State ex rel. Ware v. Kurt
| Docket Number | 2021-0823 |
| Decision Date | 18 May 2022 |
| Citation | 169 Ohio St.3d 223,203 N.E.3d 665 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. WARE, Appellant, v. KURT, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Kimani Ware, pro se.
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and John Galonski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kimani Ware, an inmate at the Trumbull Correctional Institution, filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth District Court of Appeals against appellee, Summit County Clerk of Courts Sandra Kurt. Ware seeks to compel Kurt to produce certain records under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The Ninth District granted summary judgment in Kurt's favor, holding that the proper vehicle by which to obtain all but one of the documents Ware requested is the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio. As to the one requested document that the court of appeals found subject to the Public Records Act, the court rejected Ware's request because he did not comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8), which requires the sentencing court to approve certain public-records requests made by inmates.
{¶ 2} Ware has appealed. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment in part and reverse in part and remand the cause for further consideration.
{¶ 3} In a December 2019 complaint for a writ of mandamus, Ware alleged that he sent a total of ten public-records requests in January 2019 by certified mail to the Summit County clerk of courts’ office seeking the production of 37 different documents. He requested documents related to clerk's office employees, policies, and budget information, as well as grand-jury reports, certain oaths of office, the dockets of a specific judge for a specified period, and the transcript of a 9-1-1 call in his own criminal case. Ware alleged that Kurt did not respond to his requests, and he sought statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C) for the alleged failure to produce the requested records.
{¶ 4} Kurt filed an answer and a motion for summary judgment. In her motion for summary judgment, Kurt argued that the complaint should be dismissed as moot because she either had provided Ware with the requested documents or explained why she was unable to do so. Ware filed a reply to Kurt's motion and his own motion for summary judgment. He admitted receiving some of the documents that he had requested but maintained that Kurt failed to provide everything that he had requested. Ware also argued that he was entitled to statutory damages because Kurt had acted in bad faith, ignoring his January 2019 public-records requests and failing to promptly provide all the documents responsive to those requests.
{¶ 5} After reviewing the list of requested documents, the court of appeals found that Ware had requested only one record—the transcript of a 9-1-1 call in his own criminal case—that was subject to the Public Records Act. As to this record, the court held that Ware was not entitled to relief in mandamus for two reasons: (1) Kurt did not have possession of the transcript of the 9-1-1 call from Ware's criminal case and had informed Ware of that fact and (2) even if Kurt did have the transcript, Ware failed to obtain authorization from his sentencing judge to request that record, as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(8).
{¶ 6} As to the remaining records requests, the court of appeals found that Ware had requested various policies, schedules, manuals, and employee information from the clerk of courts that fell " ‘squarely within the definition of administrative records under Sup.R. 44(G)(1).’ " 2021-Ohio-2025, 173 N.E.3d 1268, ¶ 13, quoting State ex rel. Perry v. Cleveland Hts. Mun. Clerk of Courts , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109916, 2020-Ohio-5193, 2020 WL 6504592, ¶ 7. The court also found that the "other records" Ware had requested were "court records" under Sup.R. 44(B). Id. at ¶ 13. Concluding that Ware should have sought these records under Sup.R. 44 through 47, rather than under the Public Records Act, and that Ware had failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) regarding his request for the transcript of the 9-1-1 call, the court granted summary judgment in Kurt's favor. The court of appeals also denied Ware's request for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2).
{¶ 7} Ware appealed to this court as of right.
{¶ 8} Ware advances three propositions of law in support of reversing the Ninth District's decision granting summary judgment. We review decisions of the court of appeals granting summary judgment de novo. Smith v. McBride , 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 12. "Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of all relevant materials filed in the action reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Id. , quoting Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶ 9} Ware argues in his first proposition of law that the court of appeals erred when it found that Sup.R. 44 through 47, rather than R.C. 149.43(B)(1), apply to his public-records requests. In his second proposition of law, Ware contends that the court of appeals misinterpreted State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn. Certified Grievance Commt. , 159 Ohio St.3d 211, 2019-Ohio-5157, 150 N.E.3d 43, in finding that the requested documents fell under the Rules of Superintendence. Ware's first two propositions of law are well taken in part. Although some of the requested records do fall under the Rules of Superintendence, the Public Records Act governs most of Ware's document requests.
{¶ 10} The threshold issue in public-records cases is whether the Public Records Act or the Rules of Superintendence govern the request. Parisi at ¶ 19. We must conduct this inquiry "even if the issue of the appropriate vehicle is not raised by the parties or by the lower courts." Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶ 11} The Public Records Act requires a public office to make copies of public records available to any person on request, within a reasonable period. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). But when a requester seeks public records from a court, the Rules of Superintendence generally apply. Parisi at ¶ 21-27 (); State ex rel. Parker Bey v. Byrd , 160 Ohio St.3d 141, 2020-Ohio-2766, 154 N.E.3d 57, ¶ 11-15 ().
{¶ 12} Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with the Public Records Act. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees , 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6. Mandamus is also the correct method by which to compel responses under the Rules of Superintendence. Sup.R. 47(B). Accordingly, the vehicle through which a requesting party seeks to obtain public records in mandamus is significant. If the requester seeks public records through the incorrect vehicle, then he or she is not entitled to receive the records through a mandamus action. Parisi , 159 Ohio St.3d 211, 2019-Ohio-5157, 150 N.E.3d 43, at ¶ 21.
{¶ 13} Ware requested 37 documents from Kurt, and he contends that all the requested documents are public records under R.C. 149.43. The court of appeals held that Ware's requests—except for the transcript of the 9-1-1 call in his criminal case—did not fall under the Public Records Act, because Ware sought access to "court records" that fell under the Rules of Superintendence.1 This was error.
{¶ 14} The superintendence rules identify two types of "court records": "case documents" and "administrative documents." Sup.R. 44(B). A is a document or information submitted to a court or filed with a clerk of courts in a specific case (e.g., exhibits, pleadings, orders), as well as any document prepared by the court or the clerk of courts in a judicial action or proceeding (e.g., journals, dockets). Sup.R. 44(C)(1). An "administrative document" is "a document and information in a document created, received, or maintained by a court that serves to record the administrative, fiscal, personnel, or management functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, organization, or other activities of the court ," subject to exclusions not relevant here. (Emphasis added.) Sup.R. 44(G)(1).
{¶ 15} In this case, the court of appeals found that the policies, schedules, manuals, and employee information that Ware had requested from the clerk of courts fell " ‘squarely within the definition of administrative records in Sup.R. 44(G)(1).’ " 2021-Ohio-2025, 173 N.E.3d 1268, at ¶ 13, quoting Perry , 2020-Ohio-5193, at ¶ 7. But the administrative documents that Ware sought were not records "of [a] court" as contemplated by Sup.R. 44(G)(1). Although a clerk of courts does have possession of some "court records" that are governed by the superintendence rules, not every document held by the clerk of courts falls under those rules. The Summit County clerk of courts is an elected official. R.C. 2303.01. And the office of the clerk of courts " ‘is an office separate and distinct from that of judge of the common pleas court.’ " State v. Leibold , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25124, 2013-Ohio-1371, 2013 WL 1385664, ¶ 45, quoting State ex rel. Smith v. Culliver , 186 Ohio App.3d 534, 2010-Ohio-339, 929 N.E.2d 465, ¶ 43. Therefore, we find that the court of appeals erred in holding that the documents Ware requested pertaining to the operations, procedures, and policies of the clerk of courts’ office were governed by the Rules of Superintendence. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Ware v. Giavasis , 163 Ohio St.3d 359, 2020-Ohio-5453, 170...
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... ... 149.43(B)(8) by the sentencing judge or the sentencing ... judge's successor. State ex rel. Ware v ... Parikh, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-2536, ¶ 16 ... ("In the absence of the necessary finding by the ... sentencing judge, an inmate is not ... judicial records is whether the Public Records Act or the ... Rules of Superintendence govern the request. State ex ... rel. Ware v. Kurt, 169 Ohio St.3d 223, 2022-Ohio-1627, ... ¶ 10; State ex rel. Parisi v. Dayton Bar Assn ... Certified Grievance Commt., 159 Ohio St.3d 211, ... ...