State ex rel. Reorganized School Dist. R-2 of Newton County v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 15 February 1955
• Docket Number: No. 7301,R-2,7301
• Citation: 276 S.W.2d 235
• Parties: STATE ex rel. REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICTOF NEWTON COUNTY, Missouri, Relator, v. C. M. ROBINSON, County Superintendent of Schools, and C. M. Robinson, Russell Bogle, Lawton Lawson, James P. Austin and Clifford Kirk, as Board of Arbitrators, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 235

276 S.W.2d 235

STATE ex rel. REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT R-2 OF NEWTON

COUNTY, Missouri, Relator, v. C. M. ROBINSON, County Superintendent of Schools, and C. M.

Robinson, Russell Bogle, Lawton Lawson, James P.

Austin and Clifford Kirk, as Board of

Arbitrators, Respondents.

No. 7301.

Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Feb. 15, 1955.

Rehearing Denied March 14, 1955.

Wayne V. Slankard, Neosho, for relator.

John M. Rice, George Henry, Neosho, for respondents.

STONE, Judge.

In this proceeding in certiorari, the county superintendent of schools of Newton County and members of a board of arbitration appointed under Section 165.170 (applicable in the instant situation by virtue of Section 165.293), who were respondents below and are hereinafter referred to as such, appeal from a judgment of the circuit court which quashed 'the judgment record' of said board of arbitration changing the boundary line between Reorganized School District No. R-2 (relator below and hereinafter referred to either as 'relator' or as 'the Midway District'), and Consolidated School District No. C-1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Fairview District'). (Unless otherwise specifically stated, all statutory references herein are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.) At their annual school meetings in April, 1953, the Fairview District voted in favor of the proposed change of boundary line but the Midway District voted against such change. Upon appeal by the Fairview District, the county superintendent of schools appointed a board of arbitration which, on April 21, 1953, met in the office of the county superintendent and rendered a signed 'report', the pertinent portion of which was that 'after careful consideration of the question of the matter of changing the boundary so that the district commonly known as Linwood--Sections 22, 23, 26, 27, 34 and 35, Township 25, Range 29--would be attached to the Fairview School District C-1 and detached from the Midway School District R-2, the board voted three for the change and one against the change.'

Certiorari presents only questions of law on the record brought up by the return and does not permit consideration of issues of fact [State ex rel. Police Retirement System of City of St. Louis v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 224 S.W.2d 68, 73(12)], and evidence and exhibits, even though incorporated in the return, may not be considered unless they are properly a part of the record [State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, 346 Mo. 86, 139 S.W.2d 958, 962-963(8, 9)]. The chief purpose of certiorari being to confine an inferior tribunal within its jurisdictional limits [State ex rel. Police Retirement System of City of St. Louis v. Murphy, supra, 224 S.W.2d loc.cit. 73(11); State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Neaf, supra, 139 S.W.2d loc.cit. 961(2)], the writ affords relief not only where the inferior tribunal is without jurisdiction but also where such tribunal abuses or acts in excess of its rightful jurisdiction [State ex rel. Woodmansee v. Ridge, 343 Mo. 702, 123 S.W.2d 20, 23(3)].

Although a board of arbitration appointed under Section 165.170 is not a court in a constitutional sense [Const. of 1945, Art. 5, Sec. 1, 2, V.A.M.S.; School Dist. No. 16 v. New London School Dist., 181 Mo.App. 583, 164 S.W. 688, 690(2); State ex rel. Keitel v. Harris, 353 Mo. 1043, 186 S.W.2d 31, 33(2)], the reported opinions reflect frequent references to such board as 'a judicial tribunal' [State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Denny, 94 Mo.App. 559, 72 S.W. 467, 468] or as an 'inferior tribunal' [State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561, 562; State ex rel. King v. Moreland, Mo.App., 189 S.W. 602, 604; School Dist. No. 14 v. Sims, 193 Mo.App. 480, 186 S.W. 4, 6; School Dist. No. 2 v. Pace, 113 Mo.App. 134, 87 S.W. 580, 583] or simply as a 'tribunal' [School Dist. No. 58 of Pike County v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 498, 135 S.W. 75, 78, 79]. We are told that '(t)here can be no doubt that (the) finding and decision by the board of arbitrators * * * is a judgment' [School Dist. No. 58 of Pike County v. Chappel, supra, 135 S.W. loc.cit. 77], and we find other references to the board's decision as a 'judgment' [State ex rel. Rose v. Job, 205 Mo. 1, 103 S.W. 493, 501, 502; State ex inf. Richeson v. Cummins, 114 Mo.App. 93, 89 S.W. 74, 75; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Denny, supra, 72 S.W. loc.cit. 469]. It would seem to be clear that determination of a boundary line dispute by a board of arbitration necessarily involves performance of duties judicial or quasi judicial in nature [State ex rel. and to use of Parman v. Manring, 332 Mo. 235, 58 S.W.2d 269, 273; State ex rel. Hanna v. Ross, 220 Mo.App. 388, 286 S.W. 726, 727(1); In re City of Kinloch, 362 Mo. 434, 242 S.W.2d 59, 63(6)], and that accordingly certiorari, which lies only where the action to be reviewed is judicial or quasi judicial in nature [State ex rel. Davidson v. Caldwell, 310 Mo. 397, 276 S.W. 631, 634(5); State ex rel. Adams v. Crain, Mo.App., 201 S.W.2d 426, 429(2), and cases there cited], may be employed to review the award or judgment of such board of arbitration [School Dist. No. 14 v. Sims, supra, 186 S.W. loc.cit. 6(4); State ex rel. King v. Moreland, supra, 189 S.W. loc.cit. 604(3)].

Relator concedes in the instant case 'that the procedure leading up to the hearing by the board of arbitration was regular' and thus that the board had jurisdiction to hear and determine the boundary line dispute; but, it is insisted that 'the record of the board of arbitration should be quashed because it shows upon its face that the board acted without and in excess of its authority granted under the statute (Section 165.170) in that it considered the proposition of changing the boundary line and voted to change the boundary line but did not do the only thing it was required or had a right to do under the statute and that is to consider the necessity for the change of boundary.' In determining the question here presented, we confine ourselves to the final award or judgment of the board, that being the only record which the county superintendent of schools or the board is required to make and keep [School Dist. No. 35 v. Hodgins, 180 Mo. 70, 79 S.W. 148, 151; State ex rel. King v. Moreland, supra, 189 S.W. loc.cit. 604; School Dists. Nos. 18, 19, 29, 30, Webster County v. Yates, 161 Mo.App. 107, 142 S.W. 791, 793; School Dist. No. 58 of Pike County v. Chappel, supra, 135 S.W. loc.cit. 78-79; School District No. 2 v. Pace, supra, 87 S.W. loc.cit. 582; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Denny, supra, 72 S.W. loc.cit 468(2)], ¹ and we accord no consideration to an amended report by the board which contained an express finding 'that the proposed change is necessary' but which admittedly had been 'prepared and executed after the writ of certiorari had been issued and served.' "After the certiorari has been served on the inferior tribunal, the latter is powerless to alter its record or decree, even for the purpose of correcting mistakes, unless the record itself furnishes the means of making the correction, or the error is a mistake in the arithmetic of the court." State ex rel. Adler v. Ossing, 336 Mo. 386, 79 S.W.2d 255, 256(2). Furthermore, the board of arbitration had no power or authority to issue an amended award, as it undertook to do here, after the original award or judgment by the board had been transmitted by the county superintendent to the clerks of the interested districts [Brown & Moore v. Durham, 110 Mo.App. 424, 85 S.W. 120(2); annotation 104 A.L.R. 710], and after 'the last day of April' on or before which the county superintendent was required by Section 165.170 so to transmit the board's award to such clerks.

As stated in relator's amended application, the proposition submitted at the annual school meetings was 'to change the boundary line between such districts.' The Fairview District having voted 'in favor of such change' and the Midway District having voted 'against such change,' Section 165.170 provided that 'the matter', i. e., the proposition to change the boundary line, might be referred to the county superintendent, who, upon timely appeal, was invested with the power and the duty to appoint a board of arbitration. We think it plain that 'the matter' to be determined and settled by the board was, to use the language of relator's brief, 'the proposition of changing the boundary line.' Giving heed to the statutory provision that the board's duty 'shall be to consider the necessity for such proposed change and render a decision thereon,' obviously 'the matter' before the board, i. e., 'the proposition of changing the boundary line,' was to be determined with a view to, and on the basis of, the necessity for the proposed change. But, in our view of the case, the simple fact that the board's written award or judgment (although showing that the board had acted 'after careful consideration of the question of the matter of changing the boundary') contained no specific affirmative finding as to 'the necessity for such proposed change' neither establishes nor indicates that the board did not consider and determine the question of necessity and likewise neither impels nor justifies relator's conclusion that such judgment 'shows upon its face that the board acted without and in excess of its authority granted under the statute.' It should be borne in mind that this is not a case in which the judgment under review affirmatively shows on its face that the board determined the boundary line dispute on some basis other than necessity (as in State ex rel. School Dist. No. 4 v. School Dist. No. 3, 163 Mo.App. 253, 146 S.W. 816, 817, where the board's judgment was predicated on the belief 'that the change will improve school district No. 3 more than it will injure school district No. 4'), but that the instant judgment simply was silent as to the reasons or considerations which motivated the board's determination of the...