State ex rel. Rollins v. Board of Educ. for Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1752,HEIGHTS-UNIVERSITY,87-1752
• Citation: 532 N.E.2d 1289,40 Ohio St.3d 123
• Parties: , 51 Ed. Law Rep. 226, 1988 SERB 4-126 The STATE, ex rel. ROLLINS, Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR the CLEVELANDHEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 123

40 Ohio St.3d 123

532 N.E.2d 1289, 51 Ed. Law Rep. 226, 1988 SERB 4-126

The STATE, ex rel. ROLLINS, Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR the CLEVELAND HEIGHTS-UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.

No. 87-1752.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 28, 1988.

Decided Dec. 28, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under R.C. 4117.10(A), on matters of wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment, a collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 prevails over a conflicting law unless such law falls within one of the exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A).

2. R.C. 3319.11 is a teacher-protection statute and not a law pertaining to minimum educational requirements under R.C. 4117.10(A).

Jacqueline Rollins, relator-appellee, was employed as a teacher by the Board of Education for the Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School District ("board"), respondent-appellant, under six successive one-year limited contracts for the school years 1981-1982 through 1986-1987.

On January 26, 1986, the board and the union entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided in part that:

"24.02 * * * Teachers are eligible for tenure who meet the following requirements:

"24.021 Taught for at least three years within the last five years in the school district.

"24.022 Filed a professional or higher certificate in the Personnel Office prior to April 25 of the current school year.

"24.023 Received a recommendation for a continuing contract from their principal.

"24.024 Eligibility for tenure does not automatically confer tenure, but tenure shall be conferred pursuant to the provisions of Revised Code 3319.11. [1988 SERB 4-127] Specifically, upon the recommendation of the Superintendent that a teacher eligible for continuing service status ('tenure') be re-employed, a continuing contract ('tenure') shall be entered into between the Board and such teacher, unless the Board by 3/4 vote of its full membership rejects the recommendation of the Superintendent." (Emphasis added.)

The agreement also set up a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.

Under R.C. 3319.11, Rollins was eligible to receive a continuing contract for the 1986-1987 school year. However, her principal did not recommend her for such a contract, as required by the bargaining agreement. Rollins was issued another unconditional one-year limited contract for the 1986-1987 school year.

Rollins' principal recommended that Rollins not be given a contract for the 1987-1988 school year, and the board did not renew Rollins' contract. On April 24, 1987, Rollins received notice of the non-renewal.

Rollins asked the president of the union to file a grievance. The president told her that, under her circumstances, a grievance could not be filed and that the desired relief would have to be obtained through a court.

Rollins did not file a grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Instead, she filed for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals allowed the writ, ordering the board to issue a continuing contract to Rollins, effective from the start of the 1986-1987 school year.

The cause is before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, George W. Palda and Jeremy A. Rosenbaum, Cleveland, for appellee.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, David J. Millstone and David T. Musselman, Cleveland, for appellant.

HERBERT R. BROWN, Justice.

In order to grant a writ of mandamus, a court must find that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law. State, ex rel. Westchester Estates, Inc., v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus. The pivotal issue in this case is whether Rollins had a clear legal right to a continuing contract (i.e., tenure) as of the 1986-1987 school year. ¹ We find that she did not.

I

Under the collective bargaining agreement, eligibility for tenure is conditioned upon a recommendation of tenure by the teacher's principal. Rollins did not receive such a recommendation for the 1986-1987 school year.

Under R.C. 3319.11, the recommendation of a principal is not a prerequisite to tenure eligibility. R.C. 3319.11 provides in relevant part that "[t]eachers eligible for continuing service status in any school district shall be those teachers qualified as to certification, who within the last five years have taught for at least three years in the district * * *." It is undisputed that Rollins met the statutory requirements for tenure eligibility.

Thus we must decide whether the eligibility requirements to secure continuing service status (established by R.C. 3319.11) can be increased by a collective bargaining agreement.

The bargaining agreement was entered into in January 1986, after the effective date of R.C. Chapter 4117, Ohio's collective bargaining Act. R.C. Chapter 4117 reshapes the law governing the relationship between public employers and employees. Local 4501 v. Ohio State Univ. (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 191, 195, 24 OBR 420, 423, 494 N.E.2d 1082, 1086.

Under R.C. 4117.10(A), on matters of wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment, a collective bargaining agreement entered into pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 prevails over a conflicting law unless such law falls within one of the exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A). ² Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 137, 143, 519 N.E.2d 347, 352-353. ³

[1988 SERB 4-128] Provisions defining eligibility for tenure are clearly "terms and conditions" of employment within the meaning of R.C. 4117.10(A). Therefore, provisions in a collective bargaining agreement pertaining to eligibility for tenure will prevail over R.C. 3319.11, unless R.C. 3319.11 comes within one of the exceptions listed in R.C. 4117.10(A).

One of the listed exceptions is that a collective bargaining agreement will not prevail over laws pertaining to "minimum educational requirements contained in the Revised Code pertaining to public education." R.C. 4117.10(A). Rollins contends that R.C. 3319.11 fits within this exception.

The phrase "minimum educational requirements" is not defined in R.C. Chapter 4117. Nor is it used or defined in the education sections of the Revised Code.

The Revised Code does refer to "educational requirements" and "the minimum standards of the state board of education and requirements set forth in the Revised Code" in several sections of R.C. Title 33. See R.C. 3301.07(D) (" * * * regular procedures shall be followed for promotion from grade to grade of pupils who have met the educational requirements prescribed."); R.C. 3313.487(A) (" * * * the superintendent of public instruction shall analyze the district's financial condition and ascertain what elements of the district's educational program exceed or fail to meet the minimum standards of the state board of education and requirements set forth in the Revised Code * * * "); R.C. 3313.488(A) (" * * * the district will not incur any expenses that will further impair its ability to operate an instructional program that meets or exceeds the minimum standards of the state board of education and requirements of the Revised Code * * * ").

Considering the words "minimum educational requirement" in the ordinary sense of their meaning and in the context of the code provisions relating to education, we believe those words do not include the teacher tenure provisions of R.C. 3319.11. Teacher tenure does have an educational benefit, ⁴ but it is not a minimum requirement. Rather, the words "minimum educational requirement" seem to indicate an intent by the General Assembly to designate laws which directly affect the quality or quantity of instruction received by students ⁵ and which mandate essential conditions related to such instruction. Examples include: the required curriculum (R.C. 3313.60[A] ), the requirements for promotion from one grade to another (R.C. 3313.60), and the minimum number of days in a school year (R.C. 3313.48). ⁶

R.C. 4117.10(A) has been consistently interpreted by the lower courts and the Attorney General to allow a collective bargaining agreement to prevail over a conflicting provision in R.C. Chapter 3319. See, e.g., Alexander Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Alexander Local Edn. Assn. (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 13, 534 N.E.2d 107 (agreement prevails over R.C. 3319.01); Lilley v. Cuyahoga Falls City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (June 4, 1986), Summit App. No. 12489, unreported (agreement prevails over R.C. 3319.17); Stone v. Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (Oct. 14, 1986), Richland App. No. CA-2396, unreported (agreement prevails over R.C. 3319.17); 1987 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 87-041 (agreement would prevail over R.C. 3313.64 and 3317.08). At least one lower court has specifically held that R.C. 3319.11 is not a law pertaining to minimum educational requirements. State, ex rel. Williams, v. Belpre City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 1, 534 N.E.2d 96.

Further, the primary purpose of R.C. 3319.11 is to protect the teacher. In State, ex rel. Bishop, v. Mt. Orab Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1942),139 Ohio St. 427, 438, 22 O.O. 494 498-499, 40 N.E.2d 913, 919, this court noted that:

" * * * [L]egislation in the form of teachers tenure acts has been enacted by a number of states for the protection of those established and qualified in the teaching profession and to prevent their arbitrary dismissal. Such legislation bears a resemblance to the older civil service laws * * *."

The court adopted the following language in describing the purpose of the Ohio Teacher Tenure Act:

" 'The very laudable purpose of this act was to insure to the teachers some measure of security in their important work and to free them, at least to a measurable extent...