State ex rel. Smith v. Industrial Com'n of Ohio, 85-1631

• Decision Date: 20 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1631,85-1631
• Citation: 498 N.E.2d 447,26 Ohio St.3d 128
• Parties: , 26 O.B.R. 110 The STATE, ex rel. SMITH, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 128

26 Ohio St.3d 128

498 N.E.2d 447, 26 O.B.R. 110

The STATE, ex rel. SMITH, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Appellee.

No. 85-1631.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Aug. 20, 1986.

David J. Boyd, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Janet E. Jackson and Tyrone Yates, Columbus, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The determination of disputed facts is a matter within the final jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. State ex rel. Hudson v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 169, 170, 465 N.E.2d 1289. Consequently, the well-settled standard of review is that the commission's findings will be fully upheld where its determination is supported by some relevant evidence. State ex rel. Kokocinski v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 186, 188, 464 N.E.2d 564.

The commission outlined, in its findings of fact, the evidence which it relied upon to reach its conclusions as required by State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483-484, 453 N.E.2d 721. The basis of the finding that appellant is not permanently and totally disabled was based on the following:

"The medical reports of Drs. Wolf and Reynolds were reviewed and evaluated. The findings and order are based particularly on the medical report of Dr. Reynolds, the evidence in the file, and the evidence adduced at the hearing."

While it is difficult to accept the report of Dr. Reynolds because it was unsigned, the report of Dr. Wolf fully substantiates the findings of the commission. Such report, although not emphasized, was certainly "evidence in the file" which was also "adduced at the hearing."

Accordingly, we must uphold the commission's findings and affirm the decision of the court of appeals denying the writ.

Judgment affirmed.

LOCHER, HOLMES and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately in judgment with opinion.

CELEBREZZE, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

SWEENEY and CLIFFORD F. BROWN, JJ., dissent.

DOUGLAS, Justice, concurring.

For the reasons stated, where herein pertinent, in my concurring opinion in State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool & Machine Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 201-217, 498 N.E.2d 464, I concur in the judgment of the court.

CELEBREZZE, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I applaud the plurality's decision to discount Dr. Reynolds' unsigned report as evidence in support of the Industrial Commission's order. The plurality properly recognizes that an unsigned medical report simply is not reliable evidence upon which the commission can base its determination as to extent of disability. See State ex rel. Brown v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 178, 179, 468 N.E.2d 777.

The commission based its order in the instant case "particularly on the medical report of Dr. Reynolds." Because this report cannot constitute evidence to support the commission's findings, the requested writ should have issued from this court. The plurality, however, is not to be deterred from searching for other evidence with which to evaluate the commission's order. In a truly perplexing development, the plurality seizes on the report of Dr. John Wolf, Jr. as " 'evidence in the file' which was also 'adduced at the hearing' " to substantiate the commission's findings. The plurality's use of Dr. Wolfe's report cannot be squared with our holding in State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 484, 453 N.E.2d 721, where we stated that "this court will no longer search the commission's file for 'some evidence' to support an order of the commission not otherwise specified as a basis for its decision." This flouting of our past decision in Mitchell is symptomatic of the plurality's misapplication of its version of the "some evidence" rule. A more careful examination of this court's standard of review of Industrial Commission determinations of disability in mandamus actions would better serve the commission and those who come before it.

The touchstone of our review, and the fundamental proposition with which every member of this court has agreed, is that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus will not be used to control the commission's discretion, but may be invoked to remedy an abuse of that discretion. It is in our attempt to define "abuse of discretion" as it relates to evidentiary challenges that this court has fallen into the "some evidence" morass. This phrase today has unfortunately come to mean as much or as little as a majority of this court wishes to make of it. It is time to jettison this hollow "some evidence" jargon. Rather, the focus of our attention must be to provide meaningful consideration to allegations of unlawful administrative action. In so doing, we should not merely substitute a new phrase for an old one, for "the precise way in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words," and "new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old." Universal Camera Corp. v. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. (1951), 340 U.S. 474, 489, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465.

In determining extent of disability, the Industrial Commission is the trier of fact, as in a trial at law to the bench. The commission sees the claimant, hears the testimony from both sides and digests the medical, vocational and other evidence offered. As we stated in State ex rel. Coen v. Indus. Comm. (1933), 126 Ohio St. 550, 551-552, 186 N.E. 398, "[t]he Constitution and statutes have confided to the Industrial Commission as a tribunal in the first instance power to pass upon such evidence. * * * In performing such function, the commission should give to all the evidence before it, * * * such weight as it finds that the evidence warrants."

Our review of commission disability determinations is necessarily limited in scope. The commission's hearing officers are specialists whose expertise and first-instance opportunity to appraise evidentiary matters must be respected by this court. Further, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to which the relator must demonstrate, inter alia, a clear legal right. This proposition is beyond contention, and it is equally well-settled that although this court may review the evidence upon which the commission based its order, we may not reweigh that evidence. In State ex rel. Coen, supra, at 553-554, 186 N.E. 398, this basic tenet of extraordinary relief was explained in the context of judicial consideration of commission orders: "Mandamus cannot be granted where the effect of its issue would be to substitute the command of the superior for the judicial discretion of the inferior tribunal." In Coen, we concluded that the courts cannot, in a mandamus action, control the commission's discretion unless an abuse of that discretion "affirmatively appears." Id. at 554, 186 N.E. 398.

Within these parameters, this court must establish workable standards for identifying an abuse of discretion by the commission. Only in this way can we fulfill our responsibility under the Ohio Constitution. In simple and straightforward language, this court has previously defined abuse of discretion as "discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence." State ex rel. Democratic Executive Committee v. Brown (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 157, 161, 314 N.E.2d 376 ; State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 581, 591, 113 N.E.2d 14 ; State ex rel. Wilms v. Blake (1945), 144 Ohio St. 619, 624, 60 N.E.2d 308 . See, also, Sinclair v. Sinclair (1954), 98 Ohio App. 308, 311, 129 N.E.2d 311 . Cf. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248. Conversely, the exercise of honest judgment is not an abuse of discretion. "Error of judgment does not invalidate discretion, exercised in good faith." State ex rel. Shafer, supra, 159 Ohio St. at 593, 113 N.E.2d 14. Thus, it is only those rare instances where an administrative body's ruling cannot be reconciled with the facts or reason which must be remedied by the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus.

Consistent with the foregoing, when this court examines whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion, the commission's disability benefits order must meet certain minimum criteria, both procedurally and substantively.

First, the commission must state specifically the evidence relied upon and explain the reasons for its order. This is nothing more than an insistence on elementary due process, which has been eloquently reaffirmed in a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court:

"It is an axiom of administrative law that an agency's explanation of the basis for its decision must include 'a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." ' [Citations omitted.] Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold regulations [or orders] whenever it is possible to 'conceive a basis' for administrative action. * * * Our recognition of Congress' [in the instant case, the General Assembly's] need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the agency's judgment in both." Bowen v. American Hospital Assn. (1986), 476 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 2112-2113, 90 L.Ed.2d 584, 597-598.

Additionally, this court, in State ex rel. Mitchell, supra, 6 Ohio St.3d at 484, 453 N.E.2d 721, explained that such specificity was necessary both to enable the parties to prepare an action in mandamus contesting the commission's disability order and to enable courts properly to review the basis of that order. In no other way can the parties' understanding of the ruling be ensured and the right to meaningful review be preserved.

Secondly, there must be a reasonable basis for the commission's...