State ex rel. Spokane & Eastern Branch of Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Justice Court In and For Spokane County

• Decision Date: 05 January 1937
• Docket Number: 26287.
• Citation: 189 Wash. 87,63 P.2d 937
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SPOKANE AND EASTERN BRANCH OF SEATTLE FIRST NAT. BANK v. JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR SPOKANE COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

63 P.2d 937

189 Wash. 87

STATE ex rel. SPOKANE AND EASTERN BRANCH OF SEATTLE FIRST NAT. BANK v. JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR SPOKANE COUNTY et al.

No. 26287.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 5, 1937

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; William A. Huenke Judge.

Writ of review by the State, on the relation of the Spokane & Eastern Branch of the Seattle First National Bank against the Justice Court in and for County and Precinct of Spokane, Hon. Frank Juse, Justice of the Peace. From an order reversing an order of the Justice Court, the Justice of the Peace appeals.

Affirmed.

Charles W. Gillespie, of Spokane, for appellant.

Graves Kizer & Graves, of Spokane, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court reversing an order made by a justice of the peace in a garnishment proceeding.

January 29, 1936, Merchants Rating and Adjustment Company, as plaintiff, obtained a judgment in the justice court against Norman Henshaw, as defendant, in the sum of $87.70 and costs amounting to $11.40. A writ of execution was issued and returned unsatisfied. The plaintiff then procured a summons in garnishment in aid of execution, which was signed by a constable, directing Spokane & Eastern Trust Company, the respondent bank, as garnishee, to appear in the justice court on a day named, then and there to be examined under oath concerning what property the bank had belonging to, and what debts it owed, the defendant and judgment debtor in that action, and, further, commanding the respondent not to pay or transfer any money or property to the defendant until the further order of the justice court.

The garnishee bank appeared in the justice court in response to the summons and moved that the process be quashed and that all proceedings taken thereunder against the bank be dismissed. The motion was denied. In due course and time, the bank sought and obtained from the superior court a writ of review directing that a transcript of the record and proceedings in the justice court be certified to the superior court. Upon the return to the writ, a hearing was had, and, from the facts then admitted and found, the superior court concluded that the action of the justice with relation to the summons in garnishment was unauthorized and that the justice court had erred in refusing to grant the respondent's motion to quash. Judgment was accordingly entered reversing the order of the justice court and directing that the summons and garnishment be quashed and all proceedings thereunder dismissed. From that judgment this appeal was taken.

It is conceded, and the superior court found, that the summons in garnishment in aid of execution and the proceedings thereunder were invoked and conducted under the provisions of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1886, which reads as follows 'If there be no property found, or if the goods and chattels levied on be not sufficient to satisfy such execution, the officer [sheriff or constable] shall, on demand of the plaintiff, summon, in writing, as garnishees, such persons as may be named to [him by] the plaintiff or his agent, to appear Before the justice on the return day of the execution, to answer such interrogatories as may be put to them, touching their liabilities as garnishees, and the like proceedings shall be had thereon Before the justice to final judgment as in the proceedings by attachment.' The language contained within the brackets above does not appear in the statute as passed by the Legislature.

The question presented to us for determination is whether action 1886 is a valid and subsisting law. The contention of the respondent has been, and is, that it is neither subsisting nor valid, (1) because it was impliedly repealed by the garnishment act relating to justice courts, and (2) because it is, in any event, unconstitutional, in that it provides for a proceeding supplemental to execution, which is of equitable cognizance, and therefore trenches upon the jurisdiction of the superior court in such cases.

If either of these theories be correct, the judgment of the superior court must be affirmed, because it is the rule in cases triable de novo that, if the decision of the trial court can soundly rest on any ground, it must be sustained. Rohlinger v. Coletta Land & Orchard Co., 64 Wash. 348, 116 P. 1095; Hammond v. Mau, 69 Wash. 204, 124 P. 377, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1142; Shafer v. United States Casualty Co., 90 Wash. 687, 156 P. 861; Horton Investment Co. v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 556, 162 P. 989, L.R.A.1918E, 194; In re Rockwood Boulevard, 170 Wash. 64, 15 P.2d 652.

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1886, above quoted, has always, from the time of its original enactment in 1854 down to the present, been a part of the chapter on executions and proceedings thereon in justice court, and not a section under garnishment therein. Cf. Laws 1854, p. 241, § 105; Laws of 1863, p. 354, § 86; Code 1881, § 1805; 2 Hill's Code, § 1554; Rem.Rev.Stat. title 12, ch. 10, §§ 1867 to 1889, inclusive. The provisions relating to writs of garnishment by justices of the peace are contained in Rem.Rev.Stat. title 12, chapter 6, §§ 1823 to 1846, inclusive, appearing originally in chapter 160, Laws 1909, p. 607, and amended by chapter 126, Laws 1911, p. 637 and chapter 109, Laws 1931, p. 323.

We shall now consider the effect of the garnishment act upon section 1886.

It is a settled rule that repeals by implication, although not ordinarily favored in law, are nevertheless effective when it appears that a legislative act is intended to cover the entire field of legislation upon a particular subject, or that subsequent legislation is contrary to, and inconsistent with, a former act. The rule is comprehended in two contrastive principles expressed as follows in Ruling Case Law:

'Where a statute covers the whole subject matter of an earlier act, and it is evident that it was intended to be a revision of, or substitute for, the earlier act, although it contains no express words to that effect, it operates as a repeal of the earlier act to the extent that its provisions are revised and supplied.' 25 R.C.L. 915, § 167.

'Except when an act covers the entire subject matter of earlier legislation, is complete in itself and is evidently intended to supersede the prior legislation on the subject, it does not by implication repeal an earlier act on the same subject unless the

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