State ex rel. Public Disclosure Com'n v. 119 Vote No! Committee

• Citation: 135 Wn.2d 618,957 P.2d 691
• Decision Date: 11 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 64332-6,64332-6
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: Page 618 135 Wn.2d 618 957 P.2d 691 STATE of Washington ex rel. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION, Appellant, v. 119 VOTE NO! COMMITTEE, Eileen Brown, Executive Director, Thomas Finch, Treasurer, Respondents. American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, a Washington nonprofit corporation, on behalf of itself and its members, Appellants, Irene Heninger, Jocelyn Marchisio, Jim Whiteside, Don Brazier, and Gary Machara, Commissioners, Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, in their official capacity; and Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of the State of Washington, in her official capacity, Respondents. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc

Page 618

135 Wn.2d 618

957 P.2d 691

STATE of Washington ex rel. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE COMMISSION, Appellant, v. 119 VOTE NO! COMMITTEE, Eileen Brown, Executive Director, Thomas Finch, Treasurer, Respondents.

American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, a Washington

nonprofit corporation, on behalf of itself and its

members, Appellants,

Irene Heninger, Jocelyn Marchisio, Jim Whiteside, Don

Brazier, and Gary Machara, Commissioners, Washington State

Public Disclosure Commission, in their official capacity;

and Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of the State of

Washington, in her official capacity, Respondents.

No. 64332-6.

Supreme Court of Washington,

En Banc.

Argued June 26, 1998.

Decided June 11, 1998.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 14, 1998.

Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Thomas G. Holcomb, Assistant Attorney General, Olympia, for Appellant

Foster, Pepper & Shefelman, Christopher Kane, Bendich, Stobaugh & Strong, David Stobaugh, Seattle, for Respondent

SANDERS, Justice.

The Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) alleges the 119 Vote No! Committee violated RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) by publishing false political advertising. We must decide two issues: does RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) violate the First Amendment on its face; and, if not, did the subject advertisement violate the statute. As we conclude, RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) indeed facially violates the First Amendment--the second question falls by the way.

I. Facts

The State of Washington on relation of the Public Disclosure Commission brought suit against the 119 Vote No! Committee, its executive director and its treasurer. The State alleges the Committee published political advertising contrary to RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) during the course of its campaign in opposition to Initiative 119, the so-called "Death with Dignity Act." Ultimately the initiative went down to defeat at the polls on November 5, 1991. The one-page printed advertisement begins with the words "Vote No!" superimposed over the words "Initiative 119," Clerk's Papers (CP) at 18, and generally suggests the initiative invites assisted suicide without sufficient safeguards. ¹

RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) prohibits any person from sponsoring, with actual malice, a political advertisement containing The Committee moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. CR 12(b)(6). The American Civil Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU) intervened pursuant to CR 24 to challenge the facial constitutionality of RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) by declaratory judgment. ³ Following briefing and argument, the trial court concluded the advertisement did not contain materially false statements and dismissed. The trial court awarded the Committee attorney fees and costs pursuant to RCW 42.17.400(5). ⁴

                a false statement of material fact. 2  The State's complaint alleged the advertisement distributed by the Committee "contained false statements of material fact,  
                and was published by the Committee with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements contained in the advertisement were false or in reckless disregard of whether the statements were false."   CP at 6. The PDC's referral arose from a complaint filed by proponents of the initiative.  The State's complaint prayed the Committee and individual defendants be fined up to $10,000 plus costs, attorney fees, and treble damages
                

Notwithstanding dismissal of the principal action against

the Committee, the ACLU pursued its claim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity. ⁵ The ACLU and the State cross-moved for summary judgment each seeking a declaration as to the statute's constitutionality under the First Amendment. On stipulated facts concerning the enforcement of RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) the court granted the State's motion, concluding the statute facially passed First Amendment muster. Both parties appealed. We granted direct review.

II. Standard of Review

"Under CR 12(b)(6), a complaint can be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because a trial court's dismissal under this rule is a holding on a question of law, appellate review is de novo." Hoffer v. State, 110 Wash.2d 415, 420, 755 P.2d 781 (1988). Likewise, the facial constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which requires de novo review. Timberline Air Serv. Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash.2d 305, 311, 884 P.2d 920 (1994).

III. Legal Analysis

RCW 42.17.530(1)(a) provides: "It is a violation of this chapter for a person to sponsor with actual malice ... [p]olitical advertising that contains a false statement of material fact...." The Committee and the ACLU argue the statute is a facially unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. The State asserts its interest in an informed electorate justifies this burden upon political debate.

The constitutional guarantee of free speech has its "fullest and most urgent application" in political campaigns.

                Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971)).  Therefore, the State bears a "well-nigh insurmountable" burden to justify RCW 42.17.530's restriction on political speech.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988).  This burden requires the court to apply "exacting scrutiny" to RCW 42.17.530(1)(a).  Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886.   See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976).  Exacting scrutiny will invalidate the statute unless the State demonstrates a compelling interest that is both narrowly tailored and necessary.  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1519, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995);  Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1846, [957 P.2d 695] 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992).  Such burdens are rarely met.  Burson, 504 U.S. at 199-200, 112 S.Ct. 1846.  Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash.2d 103, 114, 937 P.2d 154 (1997) ("The State bears the burden of justifying a restriction on speech.")
                

A. RCW 42.17.530(1)(a)

infringes on speech protected by the First Amendment

Uninhibited speech " 'is the single most important element upon which this nation has thrived.' " Nelson v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 131 Wash.2d 523, 536, 936 P.2d 1123 (quoting Guzick v. Drebus, 305 F.Supp. 472, 481 (N.D.Ohio 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 941, 28 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 175, 139 L.Ed.2d 117 (1997). Free speech is revered as the "Constitution's majestic guarantee," central to the preservation of all other rights. Id. at 536, 936 P.2d 1123. Advocacy of one's political views through leafleting lies at the very core of our First Amendment freedoms. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346-47, 115 S.Ct. 1511; Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. 1886.

The State asserts it may prohibit false statements of fact contained in political advertisements. This claim presupposes Rather, the First Amendment operates to insure the public decides what is true and false with respect to governance. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886; Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). In Meyer, the Supreme Court explained:

the State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political debate. However, the courts have "consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth--whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials--and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964).

" 'The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind.... In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.' Thomas v. Collins, [323 U.S. 516, 545, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945) ] (Jackson, J., concurring) ]." [Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir.1987) ].

Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (emphasis added).

Particularly in the religious and political realms, "the tenets of one man ... seem the rankest error to his neighbor." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352 (1940). Therefore, the Supreme Court has recognized that to sustain our constitutional commitment to uninhibited political discourse, the State may not prevent others from "resort[ing] to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church and state, and even to false statement. " Id. (emphasis added). At times such speech seems unpalatable, but the value of free debate overcomes the danger of misuse. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511. For even false statements make valuable contributions to debate by bringing about "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting John S. Mill, On Liberty 15 (Oxford, Blackwell 1947)).

Specifically, the First Amendment prohibits the State from silencing speech it disapproves, particularly silencing criticism of government itself. Threats of coerced silence chill uninhibited political debate and undermine the very purpose of the First Amendment. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667; Brown, 456 U.S. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523; Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S.Ct. 1886.

[The Founders of the nation] believed that freedom to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.... Believing in the power of reason as applied through the public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law--the argument of force in its worst form.

Whitney v. California, 274...