State ex rel. School Dist. 37 of Clark County v. Clark County

Decision Date17 April 1934
Docket Number24977.
Citation31 P.2d 897,177 Wash. 314
PartiesSTATE ex rel. SCHOOL DIST. 37 OF CLARK COUNTY v. CLARK COUNTY et al.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Clark County; Geo. B. Simpson, Judge.

Action by the State of Washington, on the relation of School District 37 of Clark County, Washington, against Clark County and others, in which Wilma Smith intervened. From the judgment, defendants and intervener appeal, and relator cross-appeals.

Reversed as to relator, and cause remanded with directions.

Dale McMullen, Claude C. Snider, Dan E. Hardin, and Albert M. Nanney, all of Vancouver, for appellants.

A. C McMicken, Ramsey, Rupp & Schweppe, of Seattle, Patterson &amp Davis, of Okanogan, and L. M. Burnett and Jos. E. Hall, both of Vancouver, for respondent.

MILLARD, Justice.

The 40-mill tax limit statute (chapter 4, p. 47, Laws of 1933 Initiative Measure No. 64, Rem. Rev. Stat. § 11238-1) provides that: '* * * the aggregate of all tax levies upon real and personal property by the state, county, school district and city or town, shall not in any year exceed forty mills on the dollar of assessed valuation, which assessed valuation shall be fifty per cent of the true and fair value of any such property in money, and the levy by the state shall not exceed five mills, the levy by any county shall not exceed ten mills, including the levy for the county school fund, the levy by or for any school district shall not exceed ten mills, and the levy by any city or town shall not exceed fifteen mills. * * *' (Italics are ours.)

Under the School Code, enacted in 1909, the levy for school purposes was $10 for each school child whether or not that child attended the public schools. The pertinent provision reads as follows: 'The county commissioners of the several counties of the State of Washington shall annually, at the time of making the tax levy for county purposes, levy a tax on all the property subject to taxation in their county, sufficient to produce the sum of ten dollars for each child of school age therein, as is shown by the certificate of the county superintendent hereinafter mentioned: Provided, That such tax on said property shall in no case exceed five mills on each dollar, at the assessed valuation; such tax to be used for the support and maintenance of the public schools in such county.' Section 5, title III, [Sub.] chapter 9, c. 97, Laws of 1909. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 4936.

The foregoing section was amended by section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933, to provide for a levy sufficient to produce 5 cents per day for each pupil in attendance in the common schools of the county. Those not attending school may not be counted for the purpose of obtaining school funds, as was the case under the 1909 statute. The amended section reads as follows: 'The county commissioners of the several counties of the State of Washington shall annually at the time of making the tax levy for county purposes, levy a tax on all property subject to taxation in their county, sufficient to produce five cents per day for each pupil in attendance in the common schools of the county during the preceding school year. No district shall be reckoned as having less than two thousand five hundred days' attendance either for revenue or apportionment purposes.'

On October 2, 1933, the commissioners of Clark county met in regular session, as required by the statute (Rem. Rev. Stat. §§ 3997-3, 3997-4), for the purpose of fixing the final budget of the county for the year 1934 and making levies therefor. The estimated requirements for 1934, as disclosed by the preliminary budget submitted by the county auditor, amounted to $307,107.30. The unexpended surplus from the preceding budget was $13,584.82. The estimated miscellaneous receipts for 1934 amounted to $52,900. After crediting the total ($66,484.82) of these two items, there remained in the budget $240,622.48 to be raised by a tax levy. The amount to be raised for the county school fund, under the provisions of section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933, was $71,245.64. That is, the total amount to be raised for county and school purposes was $311,868.12. The assessed valuation of taxable property in the county is $20,809,467. The maximum amount which could be obtained by taxation for county and county school purposes under the provisions of initiative measure No. 64 (chapter 4, p. 47, Laws of 1933), 'the levy by any county shall not exceed ten mills, including the levy for the county school fund,' was $208,094.67, or $103,773.45 less than the aggregate ($311,868.12) requirements of the county and the county school fund. The county commissioners adopted a final budget in the total amount of $208,094.67, the maximum permissible under the 40-mill tax limit statute. Tax levies were certified to the county assessor by the commissioners for the respective sums of $158,610.18 for the county current expense fund and $49,484.49 ($21,761.15 less than the amount due the school fund under section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933) for the county school fund.

School District No. 37 of Clark County appeared Before the board of county commissioners, for the first time, seventeen days after the certification of the above-mentioned tax levies and protested the action of the board. The school district claimed that, under section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933, the commissioners had no alternative but to certify to the county assessor, for the purpose of levy, the full sum of $71,245.64 for school purposes; or that, if not required to levy the full amount due the county school fund, the commissioners should ratably reduce the county current expense fund and the county school fund, the total of the two funds not to exceed the amount that can be raised by a 10-mill levy. The county commissioners refused to accede to the demand of the school district, whereupon the school district commenced this action for a writ of mandate requiring the county commissioners to levy the full amount ($71,245.65) due the school fund under section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933, and to restrain the county assessor from extending the tax rolls of the county until the board of county commissioners had made certification of the correct amount of the tax.

Wilma Smith, an indigent widow and the mother of two minor children who were dependent upon her for support, intervened in the action. Alleging that she was dependent solely on a mother's pension paid to her by the county and that the reduction of the amount of the county current expense fund (the largest single item of which was one for the payment of mothers' pensions) would cause her and others similarly situated to suffer to an unascertainable extent, the intervener prayed that the county commissioners and county assessor be required to adopt and use for tax purposes the property valuation ($25,377,400), as fixed and determined by the state board of equalization, for the purpose of raising state taxes.

The cause was tried to the court, which was of the view that the prayer of the intervener should be denied; that it was equally mandatory upon the county commissioners to levy taxes for the county current expense fund and for the county school fund; that, as the amounts required for the two funds exceeded the amount which the commissioners could legally levy, the funds should be ratably reduced; that the county current expense fund should be reduced from $158,610.18 to $143,594.78, a reduction of $15,015.40; and that the county school fund should be increased from $49,484.49 to $64,499.89, or $6,745.75 less than the amount due the school fund under section 12, c. 28, p. 171, Laws of 1933. Judgment was entered accordingly. None of the parties to the action was satisfied with the outcome of the trial. The respondent commissioners and assessor and the intervener appealed and the relator school district cross-appealed from the judgment.

The contention of appellant intervener that the property valuation upon which the taxes for county purposes should be levied is the valuation as fixed and determined by the state board of equalization and not the valuation found by the county assessor and the board of equalization of the county is answered by State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. Redd, 166 Wash. 132, 6 P.2d 619, and State ex rel. Tacoma School District No. 10 v. Kelly (Wash.) 30 P.2d 638, 639. In the first case cited we held that only the local authorities have the power to list and value property within the county for local taxation purposes. In the second case cited we said, with reference to State ex rel. Showalter v. Cook (Wash.) 27 P.2d 1075, cited by appellant intervenor:

'It was there held that the state board of equalization, in equalizing assessments and levying taxes for state purposes, is not bound by the valuations as fixed by county assessors. In other words, for state purposes the state board of equalization has the power to fix the assessed valuation of taxable property in the various counties at 50 per cent. of the true and fair value of such property. It does not follow, however, that this valuation may be used as a basis for levy of taxes for local
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