State ex rel. St. Charles Sav. Bank v. Hall

• Citation: 12 S.W.2d 91,321 Mo. 624
• Decision Date: 18 December 1928
• Docket Number: 28296
• Parties: The State ex rel. St. Charles Savings Bank v. Robert W. Hall, Judge of Circuit Court of City of St. Louis
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

12 S.W.2d 91

321 Mo. 624

The State ex rel. St. Charles Savings Bank v. Robert W. Hall, Judge of Circuit Court of City of St. Louis

No. 28296

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 18, 1928

Provisional rule made absolute.

Theodore C. Bruere, William Waye, Hensley, Allen & Marsalek and Abbott, Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards for relator.

(1) The effect of the order granting the appeal in Bank v Administratrices was to transfer the jurisdiction of the whole case from the circuit court to this court, and thereafter respondent, as judge of said circuit court, was without jurisdiction to take any judicial action in respect to said petition for injunction which had been theretofore filed as a proceeding in said cause. State ex rel. Patton v. Gates, 143 Mo. 63; Reed v. Bright, 232 Mo 399; Finley v. United Rys. Co., 238 Mo. 6; In re Grading Bledsoe Hill, Buchanan Co., v. Bledsoe, 222 Mo 604; State ex rel. Railroad v. Hirzel, 137 Mo. 435; Burgess v. O'Donoghoe, 90 Mo. 299; State ex rel. v. Goldstein, 209 Mo.App. 102. (2) If it be claimed that said application for an injunction -- though filed in the main case of Bank v. Administratrices, now pending on appeal in this court -- should be regarded, in effect, as an independent proceeding, then, by statute, the respondent judge is expressly deprived of jurisdiction to issue such injunction restraining proceedings in the cause pending in another county. Sec. 1951, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. Terry v. Allen, 308 Mo. 230; Terry v. Hague, 251 S.W. 77. (3) Though a circuit court is one of general equity powers, it has no jurisdiction or authority to issue or enforce a writ of injunction except in cases falling under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, and prohibition will lie to keep such court within the bounds of its lawful jurisdiction and authority in this respect, or to prevent such court from making or enforcing such writ when to do so would constitute an abuse of judicial power. State ex rel. Kenamore v. Wood, 155 Mo. 425; State ex rel. Caron v. Dearing, 291 Mo. 169. (4) At no time did respondent judge have any jurisdiction or authority to entertain such petition for injunction. The injunction proceeding was not germane or ancillary to the main relief sought by the cross-bill in Bank v. Administratrices, which sought merely the cancellation of a particular instrument alleged to contain an assignment of an insurance policy, and such petition for injunction could confer upon respondent no jurisdiction to restrain the prosecution of a cause pending in another county involving a wholly different cause of action, to-wit, an action by relator against the insurance company to recover a money judgment, in which action relator's right to the proceeds of the policy sued on was not dependent upon the validity of said instrument sought to be canceled by said cross-bill. Fulton v. Fisher, 239 Mo. 116. (5) So long as anything remains to be done to carry into effect the order or judgment of the lower court made in excess of its jurisdiction, prohibition will lie; and the writ may take on such form as to annul prior as well as to stay further proceedings of the lower court. State ex rel. Rogers v. Rombauer, 105 Mo. 103; State ex rel. Ellis v. Elkin, 130 Mo. 90. (6) Under the circumstances disclosed by the petition for this writ, relator's remedy by appeal is wholly inadequate to meet the demands of justice.

Alexander R. Russell for respondent.

(1) When a court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of a controversy its jurisdiction cannot be defeated by proceedings in another court of concurrent jurisdiction and may be protected by injunction. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 209 Mo. 161; State ex rel. v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435; In re Morgan, 117 Mo. 243; Seibel v. Simeon, 62 Mo. 255; Davison v. Hough, 165 Mo. 561; Capitain v. Trust Co., 240 Mo. 484; State ex rel. v. Lucas, 295 Mo. 538. (2) Regardless of the number or variety of issues or of parties, there can be but one final judgment in a case which must dispose of the entire controversy and exhaust the jurisdiction of the trial court. Russell v. Railway Co., 154 Mo. 428; Cramer v. Barmon, 193 Mo. 327; Boothe v. Loy, 83 Mo.App. 601; Seay v. Sanders, 88 Mo.App. 478; Mann v. Doerr, 222 Mo. 1; Stone v. Perkins, 217 Mo. 586; State ex rel. v. Klein, 140 Mo. 502. (3) Except as to the specific interlocutory orders from which the statute allows an appeal, there can be no appeal taken except from a final judgment which determines all of the rights of all of the parties to the litigation and leaves nothing requiring further judicial action by the trial court. Russell v. Railway Co., 150 Mo. 428; Stone v. Perkins, 217 Mo. 586; Dixon v. Transit Co., 197 Mo.App. 646.

OPINION

Blair, J.

This case comes to the writer upon reassignment. It is an original proceeding in prohibition to prevent the enforcement against relator of an injunction issued out of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. Our provisional rule issued. Service thereof was waived and thereafter respondent filed his return. To such return relator has filed its demurrer. Thus the facts appear from the pleadings.

Respondent is judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis and was presiding in Division No. 14 thereof when said injunction was granted. Relator is and was a banking corporation organized under the laws of Missouri and engaged in the banking business at St. Charles, Missouri. In December, 1906, relator filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis against J. W. Thompson upon a note for $ 20,000. Thompson filed an amended answer and cross-bill in October, 1908, alleging in substance that the note sued on and a certain insurance policy were put up as collateral security to certain notes and indebtedness which had been paid off and said collateral discharged and that said insurance policy was not collateral security for any other indebtedness due relator bank, and that relator had failed and refused to deliver up to Thompson the collateral notes and the said insurance policy and that relator was in fact indebted to Thompson. Among other things, said cross-bill prayed that relator be required to surrender said insurance policy to said Thompson and that an accounting be had, etc. Relator, as plaintiff in said suit, filed its reply, which need not be noticed. On March 20, 1912, said cause of St. Charles Savings Bank v. J. W. Thompson was, by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, referred to a referee to try all of the issues. Whether said referee held any hearings at that time does not appear. On April 30, 1914, plaintiff (relator here) entered its voluntary nonsuit and the court entered an order which appeared on its face to be a dismissal of the cause.

No further action was taken in said case of Bank v. Thompson for over twelve years after the entry of such order. On or about May 3, 1926, J. W. Thompson died. Relator then took steps to collect an insurance policy which was issued by the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York for $ 20,000 upon the life of said J. W. Thompson. This is the same insurance policy referred to in the cross-bill filed by said Thompson in the case of Bank v. Thompson. Claiming to be the assignee of said policy and to be entitled to the proceeds thereof, relator brought suit thereon against said insurance company by filing its petition in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County on May 15, 1926.

On June 28, 1926, the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York filed its answer in said suit pending in the Circuit Court of St. Charles County. This answer admitted the execution and delivery of said policy to J. W. Thompson; that said policy had been kept in force; that said Thompson died May 3, 1926; that relator Bank had submitted proofs of Thompson's death and demanded payment of the policy under an alleged assignment to it of the proceeds thereof. Said answer then alleged the appointment of Sarah E. Thompson and Marcella Thompson Berkeley as administratrices of the estate of J. W. Thompson, deceased; that said insurance company had been notified by said administratrices not to pay the proceeds of such insurance policy to relator; that the insurance company owed the sum of $ 23,121.20 on said policy and that both relator and the estate of J. W. Thompson, deceased, were claiming to be entitled to such proceeds; that it had no interest in such proceeds, except to pay the same over to the party or parties entitled thereto; that it could not take the responsibility of determining for itself which of the claimants was entitled to the proceeds of said policy.

For the reasons above alleged said insurance company asked leave to pay the proceeds of said policy into court and that the court require the administratrices of the Thompson estate to come into court and litigate with relator bank the right to the said proceeds, etc. On December 6, 1926, the Circuit Court of St. Charles County made an order requiring that said administratrices be made parties to the case pending in said court and ordered that summons issue requiring them to appear and plead to the answer of the insurance company. This administratrices did on May 27, 1927, which was the date of issuance of the injunction above and hereafter referred to.

In the meantime, to-wit, on July 30, 1926, the death of J. W Thompson was suggested in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in the case of St. Charles Savings Bank v. J. W. Thompson, in order to revive said case upon defendant's answer and cross-bill. An order was made in said court on October 26, 1926, reviving said suit in the names of the administratrices of the estate of J. W. Thompson, deceased. Relator appeared in said court and took...