State ex rel. Ry. Co. v. Hall

• Decision Date: 25 November 1935
• Docket Number: No. 33437.,33437.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI at the Relation of THE NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY, a Corporation, Relator, v. ROBERT W. HALL and FRANK LANDWEHR, Judges of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.

88 S.W.2d 342

STATE OF MISSOURI at the Relation of THE NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY, a Corporation, Relator, v. ROBERT W. HALL and FRANK LANDWEHR, Judges of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.

No. 33437.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Court en Banc, November 25, 1935.

Prohibition.

PRELIMINARY RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

Barker, Durham & Drury and David J. Tompkins for Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company.

(1) The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis is without jurisdiction to proceed with a suit, brought by a citizen and resident of the State of Tennessee, to recover damages sustained in the State of Tennessee, against relator, an interstate carrier of the State of Tennessee, which does not do any business in the State of Missouri other than solicit freight and passengers for carriage in states outside of Missouri, and it never having been admitted to do business in the State of Missouri, nor having ever consented to be sued in Missouri. Such jurisdiction would be unconstitutional and deprive relator of constitutional privileges and immunities and operate to deny it due process of law and deprive it of property unlawfully and without due process of law. Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207, 73 L. Ed. 470; Griffin v. Railroad Co., 38 Fed. (2d) 98; Davis v. Farmers Cooperative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 67 L. Ed. 996; Railroad Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 68 L. Ed. 928; State ex rel. v. Rutledge, 56 S.W. (2d) 28; Green v. Railroad Co., 205 U.S. 530, 51 L. Ed. 916; Cancelmo v. Railroad Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 166; Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 76 L. Ed. 295; Rosenburg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 67 L. Ed. 372; Art. V, Amend. to Const. of U.S.; Sec. 1, Art. XIV, Amend. to Const. of U.S. (2) To compel relator to submit to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of St. Louis and to have this suit prosecuted in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, hundreds of miles away from the place of the alleged injury and from the place of residence of defendant, would constitute an unreasonable burden and obstruction upon interstate commerce and upon relator's business as an interstate carrier, and is prohibited by Section 8, Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, known as the Commerce Clause. Art. 1, Sec. 8, Const. of U.S.A.; Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207, 73 L. Ed. 470; Davis v. Farmers Cooperative Co., 262 U.S. 312, 67 L. Ed. 996; Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 76 L. Ed. 295. (3) Where want of or excess of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record it is not a necessary prerequisite to the jurisdiction of this court that the objection be presented to the trial court. State ex rel. v. Huck, 246 S.W. 303; State ex rel. v. Dearing, 184 Mo. 647; State ex rel. v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514; State ex rel. v. Aloe, 152 Mo. 484; State ex rel. v. Eby, 170 Mo. 518; State ex rel. v. Sale, 188 Mo. 496; State ex rel. v. Williams, 221 Mo. 227; State ex rel. v. Oliver, 163 Mo. 679; State ex rel. v. Hirzel, 137 Mo. 435. (4) The amended motion to quash fairly directed respondents' attention to their lack of jurisdiction without regard to the wording of the caption and the motion was sufficient to satisfy any requirement that the abuse of process be called to their attention. The legal character of a pleading or paper filed in a case should be determined from its substance and effect, and not from its name. The first paragraph of the motion expressly recited that the relator "appearing specially and only for the purpose of this motion and protesting the jurisdiction of this Court over this defendant and over the alleged cause of action ..." and presented the jurisdictional defects. McCafferty v. Clay, 18 S.W. (2d) 569; Poplin v. Brown, 205 S.W. 411; Calman v. Cox, 296 S.W. 845; State ex rel. v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 423; Shohoney v. Railroad Co., 231 Mo. 131; Coal Co. v. Fidelity Fuel Co., 317 Mo. 610, 296 S.W. 154; Mayes v. Garment Workers, 6 S.W. (2d) 333. (5) The attention of the trial court was directed to its lack of jurisdiction by motion to quash in the following cases. State ex rel. v. Rutledge, 56 S.W. (2d) 28; Griffin v. Railroad Co., 38 Fed. (2d) 98; Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 73 L. Ed. 470.

LEEDY, J.

Prohibition to restrain respondent judges from entertaining further jurisdiction in an action brought in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis by one John W. Cannon, a resident of Tennessee, as plaintiff, and against relator as defendant, wherein plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained while a passenger on one of relator's trains in the State of Tennessee. Relator here, by motion to quash the sheriff's return (appearing specially and for the limited purpose thereof), challenged the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis over its person, and upon that motion being overruled, applied to this court for a writ of prohibition. Our preliminary rule issued, to which respondents made return, admitting, either expressly or by failure to deny, all the facts pleaded in relator's petition. The return also sets up a memorandum made and filed in said cause by one of the respondents, Judge Hall, setting forth his reasons for overruling the pleading challenging respondents' jurisdiction. Upon the filing of such return, relator filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The facts are not in dispute, and the issue is one of law. We have not been favored with a brief on behalf of respondents.

Under the pleadings, it stands admitted that relator is a Tennessee railroad corporation, and that its tracks and lines of railway are located in the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama and Georgia, and its railway system is operated wholly within those states, in which it engages in the transportation of freight and passengers in interstate commerce. No part of its railway runs into, through or traverses any part of the State of Missouri; it does not operate any engines, tracks or cars in the State of Missouri; it has never been admitted to do business in Missouri, nor has it consented to be sued therein, nor has it ever done any business in the State of Missouri, other than soliciting freight and passenger traffic for transportation in interstate commerce over its lines in other states, and for that limited purpose maintains an office in St. Louis. At the time in controversy, one J.V. McCarty, an agent of relator, was in charge of said office.

Summons was issued in said cause, to which the sheriff of the city of St. Louis made return (omitting signatures) as follows:

"Served this writ in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, on the within named defendant, the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway (a corporation), this 18 day of Mar., 1933, by delivering a copy of the writ and petition as furnished by the Clerk to J.V. McCarty, Genl. Agt. of the said defendant corporation, he being in said defendant's usual business office and in charge thereof. The president or other chief officer of said defendant could not be found in the City of St. Louis at the time of service."

Section 728, Revised Statutes 1929 (Sec. 728, Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 947), specifying the manner and conditions under which personal service of summons may be obtained upon a foreign corporation, provides: "Where the defendant is a corporation ... organized under the laws of any other state ... and having an office and doing business in...