State ex rel. Reed v. Spanaway Water Dist.
| Decision Date | 05 April 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31561,31561 |
| Citation | 229 P.2d 532,38 Wn.2d 393 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. REED et al. v. SPANAWAY WATER DIST. et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Leslie N. Jochimsen, R. D. Campbell, Puyallup, for appellants.
E. K. Murray, Tacoma, for respondents.
Plaintiffs below sought by mandamus to compel dissolution of Spanaway Water District by the commissioners thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, Laws of 1929, chapter 114, Sec. 25. The demurrer of defendant commissioners to the application for the writ of mandamus was sustained. Plaintiffs elected to stand on the demurrer. They have appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing their application for the writ.
The basic question in this appeal is whether Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq., Laws of 1941, chapter 87, Sec. 1, established an exclusive and mandatory procedure for the dissolution of water districts, with the result that the procedure implicit in Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, Laws of 1929, chapter 114, Sec. 25, was in effect canceled and is no longer available or operative as a method for the dissolution of water districts.
In this opinion, this court holds, and thereby establishes the case law rule, that Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, Laws of 1929, chapter 114, Sec. 25, is not repealed by implication through the enactment of Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq., Laws of 1941, chapter 87, Sec. 1. It follows that the procedure prescribed in Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602 is available and may be used to dissolve a water district.
The pertinent facts in this case may be stated briefly as follows: Spanaway Water District is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Washington within Pierce County. E. J. Reed and Earl W. Rau, plaintiffs below, hereinafter referred to as appellants, can be considered as owners of real estate, taxpayers and registered voters residing within the boundaries of the water district. Emerson Tarpenning, Robert Steidell and Robert Rhone were the commissioners of the district and hereinafter will be referred to as respondents. Appellants and others signed and presented to respondents a petition for dissolution of the water district, which petition was based upon the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, and the procedure implicit thereunder. Respondents took no action, but merely held the petition for more than forty-five days. Appellants applied to the Superior Court of Pierce County for a writ of mandamus. It was issued in the alternative and required the respondents to call an election relative to dissolution of the district or to show cause why they should not call the election. Respondents demurred to the application for the writ. Apparently, they argued that Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, had been repealed by Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq., and that the latter statute now provides the sole and exclusive procedure relating to dissolution of a water district.
Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, supra, provides in effect that proceedings for the dissolution of a water district may be initiated by a petition to the commissioners of the water district. The statute requires that the petition be signed by not less than twenty-five per cent of the voters within the water district. Under the statute, the commissioners, pursuant to filing of the petition as aforementioned, are required to hold an election. The voters, by their action at the polls, then determine whether or not a water district shall be dissolved. This procedure, to say the least, has some familiar and characteristic attributes of dynamic democracy in operation.
Undoubtedly, the same may be said of the procedure contemplated by Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq. But there are distinct differences in the two procedures--some quite obvious, some perhaps a little on the subtle side. In the latter instance, the procedure is initiated by the commissioners. Dissolution may be effectuated through a petition signed by the majority of the board of commissioners of the district and presented to the superior court. Under this statute, Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq., the final determination as to dissolution is made by the judge of the superior court after a finding that the interests of all persons concerned will be served best by the proposed dissolution.
To recapitulate: 1. Under Rem.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11602, (a) The proceedings are initiated by the individual voters; (b) The final decision as to dissolution is determined by the voters themselves at an election called especially for that purpose. 2. Under Rem.Supp.1941, Sec. 8931-11 et seq., (a) The proceedings for dissolution are initiated by a majority of the board of water district commissioners; (b) The final decision as to dissolution is determined by the superior court.
Appellants as well as respondents cite the same rule of statutory interpretation, together with the exception thereto. Substantially the same authorities are cited respecting application of the rule of statutory interpretation. The rule itself is well stated in Abel v. Diking & Drainage Imp. Dist., 19 Wash.2d 356, 142 P.2d 1017, 1020: See, also, Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wash.2d 94, 204 P.2d 482.
Appellants contend that the general rule disfavoring repeals by implication is applicable to this case; that the exception to the rule is not applicable. The respondents' contentions obviously are to the contrary.
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