854

State of Missouri, at the Relation of the Police Retirement System of the City of St. Louis, a Corporation, Relator, v. David J. Murphy, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Presiding in Division No. 1 Thereof, Respondent

No. 41555

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 14, 1949

Original Proceeding in Prohibition.

PROVISIONAL RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

SYLLABUS

Prohibition against circuit judge. The circuit court does not have original jurisdiction over death benefit claims against the Police Retirement System of the City of St. Louis, but such jurisdiction is vested in the board of trustees thereof. The claimant was afforded a proper hearing by the board and may not raise the issue of due process. The statutory provision for review by certiorari is inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution, and since July 1, 1946 the scope of review of the decisions of said board has been governed by Sec. 22 Art. V, 1945 Constitution, and the Administrative Review Act. The provisional rule in prohibition is made absolute.

James E. Crowe, City Counselor, and Charles J. Dolan, Associate City Counselor, for relator.

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction of all claims for refunds and pensions under the act relating to police retirement systems in all cities of this state having 500,000 inhabitants or more, has been vested in the boards of trustees of such systems. Sec. 9468 (6), R.S. 1939. (2) The action, decision or determination of any such board in any matter involving such claims is reviewable by the common law writ of certiorari, only. Sec. 9468 (6), R.S. 1939, cited under Point (1). (3) The proceeding in the court below which relator is seeking to have prohibited is not one for review of the action of the Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement System of St. Louis by certiorari. The petition upon which it is founded does not request such review. The court has listed the cause for trial without issuing any order to the Board of Trustees to certify its record in the matter of plaintiff's claim and without any reference to such record. (4) The accumulated contributions of a police officer to the funds of the police retirement system are public money, subject to legislative control. State ex rel. King v. Firemen's Pension Fund, 192 Mo.App. 583, 184 S.W. 929; Pecoy v. Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, 106 N.E. 435; State v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N.W. 954; City of Dallas v. Trammell, 101 S.W.2d 1009, 112 A.L.R. 997. (5) Officer Poehler having joined the St. Louis police department subsequently to the enactment of the Police Retirement Act, as appears from the petition of the plaintiff, it is to be presumed that he accepted the provisions of the law and agreed that his contributions should remain at the disposal of the state until it should become vested in him or his beneficiary by his resignation, by his retirement or by his death. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 10 S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426 (Cited in City of Dallas v. Trammell, supra.) (6) Officer Poehler when he accepted appointment to the St. Louis police department did so in contemplation of the reserved right of the legislature to amend or repeal the law establishing the police retirement system. State ex rel. Board of Trustees, 192 Mo. App., l.c. 594, 184 S.W., l.c. 933; Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S., l.c. 471, 33 L. Ed., l.c. 429. (7) The court erred in ruling that the legislature of Missouri could not deprive Officer Poehler's beneficiary of the right of trial by jury in a court of general jurisdiction on her petition for the recovery of contributions made by her husband to the retirement system prior to the amendment of the law in 1939. Authorities cited under Points (4), (5) and (6). (8) The court erred in overruling defendants' demurrer to its jurisdiction. Sec. 9468 (6), R.S. 1939, under Point (1). (9) The court erred in overruling defendants' motion to strike from plaintiff's petition those portions relating to her claim for the allowance of an annual pension. Secs. 9468 (6), 9469 (9), R.S. 1939.

Joseph N. Hassett and Leo F. Laughren for respondent.

(1) The benefits of the Police Retirement System Act are not granted by the trustees of the system, but by the people and the legislature. Sec. 48a, Art. 4, Mo. Constitution 1875; State ex rel. Hocker v. Nolte, 330 Mo. 299, 48 S.W.2d 916. (2) Respondent has jurisdiction to try the issues in plaintiff's (below) petition because Article 2, Chapter 54, R.S. 1939, Section 9468 (6) is unconstitutional and void in that it denies plaintiff due process of law. Federal Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Sec. 1, Missouri Constitution, Art. II, Secs. 10, 30; Art. III; Art. VI, Sec. 1; Art. IV, Sec. 48a; 12 C.J. 1234; 70 C.J. 482; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Ridge, 169 Mo. 376, 68 S.W. 1043; State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607, 271 U.S. 40, 46 S.Ct. 384; State v. Jackson, 318 Mo. 1149, 2 S.W.2d 758; Jackson County v. Fayman, 329 Mo. 423, 44 S.W.2d 849; State v. Jones, 306 Mo. 437, 268 S.W. 83; State ex rel. Anderson Motor Serv. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 339 Mo. 469, 97 S.W.2d 1116. (3) The Act, Article 2, Chapter 54, R.S. 1939, lacks the essentials of remedial procedure, does not confer fact finding powers upon the trustees, and merely gives them the powers of ordinary trustees and administrative officers without fact finding facilities, and in case of dispute leaves open to the parties the right of having a judicial determination of the matter. French v. Cook, 173 Cal. 126, 160 P. 412; Lusk v. Atkinson, 268 Mo. 109, 186 S.W. 703. (4) Plaintiff met all the requirements of the statute, and upon denial of her claim by the trustees a cause of action accrued to the plaintiff. State ex rel. Lambert v. Padberg, 346 Mo. 1082, 145 S.W.2d 123. (5) Respondent does have jurisdiction of the plaintiff's cause of action because it involves an issue of fact that cannot be determined on certiorari. State ex rel. Lambert v. O'Malley, 234 Mo.App. 773, 121 S.W.2d 228; American Fire Alarm Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners, 285 Mo. 581, 227 S.W. 114; Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1.

OPINION

Douglas, J.

This proceeding in prohibition questions the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to entertain an original and independent action to recover benefits from the Police Retirement System of the City of St. Louis. The plaintiff in such action is the widow and beneficiary of a policeman who, at the time of his death, was in active service and a member of the retirement system. Upon the death of such a member a beneficiary is entitled to an ordinary death benefit, and under certain conditions to an additional accidental death benefit. Whether the widow is entitled to the latter appears to be the real issue in controversy.

In considering whether the circuit court has original jurisdiction to determine a case seeking to recover benefits under the system we must consider the act setting up the system as enacted in 1929 and subsequently amended in 1939. Secs. 9464-76, R.S. 1939, Mo. RSA.

The act vests the general administration and the responsibility for the proper operation of the system in a board of seven trustees. Under the original act the powers granted to the board were in general terms. The board was directed by the act merely to establish rules and regulations for the administration of its funds and for the transaction of its business. Sec. 8910 (6) R.S. 1929. The character of the board's jurisdiction over claims for benefits under these general terms was considered in State ex rel. Lambert v. O'Malley, 234 Mo.App. 773, 121 S.W.2d 228, a well reasoned opinion by Commissioner Bennick. The question raised in that case was whether the act vested the board of trustees with sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine claims for benefits. That question arose from the filing of a suit in the circuit court by a policeman seeking to recover accident disability retirement allowances which the board had denied him. The board brought prohibition to prevent the circuit court from determining the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground the board had exclusive and final authority over claims. The act then had no provision for a review of a decision of the board. The court of appeals found that the absence of such a provision indicated that the act did not intend the board's findings should be final. Accordingly, the court of appeals held the board's decisions were not final and conclusive, and that a member of the retirement system could properly resort to the circuit court for a trial anew of his claim. If such was the present state of the law the question before us would be settled.

However after the court of appeals' decision holding the circuit court's original jurisdiction could be properly invoked in suits for benefits, the act was amended by the legislature. The provision granting the general powers, above mentioned, was repealed and a new provision granting specific powers was substituted, as follows: "(6) The board of trustees shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to or affecting the funds herein provided for, including, in addition to all other matters, all claims for annuities, benefits, refunds or pensions under this Act, and its action, decision or determination in any matter shall be reviewable by the common law writ of certiorari only, and any party to such certiorari proceedings shall have a right of appeal from the decision of the reviewing court. Subject to the limitations of this article, the board of trustees shall, from time to time, establish rules and regulations for the administration of funds created by this article, for the transaction of its business, and for the limitation of the time within which claims may be filed." Laws 1939, p. 619. This provision is now ...