State, ex rel. Smith v. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-1611,81-1611
• Citation: 436 N.E.2d 1005,70 Ohio St.2d 213,24 O.O.3d 320
• Parties: , 24 O.O.3d 320 The STATE, ex rel. SMITH, Exr., Appellant, v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PROBATE DIVISION, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 213

70 Ohio St.2d 213

436 N.E.2d 1005, 24 O.O.3d 320

The STATE, ex rel. SMITH, Exr., Appellant, v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, PROBATE DIVISION, et al., Appellees.

No. 81-1611.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 23, 1982.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction on the issue raised, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has a remedy at law in appeal from an adverse holding of the court that it has such jurisdiction, and may not maintain a proceeding in prohibition to prevent the prosecution of such action. (State, ex rel. Miller v. Court, 151 Ohio St. 397, 86 N.E.2d 464, paragraph three of the syllabus, approved and followed.)

2. Due to the enactment of R.C. 2107.72, amendments may be made to plaintiff's complaint to join necessary parties in a will contest action. These amendments would, under Civ.R. 15(C), relate back to the date of the original filing.

Lloyd F. Smith's last will and testament was admitted to probate on May 5, 1980, in the Probate Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Huron County, Ohio. On September 2, 1980, an action to contest the will of the deceased was filed, naming relator-appellant, Lyle W. Smith, in his capacity as executor of the estate, as one of the defendants.

On March 9, 1981, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the basis that the United Methodist Church, a beneficiary under the will, and the Attorney General of Ohio ¹ were not made party defendants within the four-month period of limitations provided by R.C. 2107.76. ² On May 11, 1981, respondent-appellee Judge Thomas E. Heydinger denied appellant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff Lloyd W. Smith leave to amend his complaint in order to join these parties.

On May 26, 1981, appellant filed the present action in prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Huron County, requesting that a writ issue to prevent appellees from proceeding in the will contest action. Appellees' motion to dismiss was granted by that court, and the cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Warren W. Ruggles, Miller & Fegen Co., L. P. A., and Richard Grimes, Norwalk, for appellant.

Richard B. Hauser, Pros. Atty., and Richard S. Lynch, Norwalk, for appellees.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice.

The issue presented in this cause is whether a writ of prohibition should issue which would prevent the respondent-appellee lower court from proceeding with the will contest action now before it.

The question of whether a writ of prohibition can be used to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior court has often been addressed by this court. The rule which emerges from the myriad of cases is that "(a) court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction on the issue raised, and a party challenging its jurisdiction has a remedy at law in appeal from an adverse holding of the court that it has such jurisdiction, and may not maintain a proceeding in prohibition to prevent the prosecution of such action." State, ex rel. Miller, v. Court (1949), 151 Ohio St. 397, 86 N.E.2d 464, paragraph three of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Gilla, v. Fellerhoff (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 338 N.E.2d 522; State, ex rel. Gonzales v. Patton (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 386, 388, 329 N.E.2d 104; State, ex rel. Bd. of Co. Commrs., v. Court (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 354, 356, 376 N.E.2d 1343; DuBose v. Court (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 169, 171, 413 N.E.2d 1205; State, ex rel. Henry, v. Britt (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 71, 73-74, 424 N.E.2d 297.

Thus, as a general rule, a writ of prohibition will be awarded only where there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. See, generally, State, ex rel. Dickison, v. Court (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 179, 180, 277 N.E.2d 210; State, ex rel. Dormody, v. McClure (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 335, 336, 364 N.E.2d 278; State, ex rel. Henry, v. Britt, supra. See, also, State, ex rel. Wall, v. Grossman (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 4, 398 N.E.2d 789. Only where there is a "total and complete want of jurisdiction" on the part of the inferior court, will such a writ be allowed despite the presence of a remedy by way of appeal. State, ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 329, 285 N.E.2d 22. Conversely, if there is no "patent and unambiguous restriction" (see State, ex rel. Safeco Inc. Co., v. Kornowski (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 20) on the jurisdiction of the court which clearly places the dispute outside its jurisdiction, prohibition will not lie. State, ex rel. Gilla, v. Fellerhoff, supra, 44 Ohio St.2d at 88, 338 N.E.2d 522.

Appellant argues that plaintiff's failure to join all necessary parties within the four-month time frame prescribed by R.C. 2107.76 precluded the vesting of subject matter jurisdiction with the Probate Court.

There is no doubt, of course, that such a jurisdictional question could be raised by appellant on direct appeal. The question becomes therefore whether the assumption of jurisdiction by the Probate Court in this instance amounts to the "unauthorized usurpation of judicial power" contemplated by the Gusweiler line of cases. ³ For the following reasons we hold it does not.

First, we note that R.C. 2107.73 and 2107.76 do not "patently and unambiguously" restrict the Court of Common Pleas from hearing the will contest action at issue in the present case. R.C. 2107.73 only defines necessary parties; it does not speak to the time for the joinder of such parties. R.C. 2107.76 merely places the limitation of four months on the commencement of an action; it does not speak to the amendment or relation back of subsequent proceedings. Thus, neither section is sufficient to divest the court of its general subject matter jurisdiction over a will case even though a question may remain as to whether necessary parties have been timely named. Indeed, neither specifically prohibit the addition of necessary parties through the amendment of pleadings after the statute of limitations has expired.

On the contrary, due to the enactment of R.C. 2107.72, ⁴ amendments may be made to plaintiff's complaint to join necessary parties. These amendments would, under Civ.R. 15(C), relate back to the date of the original filing. ⁵

Moreover, R.C. 2101.24(P) vests general subject matter jurisdiction over will contest cases in the Probate Court. ⁶ Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the respondent-appellee's ruling on the jurisdictional question was erroneous, such court had, at the very least, "basic statutory jurisdiction to proceed in the case." Gusweiler, supra, 30 Ohio St.2d at page 329, 285 N.E.2d 22.

For the foregoing reasons, this court finds neither a "total want of jurisdiction," a "patent and unambiguous restriction," or an "unauthorized usurpation of judicial power" to warrant dispensing with the appellant's adequate remedy of appeal. Accordingly, the writ of prohibition does not lie, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CELEBREZZE, C. J., and WILLIAM B. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES and KRUPANSKY, JJ., concur.

1 It is appellant's contention that both are necessary parties to the will contest action pursuant to R.C. 2107.73 which states in pertinent...